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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a study of deinstitutionalisation seeking to understand the evolvement 
of deinstitutionalisation process via the lens of sensemaking. It does so by 
conducting an in-depth qualitative, case study-based empirical study of the 
processual nature of deinstitutionalisation and the significance of organisational 
sensemaking during the deinstitutionalisation process. An interdisciplinary approach 
is adopted drawing insights from various literatures including institutional theory, 
sensemaking and social psychology. The need for greater understanding of the 
deinstitutionalisation phenomenon, especially its process is acknowledged after 
relevant literatures are reviewed. The potential of using microanalysis in examining 
the deinstitutionalisation process is demonstrated. The sensemaking perspective is 
thus used to facilitate this processual research. 
The findings emerged from this thesis have important implications for the theoretical 
development of institutional changes, sensemaking and especially 
deinstitutionalisation. First of all, the model and evidence sheds some light on the 
nature and development of the deinstitutionalisation process. Secondly, the analytic 
capacity of the institutional theory especially its descriptive and predictive contents 
are tested in the context of evolving institutions. The relative strengths of regulative, 
cognitive and nonnative influences in non-conventional cultural and institutional 
contexts extend our knowledge of institutional change and effects. Using 
sensemaking perspective, the findings also demonstrate the role and power of 
resistance during institutional processes and explain the possibility of multiple paces 
and outcomes within a single deinstitutionalisation process. As for sensemaking, 
crisis sensemaking will be examined in a new context: disaster-struck but not life-
ii 
threatening. In practical tenns, this study is carried out in an organisational context 
therefore it has relevant managerial implications. Knowledge gathered here should 
offer useful insights for businesses, especially managers. 
iii 
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CHAPTER! 
Introduction 
Our knowledge of deinstitutionalisation is limited, mostly because 
deinstitutionalisation has been deemed only a by-product of institutional change 
(Maguire and Hardy, 2009) and not recognised as a proper subject matter. Is it true 
that deinstitutionalisation is merely a consequence of institutional change like 
previously thought or is it a significant, complex phenomenon that requires greater 
attention in its own right? Deinstitutionalisation indicates the breakdown of deep-
rooted institutions, which is gravely destructive, potentially more so than institutional 
change is (Oliver, 1992). If they are two separate phenomena indeed, our current 
understanding of deinstitutionalisation has barely scratched the surface. 
In seeking to enhance our knowledge of institutional processes and organisational 
behaviours, the use of theoretical perspectives and analytic tools examining 
microdynamics has been popular among social science researchers. Sensemaking is 
one of such approaches. According to (Weick, 1 995), sensemaking is a vital 
individual and organisational activity taken in response to unexpected and confusing 
events. Sensemaking is particularly critical in challenging situations where the need 
to create consistent shared understandings and mental framework to enable collective 
action holds the key to survival (Weick, 1993). Organisational sensemaking is 
therefore as much enlightening about how we react to organisational crises (Gephart, 
1993) as it is about identity construction (Pratt, 2000). Given its focus on 
microprocesses and its ability to explain organisational and individual behaviours 
under disruptive and stressful situations, the employment of sensemaking perspective 
in the investigation of deinstitutionalisation might present the missing part of the 
puzzle as it helps unveil the rationales behind organisational responses, the course of 
1 
action as well as explain the diversity of outcomes of institutional and organisational 
restructuring undertaken when old institutions collapse. 
To examine deinstitutionalisation dynamics, I will investigate the national 
Vietnamese power company. Besides the wealth of infonnation this case has to offer 
regarding its transfonnation from central planning mechanism to the new system, 
this thesis was motivated by my personal interest in research about Vietnam. As one 
of the 'children' of the country, as we Vietnamese often refer to ourselves, I have 
always wanted to explore its rich history and cultural heritage and to playa part in 
introducing my homeland to the world. As a management student, I want to use my 
knowledge to understand the Vietnamese economy and businesses. During my 
education, one of the questions I often asked myself was 'What makes us different 
from other economies?' Thinking back, Vietnam is always at the back of my mind, 
the one reference I keep coming back to. My decision to do this PhD project all came 
down to this curiosity. When I first started thinking about the Vietnamese economy 
and its history to the present day, I was immediately drawn to institutional theory by 
its advocacy of broad institutional contexts. For me, it is always about the "Whys" -
why people are compelled to behave in certain ways, why Vietnam chose to be a 
socialist country and why market socialism, not capitalism was chosen to be the new 
ideal. Institutional theory gave me some but not all of the answers. I found that 
models of institutional change could not quite depict the depth of the problems, the 
intense pressures within the Vietnamese economy on the eve of its fall in 1985, or 
the extent of struggle for solutions and recovery. I needed a model capable of 
explaining phenomena like the Vietnamese economic refonn in 1986 and today's 
financial crisis in the West - catastrophe-motivated transfonnation and to-the-core-
deep problems. 
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In this chapter, I will discuss the research focus, its relevance and contributions to 
management studies, followed by the conceptualisation of deinstitutionalisation. 
Research questions will then be fonnulated based on current gaps of the literature 
and research methodology will be presented. Finally, an overview of the thesis 
concludes the chapter. 
1.1 Research focus 
This thesis is a study of deinstitutionalisation as a distinctive phenomenon, which is 
motivated by the view that deinstitutionalisation, in fact, is different from 
institutional change. This is a promising area of investigation partly because it has 
been subjected to little enquiry in the past. Existing studies on deinstitutionalisation 
include such empirical domains as pennanent employment in Japan (Ahmadjian & 
Robinson, 2001); American marriage (eherlin, 2004); beer consumption (Hiaat, Shin 
and Tolbert, 2009); the decline in the use of DDT (Maguire and Hardy, 2009). This 
study contributes to the literature by developing a sensemaking perspective on 
deinstitutionalisation in organisational settings. In particular, the focus is on the 
process triggered by destabilising conditions or crisis and shaped by the interaction 
between external environments and finn characteristics. A disaster-driven concept of 
deinstitutionalisation is particularly relevant nowadays for we are witnessing 
organisations and even large fields like the financial sector struggle to deal with the 
crumbling of long-standing institutions. Understanding the discourse of 
deinstitutionalisation, not just the outcomes, gives better indications of where the 
recovery plan might go wrong and possible solutions to set it right. 
The approach adopted here is an interdisciplinary one. In order to understand the link 
between institutional processes and sensemaking, a new theoretical framework is 
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needed, which integrates theoretical foundations from management studies and social 
psychology of organisations. Notwithstanding, this is ultimately a study of 
organisations, their management institutions and the thoughts and behaviours of their 
people. It therefore strongly relates to studies of organisational behaviours and 
strategic management. 
By definition, deinstitutionalisation starts where existing institutions in core 
organisational areas fail to provide meanings, schema (mental framework) and 
guidance to behaviours in daily routines, leading to the abandonment of these 
institutions. Deinstitutionalisation is caused by ill-timed, insufficient actions when 
old institutions have become obsolete with surrounding environments to the extent 
that mere institutional change would not resolve the problems. This failure beckons 
the emergence of new ones, the ones endowed with brand new appropriate logics 
hence capable of bringing orders back into the out-of-shape system. 
Deinstitutionalisation process is the transitional period where it (often but not 
necessarily always) starts off with some kind of upheaval associated with a 
possibility of major disruption. There are various degrees of deinstitutionalisation. 
Indicators of deinstitutionalisation can range from mere weakening of old beliefs to 
the complete abandonment of existing practices (Oliver, 1992). Examples of 
deinstitutionalisation can be found in many aspects of both organisational life and 
normal circumstances. They are parts of evaluation exercises that we all do, 
consciously or unconsciously, where we find existing ways of thinking, doing things 
are no longer appropriate and we actively seek for more competent replacements. In 
modern day history, phenomena like the departure of socialism and the closed market 
system in many Eastern European and Asian economies or more recently, the crisis 
of financial system in Europe are among the best exemplars of deinstitutionalisation. 
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In every case, it starts with a disaster (in case of European financial market) or a 
major disruption (in the fonn ofperfonnance crisis in socialist markets). 
Deinstitutionalisation is an organisational process worthy of interests and 
investigation in its own right because the deinstitutionalisation process is marked 
with an unknown, unstable and often dangerous situation with a sense of emergency 
that warrants close and immediate attention. Dramatic measures are often required in 
order to repair problems of such magnitude. Needless to say, failure to make sense of 
the situations at hand inevitably results in catastrophic breakdown of the entire 
organisational system. The manner by which this event is handled hence detennines 
the survival of the whole organisation. The mere recognition of the need for 
alternatives marks the beginning of deinstitutionalisation process even though signs 
of deinstitutionalisation might not yet be visible. Later on, new philosophies and 
practices are substituted for old ones, signalling a more advanced stage of 
deinstitutionalisation. 
The pivotal role sensemaking plays during the whole deinstitutionalisation process is 
unquestionable; but perhaps, further elaboration is needed as to the particular kind of 
sensemaking undertaken at different points in the deinstitutionalisation process. In a 
nutshell, sensemaking is an ongoing mental activity undergone with or without the 
agent's awareness. This notion emphasises the distinction between conscious or sub-
conscious sensemaking (Weick, 1995). The fact that deinstitutionalisation might get 
underway the very moment individuals start to question the credibility of the ideals 
they hold so dear, yet have the initiative to take action illustrates the ability of sub-
conscious sensemaking to isolate the inconsistencies hidden in the taken-for-granted 
institutions. On the contrary, conscious sensemaking is activated by tangible 
disruptions whereby some problematic events directly call for action. These events 
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signify the moment that individuals switch from sub-conscious to conscious 
sensemaking in a bid to restore the lost orders and to create a more competent 
alternative. These events are therefore referred to as 'switching events' applied to the 
sensemaking process during deinstitutionalisation. 
The crisis-driven conceptualisation of deinstitutionalisation bears some similarities 
with the notion of "critical period", which is defined as the period of the unfolding of 
a disaster, (Stein, 2004, p.1244). The critical period follows the incubation period 
and begins with precipitating events caused by disasters (Stein, 2004). Although both 
institutional changes and deinstitutionalisation are motivated by changes in the 
surrounding environments (social, political and functional factors discussed by 
Oliver, 1992), institutional changes are incremental in nature whereas 
deinstitutionalisation should be viewed as radical transformation. Moreover, while 
both processes are driven by institutional failures, institutional change occurs when 
problems lie in non-core areas of institutions and these problems are acknowledged 
and dealt with in a timely manner and accurately. In other words, core aspects of the 
institutions in question must remain relevant in the present environments and to 
organisational performance. On the contrary, deinstitutionalisation commences when 
no adjustment has been made to poorly performed but pivotal aspects of institutions 
leading to disastrous situations and a replacement of the obsolete old system 
eventually. From this perspective, incremental institutional change welcomes a 
mixture of old and new institutions whilst for deinstitutionalisation, the most 
signature aspects of the old institutions are no longer desired for they are the cause of 
devastating institution failures. The expected outcomes of deinstitutionalisation are 
rightly the desertion of old institutions replaced with brand new alternatives or the 
return of previously successful institutions. 
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In this respect, conceptualisation of deinstitutionalisation in this study follows the 
same argument proposed by Weber and Glynn (2006). Here, the way events 
associated with institutions initiate deinstitutionalisation thus providing occasions for 
conscious sensemaking IS also the triggering mechanism institutions have on 
sensemaking discussed 10 Weber and Glynn (2006). The authors offer three 
mechanisms (priming, editing, triggering) that institutions might influence 
sensemaking, apart from exerting constraints. My study of deinstitutionalisation, 
however, focuses on the triggering and constraining effect i.e. how institutional 
inconsistencies pave the way for events that set off deinstitutionalisation and how 
institutions provoke resistance or impetus for the deinstitutionalisation process. 
Though priming and editing mechanisms do not explicitly feature, their presence can 
be noticed during the "social negotiation" stage of the deinstitutionalisation process. 
My study augments Weber and Glynn's paper by elaborating the interrelationship 
among these mechanisms and its role in shaping the sensemaking process. Initiated 
by the triggering effect, sensemaking facilitates institution transformation, yet is still 
constrained by old institutional traits. This constraining effect continues to work 
alongside priming and editing mechanisms throughout the whole discourse of 
deinstitutionalisation. On the one hand, old institutions limit which cues get noticed 
to agents (against those highlighted by institutional entrepreneurs) and hinder their 
acceptance of new ideas. On the other hand, institutions edit sensemaking at the 
organisational level via the process of social negotiation and justification. And lastly, 
priming enables agents to accept and adapt to new identities created by new 
institutions by highlighting the prominent aspects of new identity within the current 
situational context. These mechanisms work together and sometimes against one 
another (constraining and triggering effects) in shaping the sensemaking process 
hence the pace and outcome of deinstitutionalisation. 
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The use of sensemaking insights to explain deinstitutionalisation in this study, rather 
than any other cognitive approach is partly motivated by the limited capability of 
cognitive factors (such as perception and interpretation) to explain an unprecedented 
phenomenon full of unknown elements like deinstitutionalisation. By 
"interpretation", the act is meant as an attempt to understand the meanings and 
relationship of data that is already in comprehensible and logical forms. 
Interpretation is therefore an allocation act of putting data into categories so they can 
be accessed at a later stage. On the contrary, sensemaking is the act of exploration 
and discovery where the unknown, illogical and incomprehensible at first can be 
given some meanings and connection to the pre-existing mental framework. This is 
exactly the reason why cognitive factors like perceptions are not able to grasp the 
nature of deinstitutionalisation because for an unprecedented events filled with 
uncertainty, ambiguity and anxiety, old perceptions are no longer useful and there is 
no readily accessible data for new perceptions to form. Before data become 
interpretable and useful, they must be recognised as relevant and important. This is 
the act of making sense. In addition, cognitive approaches view individuals largely as 
information processors and do not conceptualise them to have feelings. emotions, 
faith and motives. In contrast, sensemaking offers more useful insights by digging 
deep down to the utmost motive of why sensemaking and interpretation is made in 
the first place. The answer is identity construction; in other words, the threat to 
identity individuals experience when challenged by uncertain and threatening events. 
Generally, sensemaking is able to accommodate phenomena with disruptions and 
disaster in nature because the simplest way to describe sensemaking is order, 
interruption and recovery (Weick, 2005). The process of deinstitutionalisation is very 
much similar, with old institutions in place (orders), switching events followed 
antecedents to deinstitutionalisation (interruption) and then restoration of orders and 
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replacement of alternative institutions (recovery). Finally, while the cognitive 
process can be solitary and individualistic activities, sensemaking is not. 
Sensemaking is conceptualised by Weick as a social process that captures the reality 
and complexity of real organisation life where power and personal motives play a 
crucial role, not just cognitive capacity. For all these reasons, the sensemaking 
perspective with a more psycho-sociological approach is indeed more useful and 
appropriate for the research into deinstitutionalisation than cognitive approaches. 
Weick's theory of sensemaking provides a useful starting point; however, it needs to 
be developed to enclose emotions, appreciation of institutional context and power 
variables to offer more sophisticated understandings of individual and organisational 
sensemaking and for the study of deinstitutionalisation. 
1.2 Research aims and questions 
Given the lack of theoretical and empirical work on deinstitutionalisation, this 
research aims to use sensemaking insights to investigate deinstitutionalisation 
processes. In addition to considering the antecedents of deinstitutionalisation, my 
study intends to elaborate the whole discourse starting from the manner in which old 
institutions are disrupted, the switching events that prompt radical transformation, 
the course of restoration and alternative institutional creation. Secondly, in an 
attempt to augment our understanding of institutional effects and organisational 
behaviours, this study draws on sensemaking theory to document how 
deinstitutionalisation is influenced by both initiators and recipients of 
deinstitutionalisation. It is suggested that the ways leaders (sensegivers) and 
employees (sensetakers) make sense of the need for abandonment of old institutions 
and the acceptance of new orders play decisive roles in the outcome and pace of 
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deinstitutionalisation. Accordingly, this study is guided and shaped by two specific 
research questions as follows: 
Question 1: How does the deinstitutionalisation process unfold? 
Question 1 focuses on a broad picture of the deinstitutionalisation process, which is 
the process where old and stable institutions are challenged or delegitimated, 
resulting in the breakdown of daily routines that instigates the search for lost 
meanings (via sensemaking) and this restoration of order paves the way for new 
institutions. Deinstitutionalisation is not voluntarily welcomed but rather forced upon 
organisations that have failed to resolve problems in core areas of institutions. 
Antecedents to transformation are problems that exist for a considerable period of 
time but remain unsolved or even unidentified. Functional, political and social actors 
such as performance problems, change of leadership, workforce diversity, change of 
social expectations and styles can be expected to play a significant role. As 
deinstitutionalisation sets in motion, the pace and outcome of the process depend on 
both internal and external factors. Among others, governments and societal factors 
might be as influential as internal organisational factors such as cognitive capacity, 
institutional agents (leadership), emotions (anxiety tolerance and emotional 
intelligence), the organisational power structure and communication style. These 
variables interact with one another; their complex and far-reaching interrelationship 
has a significant impact on sensemaking at both individual and organisational levels. 
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Question 2: What impact does organisational sensemaking have on the pace 
and outcome of the deinstitutionalisation process? 
Question 2 plans to explore the sensemaking mechanisms underlying organisational 
response to deinstitutionalisation challenges, which are assumed to significantly 
influence the rate of institutional transformation (Le. the pace of 
deinstitutionalisation) and the final outcome of deinstitutionalisation. Faced with 
unprecedented and uncertain times, sensemaking insights enlighten how individuals 
are affected by confusion towards the nature and consequences of unexpected events 
or by emotions (likely negative) evoked from these disturbances. Accordingly, 
sensemaking might enable or hinder the process of deinstitutionalisation (via 
resistance), depending on the length of the sensemaking process and in which 
direction selected cues and social negotiation take sensemaking. For instance, 
deinstitutionalisation is said to proceed at a low pace (or even comes to complete 
stop) if the sensemaking process takes longer to complete due to low anxiety 
tolerance (or preference for certainty), lack of cues, failure to reach consensus among 
alternative interpretations, disagreement with leaders and high degree of 
embeddedness of old institutions. 
1.3 Research setting and methodology 
The empirical setting is set in the context of a state-owned enterprise of the 
Vietnamese power sector. In the last few decades, this company has undergone 
significant changes. Since the intensive economic reform in 1986, the new 
philosophy 'market socialism' has completely transformed the country endorsing 
new management practices and organisational forms. It has been nearly thirty years 
since the company was granted the autonomy over operations, long enough for new 
business know-how to be institutionalised and new institutions to take shape. This 
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case particularly suits the purpose of my study for the transition to the new 
institutions is well on its way yet unfinished. This means that the significance of 
sensemaking can be captured while the deinstitutionalisation process unfolds. 
Besides, the new institutions have become reasonably well-established providing rich 
information for analysis. 
The empirical investigation is directed by a combination of approaches. Firstly, this 
thesis is designed as a longitudinal study (Poole, Van de Ven, Dooley and Holmes, 
2000) of a processual research (Dawson, 1997; Hinings, 1997; Pettigrew, 1990). 
Secondly, the research aims are facilitated by the narrative approach (Elliot, 2005) 
and case study (Cassell and Symon, 2010; Yin, 2009) where data collection utilises 
multiple sources including documentaries and semi-structured, in-depth interviews 
triangulated with observations (Marshall and Rossman, 2011 ; Dawson, 1997). 
Participant selection is guided by purposive, theoretical and networking sampling 
methods (Silverman, 2010; Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Saunders et ai, 2007). Multi-
level analysis (Yin, 2009; Scott, 2001) is carried out at institutional, organisational 
and individual levels using the content analysis method (Krippendorff, 2004; 
Belreson, 1952; Holsti, 1969; Babbie, 2010). And finally, between-unit and within-
unit methods of analysis (Pettigrew, 1997) are used in combination with temporal 
bracketing (Langley, 1999) to comprehend the depth of data. 
1.4 Contributions of the thesis 
This thesis proposes to make five main contributions to the literatures of institutional 
theory, sensemaking and organisational studies in general. The first and most 
important contribution of the thesis is its conceptualisation and theoretical 
framework of deinstitutionalisation process. It aims to articulate the development of 
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events/factors that directly set off, progress and conclude deinstitutionalisation 
process. At the very least, this model enhances our knowledge of 
deinstitutionalisation as a subject and at best it allows us to make predictions for 
similar phenomenon elsewhere. 
Traditionally, institutional and sensemaking theories have been situated at opposite 
ends of research spectrum - one focused on macrostates, the other privileging micro 
organisational dynamics. This study argues that these theories need not be mutually 
exclusive and their marriage can be the ideal one. Institutional theory has been 
mostly criticised for its neglect of microfoundations just like sensemaking faulted for 
the lack of appreciation for broader perspectives. I suggest that each can offer what 
the other cannot. For this reason, I draw on the two bodies of literature to build the 
model of deinstitutionalisation process. Sensemaking accounts and sensemaking 
process, especially at organisational level shed light on the interactions between the 
initiators and receivers of deinstitutionalisation and their negotiations of new social 
orders. The study also focuses on the results of negotiations in respect to 
deinstitutionalisation outcomes. As such, the second contribution this thesis makes is 
to the stream researching the collaboration of sensemaking and institutional theory, 
which is also rare with (Weber and Glynn, 2006) as one of a very few. Here, the 
process of organisational sensemaking is a means to an end employed to explain the 
diversity of deinstitutionalisation process. 
As for empirical contribution, the thesis investigates the transitional process of old 
Confucian and central planning institutions into the scientific management of 
contemporary organisations in Vietnam. In doing so, this study contributes to the 
literature on institutional change as an exploration of institutional process in a 
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different setting and to the literature on international organisation studies where 
research on Vietnam is presently rare. 
Judged on its other merits, this study additionally portrays organisational 
sensemaking as the platform for emotions, political interests, cognition and social 
communication to come together. The model assesses the relative importance of 
these factors, individually and collectively during the process of organisational 
sensemaking and provides a different interpretation of sensemaking during critical 
situations (not life-threatening but catastrophic all the same). This is the fourth 
contribution, one particularly pertaining to the sensemaking literature. 
The last contribution this thesis intends to offer is a different view on cnSlS 
sensemaking - urgent and critical but not life-threatening. Understanding of the 
differences in collective sensemaking process and conflicts resolution should offer 
new insights and augment existing work on crisis sensemaking. 
1.5 Chapter outline 
Having set out the focus of the thesis, which is guided by two research questions, this 
introductory chapter ends with the outline of the structure and content of the 
subsequent chapters. 
In chapter 2, the basic foundations and mainstream research of sensemaking and 
institutional theory together with important areas of each literature are critically 
reviewed. Strengths and weaknesses, existing gaps and directions for further research 
are examined. Taking the interdisciplinary approach, the chapter argues that there are 
sufficient grounds to support the collaboration of the two bodies of literature, 
especially in the investigation of deinstitutionalisation, which is an under-developed 
area of institutional theory. 
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The research questions are developed theoretically in chapter 3. Here, the view of 
deinstitutionalisation as a process, rather than a one-off phenomenon, is articulated 
by a model explaining the origins, progression of events and their aftermath with 
internal and external moderating factors implicitly presented. The focus of study is 
narrowed further by putting deinstitutionalisation in the context of organisations and 
the transformation of their management practices. The interrelations between 
institutions and organisations are made central to the picture via the examination of 
factors deemed to impinge upon the whole process. The process of crisis-triggered 
active organisational sensemaking during deinstitutionalisation is then described. 
This process displays an overall picture of the discourse of reshaping lost orders. In 
doing so, it also reveals the impediments and accelerators therein and explicitly 
recognises them in the categorisation of collective sensemaking, collective response 
and deinstitutionalisation outcomes. 
Chapter 4 presents the research design and process that drive empirical investigation. 
It explains why for the topic of the deinstitutionalisation process, the overall 
approach (processual as opposed to content) is deemed appropriate, how a 
qualitative, longitudinal and single-cased design has more to offer than cross-
sectional design, why interviews triangulated with observations is chosen as the main 
method to gather operational data and why multi-level content analysis is helpful to 
the purposes at hand. The reasons behind the selection of this particular case study 
are discussed and details on sampling, data collection and management procedures 
are also given. Especially designed to examine the interplay between sensemaking 
and institutions, the strategies used for data analysis - temporal bracketing and 
within-case comparison are rationalised. Indirectly, the chapter shows that the 
benefits of the merger between institutional theory and sensemaking extend beyond 
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conceptual and theoretical grounds. In the study of deinstitutionalisation augmented 
by insights from sensemaking, the two stances are methodologically compatible. The 
chapter concludes with discussion of limitations and methodological reflections. 
Chapters 5-8 deal with the findings of empirical work; each has its own individual 
objective but in combination they add to our understanding of the 
deinstitutionalisation process and organisational sensemaking in the following ways. 
Chapter 5 primarily focuses on setting the background of the entire study where the 
historical context and institutional evolution are discussed. The path dependency 
approach helps pinpoint the origins of the management institutions of modem-day 
organisations. Also here, intrinsic features of old institutions are examined and their 
inconsistencies identified as the antecedents of subsequent transformation. Chapter 6 
examines the nature of switching events, their effects and the extent of their 
consequences. The second half of the chapter marks the beginning of the institutional 
transformation process with the birth of a new sensemaking account and the resultant 
organisational restructuring to accommodate its logics. Notwithstanding the same 
focus of institutional transformation, chapters 6 and 7 differ in their approaches, 
which look at the higher level of industrial/organisational makeover and 
microfoundations of sensemaking adjustment respectively. At the end of chapter 7, 
the progress of deinstitutionalisation is assessed and features of new institutions are 
established based on the sensemaking accounts previously discussed. Chapter 8 
offers another view of organisational sensemaking but with a different focal point. 
Unlike chapter 7 which is more concerned with the content of sensemaking accounts, 
chapter 8 is given over to describing the process of making sense in organisational 
context. In other words, it elaborates the dynamics of the organisational sensemaking 
process and scrutinises all the decisions and negotiations taken for those collective 
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sensemaking accounts to be agreed upon. The last part of chapter 8 concludes the 
empirical section by contributing each type of organisational sensemaking to specific 
deinstitutionalisation outcome. 
In the final chapter, chapter 9, the main findings are summarised concentrating on 
giving answers to the two research questions, namely the evolvement of 
deinstitutionalisation and the link between organisational sensemaking and 
deinstitutionalisation outcomes. The primary model proposed early on in the thesis is 
revised to incorporate insights from empirical work. The discussion goes beyond the 
two questions and provides an in-depth examination of the implications for 
theoretical development of institutional theory and deinstitutionalisation as well as 
managerial implications for businesses, especially managers. The chapter also 
discusses directions for further research and ends with a summary of its main 
contributions and some concluding remarks. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Institutions and Sensemaking: An overview 
2.1 Introduction 
Despite its potential contribution, research on deinstitutionalisation is exceptionally 
limited (Maguire and Hardy, 2009; Ahmadjian and Robinson, 2001). In some rare 
cases, it was indirectly studied as "a by-product of research on the adoption of new 
practices" (Maguire and Hardy, 2009). Deinstitutionalisation deserves its share of 
attention because institutional change is hardly feasible without the disintegration of 
existing institutions. The study of the deinstitutionalisation process hence offers 
details of the dynamics of the transitional phase that studies of institutional effects 
alone cannot. 
Sensemaking and institutional theory have been known as alternative explanations of 
organisational behaviours. While the central theme of sensemaking is microdynamics 
of organisations advocating meanings as the foundation of organisation identity and 
behaviours, institutional theory sees institutionalised and taken-for-granted contexts 
as the constraints on organisational actions. With differences running deeper than 
just the level of analysis, these two schools of thOUght appear to have little 
connection with one another (Weber and Glynn, 2006) but will be shown to be 
compatible with each other in due course. 
The rest of the chapter starts with previous research on deinstitutionalisation. The 
following sections will critically review two bodies of literature the insights of which 
are extensively drawn upon to facilitate the investigation of the deinstitutionalisation 
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process: institutional theory and sensemaking. Given the broad range of topics 
covered by these two major theories, only those deemed directly relevant will be 
examined. For institutional theory, these include the cognitive dimension of 
institutionalisation; concepts highlighting the role and behaviours of institutional 
agents, such as agency and legitimacy, as well as the microprocesses of institutional 
transformation. Here, the individuals receive as much attention as do institutions 
since the thesis seeks to understand the discourse and consequences of the interaction 
between the two parties. For sensemaking literature, Weick's properties and 
occasions for sensemaking are considered which provide the substances for the 
analysis of the sensemaking process during deinstitutionalisation. Other areas of 
sensemaking are then reviewed - crisis sensemaking, sensemaking as a social and 
political process, sensemaking and emotions and finally sensemaking and 
institutions. Insights from these are valuable because, conceptually, this thesis 
proposes that deinstitutionalisation (as a cognitive, social, political and emotional 
process) is essentially caused by crisis, which evokes profound emotions. The section 
on sensemaking and institutions aims to illustrate the move towards macro elements 
of sensemaking in recent years. Finally, developments in the two literatures are 
brought together to explain the rationale for the integration of the two in 
investigating deinstitutionalisation. In doing so, it shows that insights from 
sensemaking, which takes place in an institutionalised environment, facilitates 
understanding of deinstitutionalisation and contributes to linguistic development of 
institutional theory. The unity of the two theories not only satisfies our curiosity 
about a poorly researched phenomenon - deinstitutionalisation - but it also 
conveniently addresses the weaknesses of each branch of the literature; namely the 
lack of appreciation for institutional context and agency in sensemaking and 
institutional theory correspondingly. 
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2.2 Deinstitutionalisation 
Early studies were more concerned with the construction and the convergence 
process of institutions e.g. institution creation (Teece, 1981; Moe, 1990) and 
institution maintenance and diffusion (Greenwood and Hinnings, 1996; chapter by 
Jepperson and Meyer in Powell and DiMaggio, 1991) than they were with the 
antecedences of institutional change. Not until the last decade have researchers 
begun to study the pre-conditions that precipitate institutional change and 
deinstitutionalisation. Scott (2001) recognises the significant contribution, but less-
developed framework of deinstitutionalisation in saying that "it is useful to place 
studies of deinstitutionalisation in a broader context of institutional change, since the 
weakening and disappearance of one set of beliefs and practices is likely to be 
associated with the arrival of new beliefs and practices" (p. 184). It is argued that the 
dynamic nature of the institutionalisation process has been ignored, leaving theorists 
struggling to explain organisational behaviour and institutional change in some 
situations. How will the shared social meanings and legitimacy of actions explain the 
abandonment of industry standards resulting from the failure of organisations to 
share understanding and approval? Without the knowledge on conditions 
precipitating deinstitutionalisation and institutional change, traditional literature 
failed to explain changes in the status quo where habits and nonns become obsolete 
in the face of deteriorating common beliefs. Secondly, if institutions are not expected 
to exercise the same power, with the same degree across situations, then how can 
early literature judge the extent of manipulation institutional pressures have upon 
organisations? Theoretical development of deinstitutionalisation seeks to answer 
these puzzles, suggesting that under various conditions, institutionalised practices 
will be vulnerable to resistance. 
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Surprisingly, there is a huge gap in the current literature in terms of research on 
deinstitutionalisation. One possible explanation is that deinstitutionalisation is often 
seen as by-product to institutional change as changes are inevitable consequences 
once old institutions deinstitutionalise (Maguire and Hardy, 2009). Despite this 
similarity, deinstitutionalisation is qualitatively different from institutional change. 
While both processes are driven by institutional failures, institutional change occurs 
when these problems are acknowledged and dealt with accurately and in a timely 
manner. In other words, the institutions in question must remain relevant in present 
environments and to organisational performance. Deinstitutionalisation takes place 
when no adjustment has been made to poorly performing institutions leading to 
disastrous situations which in tum trigger replacement of these obsolete and 
irrelevant institutions. Insights on antecedents, process, outcome, characters and 
indicators of deinstitutionalisation can shed some light on how institutions are 
created as the abandon of one institution is likely to be associated with the arrival of 
new one. Given its importance and potential in augmenting our knowledge of 
institutional artefacts, deinstitutionalisation as a phenomenon in its own right 
deserves much more attention than it presently receives. 
Among others, Oliver (1992) gIves one of the most comprehensive theoretical 
backgrounds on deinstitutionalisation. She identifies three major (external and 
organisational) sources of pressure on mature institutionalised practices: functional, 
political and social. Functional pressures can be performance-driven or be traced 
back to variations in derived utility resulting from conflicts between organisational 
effectiveness and requirements of institutional rules. A collection of studies in 2002 
by various authors, such as Thornton, Lounsbury, Lee and Pennings and Kraatz and 
Moore, investigate a wide set of factors that challenge the functional capacity of 
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institutionalised activities, including resource competition and market acquisitions 
and shifts in institutional logics and performance pressures. In these cases, demand 
for efficiency contradicts institutional logics and/or destabilised events lead to re-
evaluation of established rules and practices. 
The second category Oliver (1992) noted is the political pressures which jeopardise 
the legitimacy of its holders. This set of pressures can be endogenous or exogenous 
(environmental factors). The former consists of changes in power distribution and 
growing power of representatives whose interests are incompatible with the status 
quo whilst the latter can be caused by external demand to adopt innovative measures 
or lessening dependence on outside funding. Townley (2002) and Greenwood and 
Suddaby (2006) elaborate how external forces, such as professional associations and 
government intervention, can alter institutions that were thought to be stable. 
Both functional and political pressures are assumed to be known and can be acted 
upon by organisations. Nevertheless, organisations are not only influenced by factors 
they are consciously aware of. There are sets of social pressures precipitating 
deinstitutionalisation that are subtle and might not be obvious yet are truly 
influential. These conditions include disruptions to organisational practices (high 
turnover, increasing workforce diversity) and changes in societal nonns and values. 
The resultant transformations might not be transparent to agents because these 
changes might not require immediate adaptations. Only after a certain period of 
constant conflict between the old and the new do mounting pressures eventually 
trigger deinstitutionalisation. Findings by Zitber (2002) confirm Oliver's theory: the 
entrance of new participants modifies interpretative frameworks of organisational 
behaviour. These three initiatives of change originating from both within and outside 
organisation's sphere of influence exert dissimilar power in different situations but 
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state and societal forces are among the most critical sources (Powell and DiMaggio, 
1991). Several of these factors can interact as well as compete with one other. 
The theoretical paper on deinstitutionalisation by Oliver (1992) is a rare example of 
empirical study of deinstitutionalisation. Other such studies include Ahmadjian and 
Robinson (2001) on permanent employment in Japan; Cherlin (2004) on American 
marriage; Hiaat, Shin and Tolbert (2009) on beer consumption; and Maguire and 
Hardy (2009) on the use of DDT. These papers examine the reform of practices in 
various fields, as the result of economic pressures, social and institutional constraints 
or social movements, which in turn transform normative, cognitive and regulative 
environments of that particular field or sector. Maguire and Hardy (2009) are the first 
to examine the microprocesses of the phenomenon in detail. The authors focus on the 
process of outsider-driven deinstitutionalisation via the discourse of texts that 
delegitimate old practices. Similarly to institutionalisation, outsider-driven 
deinstitutionalisation is suggested to work via the three pillars: cognitive, normative 
and regulative. Deinstitutionalisation is feasible when outsiders are able to normalise 
problematisations of existing practices and this is done via the dissemination of texts 
that emphasise the failure of existing practices and rationalise alternatives (new 
subject positions), proving the foundation for the abandonment of such activities. 
The paper is refreshing not only because it is the first empirical study of an 
interesting but under-researched phenomenon like deinstitutionalisation, but because 
it represents the new development of organisational research and institutional theory, 
in particular the application of microprocesses in seeking the explanation of changes 
of macrostates. Not only does it elaborate the process of deinstitutionalisation thus 
revealing the 'black box' linking antecedents and outcomes of institutional change, 
but the authors have done so by explaining how meanings are modified (via texts) 
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before new discourse and institutions are approved and by highlighting the power of 
agents and their defensive work against forces trying to undennine the old 
institutions. 
Oliver (1992) and Maguire and Hardy (2009), each in their own way, raise our 
attention to various areas of interest. Oliver (1992) breaks the nonnal consensus that 
institutions are stable and immune to attacks once institutionalised. Instead, the 
author points out social, political and functional factors that might destabilise or even 
cause the abandonment of well-matured institutions. Insightful as it is, Oliver's 
theoretical paper focuses only on the antecedents or the content of institutional 
artefacts. There still remains a 'black box' between the antecedences and outcomes 
of deinstitutionalisation. Maguire and Hardy's study (2009) is the first answer, 
among many to come, which takes process as its focal point. In addition, the authors 
link discourse and translation with the process of deinstitutionalisation in explaining 
the loss of legitimacy of stable institutions as well as the methods and instruments 
used for their replacement by new ones. Although incredibly insightful, Maguire and 
Hardy's study (2009) pictures deinstitutionalisation merely as a social and cognitive 
process. Provided that deinstitutionalisation is related to some kind of upheaval or 
disruption to old practices, the process of deinstitutionalisation is likely to cause 
emotional outburst. Insights from psychology are therefore vital to the understanding 
of recipients' feelings towards deinstitutionalisation and the motivation behind their 
responses. In addition, Maguire and Hardy (2009) concentrate only on outsider-
driven deinstitutionalisation where meanings and texts are already in accessible 
fonns for later translation. This might not always be the case. In the real world, many 
organisational environments are filled with uncertainty and ambiguity where there is 
no interpretable data or there is too much infonnation. In such circumstances, the 
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cognition approach alone might not be able to explain the phenomenon. 
Sensemaking, on the contrary, is a useful choice since sensemaking is born out of 
uncertainty and is the most effective instrument to deal with disruptions. 
Sensemaking does not work on existing data in interpretable forms; it works by 
plausibility wherein it is essential to keep on acting to know whether the decision is 
right or wrong. Understanding of the current state is revised continuously and is 
driven by possible explanations. Moreover, the sensemaking approach allows for the 
role of emotions, politics and social factors to be considered. From this standpoint, 
the process of deinstitutionalisation becomes more than just the practice of cognition 
but is now a social process where emotions and politics playa part in determining the 
outcome of deinstitutionalisation. The indeterminate nature of sensemaking also 
provides more realistic explanations of the outcomes of deinstitutionalisation as there 
is no guarantee that recipients of deinstitutionalisation are able to make sense in the 
same manner as initiators of change or even able to make sense at all. The inability to 
make sense might slow down deinstitutionalisation or even prevent the whole 
process occurring. Indeed, insights from sensemaking can help to account for various 
outcomes and paces of the deinstitutionalisation process. 
2.3 Institutional theory 
Institutional theory has risen to become a powerful explanation of both individual 
and organisational behaviours. The study of institutions covers a wide range of 
disciplines: economics, political science, history, organisational analysis and 
sociology; each has its own sets of assumptions and goals. Despite divergent 
conceptualisations and approaches, the central underlying theme of all versions of 
institutionalism is the advocacy of the analytic capacity of institutions rather than 
individuals (Peters, 1999) in providing the answer for questions on firm existence, 
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boundary, maturity and development. It is argued that by creating regularities in 
human behaviour, institutions mitigate uncertainties generated by multifaceted 
interactions among social actors (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991). In this study, the focus is only one branch: the sociological version of 
institutionalism (Scott, 2001). During the past few decades, a resurgence of interest 
in institutions - referred to as neo-institutionalism - places greater emphasis upon the 
cognitive aspect of the institutionalisation process than does the efficiency 
(economics) version. This movement is inspired by the popularity of the sociological 
theme within the literature. Significant progress was made when the concept of 
institution was developed to integrate the cultural-cognitive element, not just a 
technical principle (regulative) and an objective criterion (normative). It is now 
recognised that organisations do not merely function as technical systems but also act 
as platforms for cultures to flourish (chapter by Scott in Powell and DiMaggio, 
1991). Further progress was made by acknowledging the existence of multiple 
institutions, not just the one. Understanding of institutional effects hence becomes 
more comprehensive, being able to embrace the reality that institutions' logics are 
derived from more than one source of rationalities including governmental 
requirements, professions, the educational system and personal ideologies (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977). The interactive nature of multiple institutions is entitled to greater 
attention, given its capacity to generate various alternative formulations and 
prescriptions (Scott, 2001). 
2.3.1 The promotion of the cognitive dimension. agency and legitimacy 
The sociological literature on institutions is very rich, thereby conceptualisations can 
be confounding. Theorists in the field hold opposing views of how institutional terms 
should be defined making finding the comprehensible and united conceptualisation 
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of institution difficult. Amid this conceptual intricacy, institutions are seen by most 
theorists to possess certain qualities: resilience (resistance to change), reproducing 
ability (Zucker, 1977) and ability to constrain behaviour. Scott (2001) and Jepperson 
(chapter in Powell and DiMaggio, 1991) gave us some useful examples - among a 
vast number of treatments - of the concept of institutions. Some define institutions in 
the most general terms, such as "social structures" or "social order", which is 
attained at a certain state or degree of stability. Other conceptualisations, in contrast, 
pay greater attention to micro features, such as Scott (2001). In his work, institutions 
consist of normative, regulative and cognitive elements, which are transmitted via 
"various types of carriers (symbolic systems, relational systems, routines and 
artefacts) and operate at different levels of jurisdiction (from the world system to 
interpersonal relationships) II (p. 48). Using three pillars of institutions, Scott (2001) 
accommodates an insightful and comprehensive statement which largely captures the 
broad range of institutional terms and mechanisms. The regulative pillar is the most 
widely accepted aspect of institutions and is closely related to the conceptualisation 
of the economic version (North, 1991) in its emphasis of rules and controls. Force, 
monitoring and punishment are central ingredients of the regulatory pillar. The 
normative pillar primarily originates in the work of March and Olsen (1989); it relies 
on normative systems, such as values and norms, to introduce evaluative and 
obligatory dimensions to behaviour. Those beliefs, heavily grounded in existing 
structures or 'ways of doing things', internalised by individuals themselves or 
imposed by others, dictate behaviours of actors in certain situations. Last but not 
least, the cognitive pillar advocates the shared conceptions of social reality and the 
frameworks of how meanings of this reality are constructed. In doing so, the 
cognitive dimension concentrates on the mediation of symbolic interpretation of the 
world and the interactions through which such sensemaking is transmitted and 
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maintained among individuals. 
The promotion of the cognitive element augments sociological literature on 
institutionalism by arguing that even under the constraints of institutions, behaviours 
do not simply encompass objective conditions (advocated by old and new 
institutionalism) but also subjective interpretation of actors. Taking the sociological 
approach, cognitive capacity enables individuals to consciously and actively respond 
to institutional pressures via the process of sensemaking, interpretation and 
adaptation. Such reactions combine with institutional designs to determine the 
outcome and discourse of institutionalisation. The interaction and possibly conflict 
among these rationalities emphasises the importance of the cognitive pillar in 
providing a more complete knowledge of institutionalisation processes. 
The promotion of the cognitive side of the institutionalisation process not only offers 
a more complete set of institutional pressures, it also highlights attempts by 
researchers to discover more in-depth microanalysis thus reinforcing the role of 
agency in the institutional process. Originally, sociological theorists are criticised for 
their narrowly defined conceptualisations, concerned only with regulative and 
normative components of institutions and also for their ignorance of agency and 
interests (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). Taking this perspective, the restricted one-
way mechanism of institutionalisation process ensures that individuals are 
constrained and bounded by rules, values and norms, whose response at best is to 
conform to such controls to gain legitimacy. In this sense, early literature has treated 
institutions as exogenous variables and institutions are only supposed to affect 
superficial components of organisations like structures and practices. By endorsing 
the notion of agency, theorists move away from considering individuals as passive, 
powerless agents to posing them as an active, integral part of the institutionalisation 
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process instead. Taking one step further, agents are deemed capable of initiating 
changes hence able to influence key elements of an organisation - its logics, culture 
and identity. On these occasions, agency is at its most powerful. 
Accompanying the rising popularity of the agency concept is the emergence of an 
altered view on legitimacy and its role. Legitimacy refers to the common perception 
that actions are desirable, appropriate and materialised upon only if it is transparent 
to others. As Giddens (1984) argued, social structures, even with their power to 
restrain behaviours, will not be able to deliver such authority without the existence of 
power and legitimacy for those who possess it. By furnishing individuals with 
rewards for conforming to institutional pressures, legitimacy hence is crucial for the 
creation, diffusion and transformation of institutions (Dacin et ai, 2002). While early 
work largely viewed legitimacy as antecedent and an outcome of the 
institutionalisation process, in neo-institutionalism, legitimacy becomes a component 
of the institutionalisation process itself, for legitimacy of key actors partly governs 
how organisations respond to institutional change. It is the fact that in some 
circumstances, agents with great power, whose interests and goals contradict (or 
correspond) with institutionalisation or deinstitutionalisation, can generate a wave of 
resistance (or support) so strong that it can either delay/terminate (or 
initiate/accelerate) the whole process of institutionalisation. In other words, the 
legitimacy of key actors can either be an inhibitor or an accelerator of 
institutionalisation. Evidence shows that not only legitimacy but several other types 
of entropy and dissipation factors, interacting with one another or competing in some 
cases, can help to explain why the same institutions create dissimilar impacts under 
different settings (countries, regions, professions and organisations). 
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Weaknesses of previous work explain why institutional theory did not provide 
satisfactory answers to the question of 'why the same institutions generate different 
impacts for different groups of actors, whose shared meanings and frameworks 
supposedly lead to analogous sensemaking'. The promotion of agency and 
legitimacy in the cultural-cognitive pillar should fill the gap between old and new 
institutionalism, as well as providing a more thorough understanding of institutions 
and their participating actors allowing explanations of variations in institutional 
effects and outcomes. The concept of agency in a controlled institutional context is 
paradoxical nevertheless. The paradox of embedded agency in institutional theory is 
often referred to as the tension between structure and agency (Garud et ai, 2007). On 
the one hand, the cohesive nature of institutional constraints makes it difficult for 
actors to escape from them; it is this solid structure that embeds actors in pre-existing 
regulative, formative and cognitive frameworks. Here, institutions create stability 
and reduce human action to merely a responsive processor of given information. It is 
then difficult, if not impossible, to contemplate where the need and motivation for 
change come from given the commitment to existing ways of doing things, or where 
agents find the power to implement changes even if they are justified. On the other 
hand, agency literature considers the disruptions associated with changes as 
opportunities for 'autonomous agency' to break from current norms (Shane and 
Venkataraman, 2000). It is not unusual to see actors unwillingly embrace change as 
directed as agents are swayed by two major conflicting forces: one imposed by 
institutions calling for stability and conformation while the other provides the 
impetus to deviate from norms when opportunities are present. One possible 
resolution to this paradox lies in a different conceptualisation of agency: institutional 
entrepreneurship. 
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The tenn institutional entrepreneurship refers to "the activities of agents with 
interests in particular institutional arrangements, who seek legitimacy and resources 
to transform existing institutions or promote new ones" (Maguire and Hardy, 2004, 
p. 657). This concept directs our attention to agency, legitimacy, interest and power 
hence enables us to explore how different meanings are borne out of the same 
institutional pressures leading to different types of behaviour. Contrary to previous 
conceptualisation of agency, agency now is defined as being inherent within 
structures that actors themselves construct (Garud and Kamoe, 2003). Following this, 
institutions do not simply constrain actors but endow them with the foundations for 
future entrepreneurial activities. Institution therefore is as much a constraint as it is a 
facilitator for agency. This role of institutions can only materialise if actors are able 
to reflect and improvise with social rules and institutional processes. These qualities 
(reflection and improvisation) pennit actors to envisage alternative options to 
confonning and also give them the necessary means to legitimate such rule breaking. 
In addition, institutional entrepreneurship is an intense political process (Seo and 
Creed, 2002) whereby institutional entrepreneurs endowed with skills and 
creditability seek to unify collective actions. By recognising that institutional 
meanings are socially constructed and negotiated among actors, it challenges the 
traditional view that institutional shared meanings and frameworks are transmitted 
without contestation. The collaboration of such comprehensive institutional 
microdynamics with macro analysis promises a more complete view of institutional 
phenomena. 
2.3.2 The acknowledgement of institutional microprocesses 
The cognitive channel in institutionalisation process and institutional change, as well 
as the role of agency and legitimacy, has featured more appreciably in theoretical 
31 
frameworks. Early scholars such as Meyer and Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) tended to focus on the ways in which institutional mechanisms 
confine organisational structures and behaviour. Recent work has given more weight 
to how individuals perceive, act strategically and therefore contribute to institutional 
changes (Oliver, 1991; Goodstein, 1994) and the role of institutional 
entrepreneurship during institutional change processes (Garud and Karnoe, 2003). 
The underlying point of giving such role to agency and cognitive content is to reveal 
and to justify the significance of interpreting actors, who stand between institutional 
initiatives and outcomes. Papers such as Lounsbury and Crumley (2007) and Child, 
Lu and Tsai (2007) address issues associated with institutional entrepreneurship such 
as 'where do new practices come from?' and 'what is the role of powerful actors in 
bringing about changes?'Notwithstanding, powerful actors mentioned in these 
studies are mainly macro institutions like states, governments and professions. Micro 
analysis of institutional entrepreneurship is just as important to our understanding of 
social production of shared meanings and mental frameworks (Hardy and Phillips, 
1999) as these micro analyses focus on how coalition of diverse interests to generate 
collective actions is powerful enough to overcome contestation and struggle to secure 
support and acceptance during institutional change processes (Fligstein, 2001; Wijen 
and Ansari, 2007). 
Related to this stream is the research employing discourse analysis to specifically 
examine how texts are generated i.e. inscribed, spoken or written in material and 
accessible forms (Phillips et al. 2004; Taylor, Cooren, Giroux, and Robichaud, 
1996). Texts in various forms including written or verbal reports, pictures, and 
symbols etc. is the medium via which organisational shared meanings and 
knowledge are fonned. Researchers have investigated the significance of different 
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forms of texts in organisational knowledge creation process and institutional change 
processes. Lanzara and Patriotta (2001) used videocassette recording (VCR) as the 
method to investigate and conclude that the knowledge creation process is an 
ongoing transformation resulted from controversies and debates and are subject to 
local disputes, experiments and reassembling. Munir and Phillips (2005) explored 
how the management of meanings involved in institutional change at Kodak altered 
the way people understood photography. Using one of Fiat factories as case study, 
Lanzara and Patriotta (2007) recreated the process of institutional transformation and 
the creation of institutional and cognitive order using 'templates' as the medium. 
One of the most influential works on discourse though, is the paper by Phillips, 
Lawrence and Hardy (2004) on "Discourse and institutions". The authors introduce a 
new exciting development of institutions research: the so called linguistic revolution 
of institutional theory wherein institutional controls are believed to be transferred via 
discourse and texts embedded in actions instead of actions per se (Phillips et ai, 
2004, p. 635). Here, the deepest source of institutions does not feature in patterns of 
actions but it is texts that disseminate information about actions and restrict others' 
actions. "Institutions therefore can be understood as the products of discursive 
activity that influence actions" (Phillips et ai, 2004, p. 635). The refreshment that 
discourse analysis brings to institutional theory can be described as the missing piece 
of mainstream research, which favours effects over processes of institutionalisation 
(and deinstitutionalisation). By emphasising linguistic processes, the microdynamics 
of how institutions are constituted are revealed. Specifically, the authors propose that 
discursive processes of institutions elaborate how social reality is constructed by 
identifying the mechanisms of how actions generate texts, how meanings embedded 
in texts are transformed into discourses and how discourses produce institutions. Not 
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only does it offer a fresh method to study institutional phenomena as discourse 
analysis, the appreciation of the link between language study and institutions study 
helps shed some light on the hidden reality of social construction and also aids the 
growing area of institutional entrepreneurship. The conditions that allow certain 
actions to tum into texts and texts into discourses are partly dictated by the power 
relations within organisations. For example, texts generated and disseminated by 
leaders with legitimacy and power are more likely to get accepted and 
institutionalised. The issue of power and legitimacy bears a close connection to the 
notion of institutional entrepreneurship thus insights from discourse analysis can 
certainly discover the mechanisms of how institutional entrepreneurship is created 
and how it works. This is because institutions cannot be modified directly but only 
via production of influential texts. Institutional entrepreneurship is therefore a 
discursive activity and it requires entrepreneurs to engage directly in the processes 
of social construction that underlie institutions (Phillips et ai, 2004, p. 648). 
Another noted exemplar is the paper by Zilber (2007) in which the author uses 
stories to unveil the mechanism of how institutional entrepreneurship corrects the 
paradox of embedded agency in bringing about new practices. The author discusses 
the microprocesses of institutional entrepreneurship whereby "institutional 
entrepreneurs frame, justify and legitimate new or renewed institutional orders 
through telling stories", (p. 1050). In doing so, the paper contributes to the literature 
by exploring how meanings are constructed and manipulated and which process has 
not been paid sufficient attention in the past (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005). 
Significant attention on discourse analysis and institutional entrepreneurship 
undoubtedly shows that microdynamics of institutional phenomena have featured 
more prominently in frameworks of institutional theory alongside macro aspects. 
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Moreover, the role of social construction and power within the institutionalisation 
process is re-emphasised. Language study with focus on texts and discourse also 
opens a new window for further organisational research. Lastly, it is a noteworthy 
achievement that by promoting microprocesses of institutions and the insights from 
language study, institutional theory has taken a step closer towards sensemaking and 
might well benefit from sensemaking literature. The rationale for combining 
sensemaking and institutional theory will be discussed in section 2.5. 
2.3.3 Research gaps 
Indeed, the literature has concentrated more on the role of agency, legitimacy and 
microdynamics of institutional process. The assumption that institutions, once 
stabilised, will stay unchallenged is no longer popular. In its place, a growing branch 
of research has started to explore the conditions surrounding institutional change, its 
discourse and outcomes. Institutional entrepreneurship has been hailed as the answer 
to the paradox of embedded agency by emphasising that individuals seek their own 
interpretations and initiate their own responses to institutional pressures. 
Admittedly, the field of institutional theory, especially sociological institutionalism, 
has come a long way with regard to conceptualisation and theoretical refinements. 
Nevertheless, there is room for improvement. Although the notion of agency has 
been more widely accepted, theorists mainly stayed on the theme viewing agents as 
merely participants in the institutional change process. As a consequence, theorists 
are at great risk of underestimating the role of leadership and ignoring the possibility 
that agents are facilitators of change. Recent development in institutional 
entrepreneurship literature has begun to shed some light on these issues but a more 
sophisticated concept of institutional entrepreneurship and a framework of how 
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leadership influences the course of institutional change and deinstitutionalisation are 
needed. 
Actor's sensemaking and interpretations are indeed crucial for the legitimation of 
new institutions hence analysis of institutional change and deinstitutionalisation 
could not be complete without the knowledge of cognitive adaptation of agents. As 
discussed by Phillips et al (2004) and Maguire and Hardy (2009), discourse analysis 
with the focus on how institutions are created and disseminated via texts, discourse 
and actions will reveal the microprocesses underlying the institutionalisation process 
and institutional entrepreneurship. Together with discourse analysis, insights from 
sensemaking offer great value in this matter because only actions associated with 
conscious sensemaking can produce interpretable texts and coherent discourse thus 
stable and legitimate institutions. For this reason, institutional studies should 
integrate literatures on microdynamics of organisations and behaviours to gain more 
sophisticated understanding of institutional phenomena, especially 
deinstitutionalisation. 
2.4 Sensemaking literature 
The work by Weick (1979, 1995, and 2005) on sensemaking has been recognised as 
the most celebrated contribution to sensemaking literature. Weick's concept of 
sensemaking has been refined over time but its roots can be traced back to his 
dissatisfaction with traditional analysis of organisations, which are seen as rational, 
goal-oriented structures (Connan and Poole, 2000). Borrowing insights from the 
social psychology of organising, his treatment of organisations as loosely coupled 
systems offers a more sophisticated understanding of organisational behaviours. And 
for it, he rightly owns one of the most influential views in modem organisational 
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theory. In fact, sensemaking theory has been deemed revolutionary thinking since 
first introduced. According to Weick, meanings, not just goal-orientated practices, 
are the materials (language, talk, conversation) that shape organisational identity and 
hinder actions (Mills, 2003 as quoted by Weick, 2005). As an alternative to 
traditional orthodoxies, Weick insists that organisations should not be viewed as 
outcomes of deliberate planning. Instead, he stresses the concept of organising as a 
process within a socially constructed context wherein a sequence of events is ordered 
to rationalise actions. The rest of the section critically reviews areas of the literature 
deemed relevant to the thesis, which are properties and occasions for sensemaking, 
sensemaking during crises and disasters, sensemaking and emotions, sensegiving and 
power and finally sensemaking and institutions. 
2.4.1 Properties of sensemaking 
Underlying the majority of Weick's work are vanous ideas from social 
constructionism and interpretivism, based on which he develops seven properties of 
sensemaking. Although the focus of my study is not the content but the process of 
sensemaking, all properties of sensemaking - grounded in identity construction, 
retrospective, enactive of sensible environments, social, ongoing, focused on and by 
extracted cues and lastly driven by plausibility rather than accuracy (Weick, 1995)-
are implicitly present. According to this, sensemaking is first and foremost an 
attempt to develop or regain a sense of self. By infusing oneself into the environment 
and observing the reactions, one satisfies the need for self-enhancement, self-efficacy 
and self-consistency. Active and controlled sensemaking is therefore the direct result 
of failing to confinn oneself or is caused by the anxiety triggered by ambiguity in the 
environment impeding the creation of order in mental frameworks. The importance 
of retrospection in sensemaking refers to the idea that past events obstruct current 
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and future decision making by proffering one form of causal reasoning over another. 
The environment in which sensemaking occurs is inseparable from the act of making 
sense itself. The word 'enactment' means that people are not only constrained by the 
surroundings but they jointly create their own environment. Sensemaking is ongoing, 
social and focused on extracted cues because during the continual process of 
socialisation and in the midst of events, people are disturbed by unexpected signs 
which do not fit with the existing framework. The act of noticing, bracketing and 
labelling enables people to place fluxes into categories, generating meanings and 
institutionalising them into rules. Finally, sensemaking is about the plausibility that 
drives people forward. By seeking social approval of their actions, which are 
stimulated by plausibility, the underlying faith for actions is justified and that alone 
provides ample justification for sensemaking. 
2.4.2 Occasions for sensemaking 
Although sensemaking is an ongoing and autonomous process, there are situations 
that trigger active sensemaking (Weick, 1995, chapter 4) and actions. These 
occasions for sensemaking are caused by a number of disruptions to ongoing flows. 
These occasions do not always materialise as threats (negative arousal) but 
sometimes as opportunities (positive arousal) and necessity. Notwithstanding all 
requires repair. For these interruptions to be noticeable, credible and potent cues for 
sensemaking, there must be a persistent and difficult-to-close gap which is of interest 
to agents (Smith, 1988). The perception of how things were hence became irrelevant. 
These gaps are created by discrepancy or contradiction between the current and 
expected states of the world which should be recognised by agents. 
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According to Smith (1988), as quoted in Weick (1995), "a problem is a relationship 
of disharmony between reality and one's preferences, being a relationship, it has no 
physical existence. Rather, problems are conceptual entities or constructs" (p. 1491). 
As conceptual entities, the way problems are constructed is contingent upon one's 
capability for reflective thoughts which is limited by contextual boundaries. The 
existence of abnormal disparity alone does not automatically make it noticeable. 
Rather, it is noticeable because personal experience increases one's sensitivity to the 
environment and encourages their deliberate initiative (Louis and Sutton, 1991). The 
cognitive capacity for noticing and labelling undesired situations is crucial to the 
ability to register problems in the intellectual system by selecting potential cues from 
ongoing flows of events. In this aspect, Smith's conceptualisation of problems 
advances our understanding of sensemaking as it elaborates the early stage of 
sensemaking and it alerts our attention to the cognitively constructed nature of 
occasions for sensemaking. This conceptualisation, however, is not without fault. As 
Weick pointed out, simply classifying an unwanted state as a problem does not verify 
the purpose of sensemaking. To label something 'problematic' is a consequential act 
(Weick, 1995, p. 90) as it calls for further elaboration of deliberate solutions and 
actions. "Once something is labelled a problem that is when the problem starts" 
(Weick, 1979, p. 48). 
There are two common occasions for sensemaking in the organisational context: 
ambiguity and uncertainty. Though both of these can instigate conscious 
sensemaking, their mechanisms differ. Ambiguity provokes sensemaking by the 
shock of confusion while uncertainty does so by one of ignorance (Weick, 1995, 
chapter 4). Ambiguity can be defined as lack of clarity, high complexity or a paradox 
that make multiple explanations plausible (Martin, 1992, p. 134). Here, whether 
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understood as a lack of distinctive categories (lack of clarity), difficulty of singling 
out elements (high complexity) or existence of two or more interpretations, 
ambiguity in these situations deprives one of essential suppositions for effective 
sensemaking. Ambiguous situations are mainly found in organisations with unclear 
goals, vague rules and responsibilities, lack of success measurement, poor 
understanding of cause-effect relationships and multiple, conflicting interpretations 
(McCaskey, 1982 as quoted in Weick, 1995). 
Uncertainty is as omnipresent as ambiguity in terms of interruptive power to ongoing 
flows. Milliken (1987, 1990) defines uncertainty as inability to predict something 
with accuracy due to the lack of knowledge of changes in the surrounding 
environment (state uncertainty), of the impacts changes have on organisations (effect 
uncertainty) or of the subsequent reactions (response uncertainty). Stinchcombe 
(1990) augments Milliken's concept of uncertainty by adding that uncertainty 
evolves over the course of action (as quoted by Weick, 1995, p. 96). This 
conceptualisation sits well with sensemaking analysis as it indicates that deliberation 
from sensemaking alters the state of uncertainty as the sensemaking process 
continues. Information at each step signals how things are unravelling, confirming 
sensemaking outcomes at the previous stage and turning uncertainty into risk. In a 
nutshell, uncertainty is an occasion for sensemaking due to the inability to project 
current situations into the future with foreseeable consequences. Agents overlook 
interpretations capable of assisting extrapolation (Weick, 1995). Despite having the 
same disruptive nature to ongoing flows, ambiguity and uncertainty requires a 
different solution. To remove confusion from ambiguity, agents need clarified 
information (via social interaction) while simply more information is needed to 
eliminate ignorance in uncertainty. 
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Viewed as an instrument to deal with uncertainty and ambiguity, it is no surprise that 
sensemaking studies have largely focused on incidents involving a sudden loss of 
meanings and orders. In his 1993 paper about the Mann Gulch disaster, Weick 
referred to this as a "cosmology episode" - the moment when people feel "the 
universe is no longer a rational, orderly system" (Weick, 1993, p. 633). These 
occurrences initiate sensemaking because individuals get confused and often 
frightened by the prospect of long-held beliefs and perceptions becoming invalid. 
Diverse as they might be, research on occasions for sensemaking like Patriotta 
(2003) on breakdown, Orlikowski and Gash (1994) on discrepancy and Weick and 
Sutcliffe (2001) on disconfirmation share a similar context, that is when there is too 
much (ambiguity) or too little information (uncertainty). Either way, as the world at 
present is not the same as the world in expectation, significant efforts must be spent 
to bring order back otherwise people will lose touch with who they are. This 
sensemaking act therefore is part of individuals' identity construction (or 
reconstruction if challenged). Cues are extracted, connections are made with past 
occurrence, led by plausibility in the hope of restoring self-identity, sensemaking 
rationalises previous actions, in tum acting as foundations for further sensemaking. 
2.4.3 Sensemaking during disasters and crises 
A closely related genre to occasions for sensemaking, namely 'disaster sensemaking' 
has received great attention in recent years. These incidents instigate conscious 
sensemaking in extreme circumstances involving a greater degree of confusion, 
threat or danger. Noted examples include Weick (1988 and 1993) on the Mann Gulch 
disaster; Gephart (1997) on the 1977-1978 Lodgepole 'sour gas well' blow-out; 
Kayes (2004) on the 1996 Mount Everest mountaineering disaster and Stein (2004) 
on the stories of Apollo 13 and Three Mile Island nuclear plant. Most of these studies 
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offer some interesting and useful insights on factors influencing the ability of 
individuals to make sense under such extreme circumstances. For instance, Stein 
(2004) highlighted the importance of anxiety tolerance; Mullen et al (2006) stressed 
the role of power and individual responsibility; Kayes (2004) blamed directive 
leadership and ill-defined problems whereas for Weick (1993) it is visual role 
systems, intergroup relations and attitudes towards wisdom that make all the 
difference. 
Disaster sensemaking has several features that make it distinct from sensemaking 
under normal situations. Due to the nature of events, crises often impose on 
individuals a sense of emergency that demands immediate and full attention (Weick, 
1988). This is because failure to make sense can lead to devastating consequences, in 
many cases even death. If the normal sensemaking process is already emotion-laden, 
the level of stress experienced in disaster sensemaking is considerably higher, 
sometimes to an extent that prevents sensemaking altogether. Sensemaking during 
these critical periods matters not only to sensemakers but also to the unfolding of the 
crisis itself (Weick, 1988). Together with providing the substance for sensemaking, 
the actions of agents play an important part in resolving or worsening the initial 
disaster. If incorrect actions are taken, disaster will be exacerbated making it even 
harder for subsequent sensemaking. For this reason, individuals might hesitate to act 
for "there is a delicate trade-off between dangerous action which produces 
understanding and safe inaction which produces confusion" (Weick, 1988, p. 305). 
The fact that individuals are aware of the consequences of their actions means that 
sensemaking takes greater effort and a long time to deliberate. Disaster sensemaking 
also differs from normal organisational sensemaking in that the essential collective 
42 
consensus required during crises is not compulsory in the mundane organisational 
world (Maitlis, 2005). 
Understanding of disaster sensemaking is very helpful for the study of 
deinstitutionalisation as crisis-triggered deinstitutionalisation is also marked with an 
unstable and threatening episode. Hence, factors influencing disaster sensemaking 
are also likely to be relevant for deinstitutionalisation. Having said that, disaster 
sensemaking takes place in life-endangering special settings where agents' 
sensemaking and actions have direct and visible effects and consequences while for 
organisations, outcomes and impacts of sensemaking might not be as easily observed 
or traced due to a large number of stakeholders and issues. During 
deinstitutionalisation, there is an urge to act quickly but the demand on time is not as 
severe; less pressure is imposed on the participants for timely and good quality 
stories. In brief, if normal sensemaking and disaster sensemaking represent two 
extremities then sensemaking during deinstitutionalisation is situated in the middle 
since the environments for sensemaking during deinstitutionalisation are not as 
dangerous and urgent; and the consequences of actions are not as critical as those of 
disasters but there is still greater tension than that of normal organisational 
sensemaking. Moreover, capacity and instruments for sensemaking are limited 
during crisis making sensemaking more difficult and prone to failure. Investigation 
into the sensemaking process and relevant factors during deinstitutionalisation might 
shed light on individualistic features of crisis sensemaking. 
The theory of sensemaking fills an important gap in organisational theory by 
providing' a micro mechanism that produces macro change over time; one means by 
which agency alters institutions and environments (enactment); reinterpretation of 
breakdowns as occasions for learning ... ' (Weick, 2005, p. 419), yet it is able to 
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construct even more comprehensive understanding by taking into account not just 
cognitive but also socio-psychological, political and institutional dimensions of 
organisational behaviours. Putting it differently, Weick's work is a useful starting 
point for research into organisational practices and changes but would be more 
insightful if broader institutional context, power and emotions were brought into the 
picture. Investigations of incidents where the sensemaking process breaks down or is 
disturbed shed lights on the process of how sensemaking is restored in the mist of 
turbulence and the consequences of a failure to do so. 
2.4.4 Sensemaking and emotions 
The important role of emotions in the process of sensemaking is briefly mentioned 
but is not developed fully in Weick's analysis of occasions for sensemaking. 
Interruptions to ongoing flows are believed to inflict emotional arousal which might 
hinder the subsequent effort to make sense. This is the motivational function of 
emotions (George and Jones, 2001). Their theory of resistance to change 
emphasising the interconnection between cognition and affection implicitly stresses 
the significance of emotions. The authors argue that emotion is not only a trigger of 
conscious sensemaking but also has influence on the whole process of making sense. 
Emotional reaction is intense therefore tends to be short-lived. However, emotions 
will tum into less intense states called moods at subsequent stages (George and 
Jones, 2001, p. 430). Moods are less affecting but have persistent effects on 
behaviours and thinking processes without disturbing them (Brandy, 1970; Clark and 
Isen, 1982; Morris and Reilly, 1987; Nowlis, 1970; Thayer, 1989 as quoted by 
George and Jones, 2001, p. 430). Consequently, positive emotions provoked by 
discrepancies are often associated with positive moods and negative emotions are 
likely to be the cause of later negative moods. Moods work on information 
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processing through the process of priming (directing people's attention to 
infonnation, memories, judgements that are consistent with current mood) and 
thinking styles. George and Jones (2001) advocate that "positive moods result in 
. 
creative and expansive thinking to uncover opportunities for gains while negative 
moods induce deductive reasoning, systematic and critical thinking to uncover the 
source of difficulties" (p. 432). In this sense, emotional reactions are indeed vital to 
sensemaking, acting as dissipation or entropy of the sensemaking effort. The analysis 
of the sensemaking process therefore cannot be completed without the consideration 
of emotions. 
Despite its potential in elaborating sensemaking instigated by discrepancies or 
uncertainties, little is known about how different stakeholders think or feel about 
change initiatives (Bartunek et ai, 2006; George and Jones, 2001). In recent years, 
greater interest has been given to emotions in the workplace (e.g. Seo, Barrett and 
Bartunek, 2004; Fisher and Ashkanasy, 2000) and emotional response of participants 
during organisational change (e.g. Huy, 1999, 2002, Bartunek et ai, 2006). These 
studies redirect our attention to the psychological aspect of both individual and 
organisational life when resistance might conceal deeper motivations. Individuals 
whose work-life is severely disturbed have to find a way to defend their beliefs in 
order to cope. Hiding behind seemingly straightforward resistance to new things, 
there is more urgent need to reconnect with the purpose of their existence. Emotions 
are a large part of the social sensemaking process and especially so during crises. 
The inability to make sense is not attributed to limited cognitive ability alone; it is 
partly explained by the inability to cope with emotions, referred to as emotional 
intelligence by Huy (1999,2002). Individuals wanting to adapt to stressful situations 
need not do so in isolation. Social interaction, especially among people with similar 
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feelings, can certainly be a powerful defence mechanism. Emotional contagion 
(Bartunek et ai, 2006) and emotion empathy provide individuals with emotional 
support and tend to form sensemaking accounts of people in the same 'emotion' 
group which are more persuasive than those of outsiders. This emotional capacity of 
organisation, together with its cognitive capacity and the intensiveness of core 
rigidity all have impacts on the sensemaking process. 
2.4.5 Sensemaking as a social and political process: the role of power and the 
notion of sense giving 
Weick's sensemaking appears incomplete to some people in his treatment of power 
relations and political activities in organisations. Basically, Weick indicates majority 
voting is the basis of collective sensemaking therefore downplays the fact that 
sensemaking, like any other organisational activity, is a political process. If an 
organisational hierarchy is put in place to ensure that people do not share the same 
positions and power, then naturally their influence in a socially constructed reality 
will also be unevenly distributed. Managers and individuals with authority are in a 
better position to get their stories noticed, enacted and disseminated. Mills (2003) 
gave a thorough critical evaluation of Weick's work and points out that failure to 
consider power is one of the greatest weaknesses in Weick's model. The author 
assesses two properties of sensemaking: focus on extracted cues and the social 
process of sensemaking and argued that by taking into account power, these notions 
will be better equipped for the analysis of change. This is because in a realistic 
organisational setting, cues are not single-handedly picked up by individuals but 
rather selected by and then highlighted to individuals by more powerful actors. 
Likewise, sensemaking is a social process as individuals are open to influences from 
social collective and powerful individuals. This issue of power raises the question of 
46 
social-psychological control that unifies different meanings from shared experiences. 
Weick himself acknowledges this in saying that enhancement to sensemaking will 
tackle questions such as how power gets expressed, increased, decreased and 
influenced others. - Through things like control over cues, who talks to whom, 
proffered identities, criteria for plausible stories, actions permitted and disallowed, 
and histories and retrospect that are singled out (Weick, 2005, p. 418). In this sense, 
political sensemaking with negotiation power as a central theme share the same 
stance with the literature of institutional entrepreneurship whereby powerful agents 
are the creators and facilitators of institutional change or deinstitutionalisation. 
Indeed, organisational sensemaking is a social and political process where unequal 
distribution of power might have a significant impact on the discourse of meanings. 
Some individuals are in a better position than others due to their access to 
information and some have motivations to disseminate their stories by drawing the 
attention of others to the signs of problems and plausible storylines that explain 
them. This activity is what Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991) called sensegiving, which 
refers to the process of attempting to influence the sensemaking and meaning 
construction of others toward a preferred redefinition of organisational reality 
(p.442). The notion of sensegiving is derived in the context of strategic change 
commonly found in organisational life. Plans are initiated by the top management 
team (institutional entrepreneurs), which has power, visions and willpower. These 
insights will then be interpreted by and implemented at lower levels. The sensegiving 
of radical changes associated with deinstitutionalisation might range from the 
promotion of certain plausible stories with positive consequences to the favouring of 
rules, values and positions that are legitimated by these stories. In other words, what 
institutional agents are trying to do is to convey the nature of his vision, the values 
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underlying it and the actual changes that he wishes to achieve (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 
1991). The implicit assumption is that institutional entrepreneurs must already be 
able to make sense of the situations before or better than sensetakers (the targets of 
institutional entrepreneurs' sensegiving) if sensegiving is ever attempted. The 
presumption that institutional agents are more competent at making sense compared 
to the rest of workforce is reasonable as managers often have better access to 
infonnation and are in a better position to fonn a holistic view of the challenges 
faced by organisations. 
The importance of sensegiving in the social process of sensemaking is well-
appreciated in previous studies. For example, Maitlis (2005) explains how the extent 
of stakeholders and leaders' involvement in sensegiving activities determines the 
outcomes of the social sensemaking process. Each of these outcomes details 
interaction characteristics and the sensemaking accounts result. Gioia and Thomas 
(1996), on the other hand, suggest that leaders might use sensegiving strategies 
differently depending on the political or strategic nature of the problem. 
Most studies on social sensemaking and sensegiving concentrate on how sensegiving 
activities are conducted but less attention is paid to how recipients respond or the 
outcome of such a process. Maitlis (2005) is one of the first to examine the process 
of interaction between leaders and stakeholders. More such study is needed to fully 
understand the dynamics of the social and political process ofsensemaking. 
2.4.6 Sensemaking and institutions 
Weick's conceptualisation ofsensemaking seems to overstate agency and neglect the 
role of institutional contexts in which sensemaking is constructed (Weber and Glynn, 
2006). This limited role of institutions in sensemaking theory stems from the fact that 
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sensemaking largely concerns the microdynamics of cognition. However, the broader 
institutional context of sensemaking should not be overlooked because organisational 
environments within which sensemaking activities are conducted can hardly be 
considered as context-free. Human behaviours are bounded by the constraints 
embedded in existing institutions and, by enacting, individuals engage in a 
continuous dialogue with the environment, each playing a part in shaping the other. 
The notion of enactment in this sense should be viewed as a two-way relationship. 
Moreover, Weick (1995) stressed that sensemaking is a social process whereby 
meanings are socialised into existence but he does seem to forget that socialisation is 
itself prearranged by institutions. Distinctive interpersonal interaction patterns in 
each organisation are indeed the reflection of the culture that very organisation 
institutionalised. The concept of social sensemaking, therefore, should also be altered 
to account for the influence of institutions. Not only do the old traits of institutions 
partly determine which types of cues are more prominent by directing attention to 
discrepancies, institutions also affect how sensemaking is shaped and edited. Here, 
institutions dictate the characteristics of interrelationship among members i.e. how 
organisational members prefer to socialise (face-to-face or any other types), who 
should communicate with who and about which matters. All of these have significant 
bearing on both individual and organisational sensemaking. For institutions valuing 
close and interconnected contact with a high degree of interdependence, individuals 
are more likely to integrate sensemaking of others with their own; and organisational 
sensemaking is likely to be united and coherent since there is little or no contestation 
among alternative sensemaking accounts. In contrast, for institutions with a culture 
of high dependence and diverse backgrounds, individuals tend to form their own 
version of the story and are less likely to be influenced by others. Organisational 
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sensemaking in this case might not be as unitary but is more comprehensive having 
covered various aspects of reality. 
Despite these potential insights, research on the link between sensemaking and 
institutions is extremely rare. Weber and Glynn (2006) provide the first theoretical 
paper that considers various mechanisms via which institutions impinge on 
sensemaking. The authors suggest that sensemaking is constrained by values and 
beliefs embedded in institutions, edited via the socialisation process shaped by 
institutions, primed by different situations and triggered by discrepancies in 
institutions. This paper clarifies the impacts of institutions on the process of 
sensemaking and, at the same time, shows exactly how much organisational analysis 
benefits by incorporating sensemaking and institutional theory. Not only is empirical 
work studying the connection between sensemaking and institutional theory needed, 
future research must test the mechanisms outlined in the study by Weber and Glynn 
(2006) in different settings. The interrelationship among these mechanisms and their 
relative strengths can reveal great insights about intangible yet crucial institutions 
that govern organisational behaviours. 
To sum up, as competent and useful starting point as it is, Weick's theory of 
sensemaking can be strengthened by embracing broader institutional and social 
contexts as well as the significance of power and emotions. In Weick's words, future 
conceptualisation and analysis of sensemaking should be ..... more macro ... , more 
infused with emotion and with issues of sensegiving and persuasion" (Weick, 2005, 
abstract). With these new insights, sensemaking theory should provide a more 
sophisticated and realistic sociological approach to how sensemaking is formed 
under the facilitation and restriction of emotions, politics and institutionalised orders. 
The mediating conditions, especially, give fruitful implications for the practices and 
50 
management of changes when ambiguity, uncertainty and rigidity of bad old habits 
demand significant emotional capacity and initiatives from organisational members 
and vision, leadership and interpersonal skills from leaders. These are the key to a 
smooth and successful change process. 
The next sections will explain the motivation for the merger of sensemaking and 
institutional theory in the study of deinstitutionalisation. 
2.S Understanding deinstitutionalisation: institutional theory and 
sensemaking in collaboration 
The incorporation of the sensemaking perspective corrects the lack of appreciation 
for micro influences during institutional change and deinstitutionalisation. If agents 
bear the direct impacts of and improvise with institutional pressures and if 
institutions are transfonning, why is sensemaking not taken into account? Agents' 
sensemaking and interpretations are essential if the need for deinstitutionalisation is 
to be recognised, if the explanation of the inertia tendency is to be attained and if the 
legitimation of new institutions is to reach its goal. For this reason, analysis of 
institutional phenomena must integrate the insights of cognitive adaptation of agents, 
who must be equipped with brand new logics and nonnative rationality to 
accommodate institutional change (Dacin et ai, 2002). Microanalysis provided by the 
sensemaking perspective can link macrostates across time (Weick, 2005) by showing 
how macro influences are made sense of in different ways leading to different 
behaviours and facilitating changes later on (Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1998). 
This weakness of institutional theory, in fact, provides the justification for the 
consolidation of sensemaking and institutional theory. The juxtaposition of 
institutional theory and sensemaking has been very rare (Weick et ai, 2005, p. 17) 
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but there is clear justification for combining the two. First and foremost, the 
sensemaking perspective can address the criticism that institutional theory fails to 
explain and, in some cases, does not even consider the role of agency in the process 
of institutionalisation. The limited role of sensemaking in the investigation of 
institutional process stems from the view that meanings, scripts, norms and values 
are taken-for-granted carriers of institutionalised cognitive constraints to which 
agents have no other choice but to intemalise such demands. No consideration is paid 
for nonconformity strategies. In this view, sensemaking provides the feedstock for 
institutionalisation (Weick, 1995) therefore provides the answer for variation in 
institutional effects in different contextual settings where agents are confronted by 
different societal and relational demands and the implications these findings have on 
strategic management of institutional processes. On the other hand, the current theory 
of sensemaking neglects the significance of broader institutional contexts, in which 
sensemaking is embedded (Weber and Glynn, 2006). Hiding behind the relationship 
between sensemaking and institutional context is the relationship between persons 
and their environments. Unilateral influence is hardly conceivable for environment 
and individuals are inseparable; one leaves a lasting impression on the other. The 
moment agents make an attempt to separate cues from flows of activities, interpret 
them according to the existing framework then turn them into actions, the 
environment is modified by agent reactions accordingly. This interaction is a 
reciprocal, continuous dialogue which deserves further attention. In sensemaking, 
institutions are continually re-interpreted and re-constructed. In order to understand 
the link between institutional process and sensemaking, a new theoretical framework 
is needed, which does not entirely belong to management research or social 
psychology of organisations. This is interdiSciplinary research. 
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The conjoining of sensemaking and institutions should not be limited to recognising 
that institutions impose constraints on sensemaking. Weber and Glynn's study (2006) 
is one among a few rare efforts to address this issue. The authors propose a theory of 
how institutions, via mechanisms other than constraining such as triggering, priming 
and editing can help clarify the process of sensemaking. First, institutions are said to 
prime sensemaking due to the fact that individuals possess more than one identity, all 
are institutionalised, and the selection of one identity and associated frames is 
determined by certain situations. Tangible situations entail particular roles and scripts 
which act as primers for appropriate identity and norms to follow. Priming thus 
augments institutional enactment by emphasising the role of situational context over 
taken-for-granted macro institutional contexts. With traditional constraint-inflicted 
mechanisms, institutions restrict behaviours from outside by imposing accepted 
norms rather than from inside individuals. However, without effectively bounded 
rules, actors might find a way to deviate. Institutions in Weber and Glynn's theory 
edit sensemaking via social feedback and expectations, which is a more reliable 
mechanism. In this perspective, sensemaking starts with concerns and extracted cues 
but socially monitored through evaluation and modifications and socially negotiated 
based on power differences. This explains why there might be different plausible 
meanings attached to one problem, some enactments of some meanings end up more 
successful than others. Finally, institutional inconsistencies can also create the 
occasions for sensemaking (Weick, 1995, chapter 4) by creating contradictions, 
ambiguities and uncertainty inherent between or within institutions. In short, 
institutions do not only provide regularities in sensemaking through cognitive 
constraint but also prime, edit and trigger sensemaking. These mechanisms enrich 
both institutional theory and Weick's sensemaking perspective. 
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Inspired by the lack of interest on deinstitutionalisation phenomenon that it so 
deserves, my study attempts to gather insights from sensemaking and institutional 
theory together in the examination of deinstitutionalisation process. The combination 
of sensemaking and institutional theory perspectives offers a more comprehensive 
picture of deinstitutionalisation because, on the one hand, sensemaking reveals the 
transformation at an individual level, which is essential for the legitimation of 
deinstitutionalisation, and on the other transformation at an institutional level in 
terms of values and practices endorsed. The sensemaking perspective is appropriate 
for the study of deinstitutionalisation not only because it discloses the micro 
foundations underlying institutions, it does so while taking into account the socio-
psychological aspects of individual and organisational life and by emphasising the 
importance of emotional as well as cognitive response at the receiving end of 
deinstitutionalisation. Equally importantly, the sensemaking process during 
deinstitutionalisation is constrained by existing institutionalised beliefs, values and 
practices therefore the institutional theory perspective not only describes a larger 
picture of the whole process, i.e. transformation of macro states, but also highlights 
the impacts of institutions on sensemaking. 
This study of the deinstitutionalisation process aims to reconcile the two important 
bodies of literature: sensemaking and institutional theory, at the same time filling 
gaps in each literature. Its purpose and place is represented in the diagram below 
(Figure 2.1). On the one hand, sensemaking theory, building on Weick's work as the 
milestone, extends its scope of analysis to encompass emotions, power, disasters and 
crises as occasions for sensemaking and especially macro aspects of sensemaking -
institutions. On the other hand, institutional theory, starting with the promotion of 
cognitive pillar and agency, followed by the acknowledgement of institutional 
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microprocesses, has shown SIgnS of appreciation for the mIcro foundations of 
organisational behaviours. With weakness in each literature addressed by the other' s 
perspective, it is no surprise that the gap between sensemaking and institutional 
theory can be perfectly filled by studies that incorporate both standpoints. 
"Deinstitutionalisation process via the lens of sensemaking" is one such study . 
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Figure 2.1 Development of institutional 
theory and sensemaking literatures 
In this chapter, the basic foundations of sensemaking and institutional theory 
together with important areas of each literature were critically reviewed. Directly 
relevant to the topic of deinstitutionalisation, reviews of institutional theory include 
institutional entrepreneurship and the cognitive dimension, the recognition of 
microprocesses and of course the lack of interest in deinstitutionalisation. As for 
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sensemaking, it assesses the most influential and acknowledged work in sensemaking 
- 'Sensemaking in organisations' by Karl Weick - and covers areas such as 
properties of and occasions for sensemaking, crisis sensemaking, sensemaking and 
emotions, sensemaking as social and political process and finally sensemaking and 
institutions. Following this review, it was argued that the two bodies of literature 
have come to appreciate the views of one another, evidenced in the chosen lines of 
work in recent years. Specifically, institutional theory has realised the potential of 
microprocesses in helping understand institutions, just as sensemaking theory does 
by investigating the interaction between sensemaking and institutions. The review, 
however, identified one potentially great area yet largely untouched: 
deinstitutionalisation, which provided the rationale for this particular thesis. Also, the 
discussion justified the decision to incorporate perspectives of sensemaking and 
institutional theory in studying deinstitutionalisation for they perfectly 
complemented each other and the juxtaposition conveniently addressed weaknesses 
of both. With the aims and approach set, the next chapter will outline the conceptual 
and theoretical framework of this particular study. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Theoretical framework 
3.1 Introduction 
Having discussed the main research streams, strengths and limitations of 
sensemaking and institutional theory literature in previous chapter, identifying the 
gaps for further research and the rationale of this study, this chapter sets out to 
construct the guiding theoretical framework. The more specific aims are to develop a 
model of the deinstitutionalisation process and to explore the role of organisational 
sensemaking during deinstitutionalisation. 
3.2 Theoretical model 
To approach the case and to guide interpretation and analysis, sensemaking and 
institutional theory perspectives are particularly relevant. Sensemaking insights 
enlighten the process of coping with the uncertainty and ambiguity inherent in the 
deinstitutionalisation process. Properties of the sensemaking process, such as 
extracted cues, identity construction and social negotiation combined with emotions 
and power variables will provide a broad picture of how transformations at the micro 
level lead to transformations at the macro state under the influence of institutional 
entrepreneurs and their sensegiving efforts. On the other hand, institutional theory 
offers some useful insights into the relationship between broader institutional 
environments and firm strategic reactions at both individual and collective levels. An 
institutional perspective reveals how institutions provide substance and occasions for 
sensemaking. Not only can agents draw meanings from institutional artefacts to 
guide their behaviour but contradictions within and between institutions can also act 
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as motivators for conscious sensemaking in attempts to restore identity. Analytic 
tools from the institutional perspective are used in the description and explanation of 
antecedents of deinstitutionalisation, which lead to radical change in organisation 
form, rules, practices and philosophies. 
In this regard, the role of institutional entrepreneurs is appreciated by stressing 
transformations at individual level (managers and employees), rather than assuming 
that institutional forces manifest themselves in action. In fact, the "interplay between 
actors, actions and meanings" (Zilher, 2002) decides to a great extent how 
institutional entrepreneurs make sense of the situations at hand, which in turn shape 
the course of their actions and organisational reactions. This is because not only 
acting as interpreters, organisational members are also the carriers of institutional 
meanings. Although institutional theorists acknowledge the impacts that cultures and 
social structures have upon people, fundamentally, structures are constructed and 
cultures are interpreted by people. Without meanings attached to social orders by 
cohorts of such rules, culture is no more than a collection of traits, used as 
description of a spiritual phenomenon rather than a list of orders that guide 
behaviours. The act of agency, which represents the connection between institutional 
artefacts and actors, is then the transfonnation of meanings into actions. With the 
focus on cognitive discourse, institutional theory from the sensemaking perspective 
makes institutional phenomenon more explicit and at the same time opens a new path 
for understanding the dialogue between institutions and agents. 
3.2.1 Deinstitutionalisation process 
Based on the work of Oliver (1992), Weick (1995), Garud et al (2007) and George 
and Jones (2001), a theoretical framework for the deinstitutionalisation process is 
proposed (Figure 3.1 below). 
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At the beginning (of Figure 3.1 and deinstitutionalisation), there are old 
institutions in place which are stable and mature. Institutionalised ways of 
thinking and doing things exist in any organisations where routines, rules and 
norms are the guidance for the functioning of organisational activities. Given the 
constantly evolving environments that organisations face, antecedents of 
deinstitutionalisation, known or not, are present all the time. If these functional, 
political and social factors (Oliver, 1992), which call for organisational attention 
and responses are dealt with by timely and correct actions, the likely outcome 
would be incremental institutional change. However, if this information is 
ignored, tensions in the organisational system accumulate over time and disaster 
threatens. To state the matter succinctly, the destabilising tendency of 
deinstitutionalisation is caused by wrongly ignored and potentially dangerous 
situations that have urged modifications to organisation norms, values and 
philosophies. These deeply embedded rigidities and consistencies eventually 
entail performance crisis and potentially disastrous collapse of the 
institutionalised systems. Although indicators of deinstitutionalisation can be 
mere weakening of old beliefs and values, these subtle changes are not easily 
recognisable hence in most cases, the clearest indicator of deinstitutionalisation 
is the departure of the old and the replacement of alternative institutions. 
Disturbances to ongoing flow of activities arise where switching event(s) 
producing clear contradiction of how things have been done in the past and how 
things are supposed to be done at present essentially prompt institutional 
transformation and heighten active sensemaking in response. Occasionally, 
disruptions might not be as clear cut with obvious consequences, but ones with 
indistinct features. McCaskey (1982) summarises characteristics of ambiguous 
changing situations as having an unsure nature, problematic information, 
60 
multiple and conflicting interpretations, different value orientations, unclear or 
multiple goals, vague roles and responsibilities, lack of success measures, poor 
cause-effect link. The problem caused by ambiguity inherent in these cases is not 
about the inability to obtain correct understanding of situations or lack of 
information but rather about the quality of information, which can be resolved by 
social construction and clarification of meanings. Uncertainty, on the other hand, 
is caused by ignorance. While more information cannot discard ambiguity, 
ignorance in uncertainty can be solved simply by attainment of essential 
information. One important point to mention is that both ambiguity and 
uncertainty are subjectively perceived, interpreted and felt (Martin, 1992), which 
means that the level of ambiguity and uncertainty will change through the course 
of sensemaking, which is exactly the reason why sensemaking is set in motion, to 
alleviate these uncomfortable feelings. 
As opposed to the ongoing sensemaking that enables individuals to take notice of 
the inconsistencies and rigidities inflicted by taken-for-granted yet troublesome 
institutions, conscious sensemaking is activated to cope with the unknown and 
unstable disturbances unfolding when a period of incubation (Stein, 2004) has 
reached its peak, i.e. at the moment switching event(s) occur. The incubation 
period is the time preceding the switching events, during which time signs of 
distress, unidentified or wrongly interpreted, have not been acted upon. This 
stage of the deinstitutionalisation process might be the most distressing of all 
stages for it is marked with strong emotions such as confusion, anxiety and 
uncertainty. Although these emotions still play an important part in the aftennath 
of the switching events, their intensity might subside as time passes. 
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The subsequent stage of deinstitutionalisation demands a sensemaking attempt to 
restore the loss of meaning which occurs when the world's order has been 
violated. Faced with unknown situations, people need to look for cues that might 
have been missed and to incorporate them into a new framework that is able to 
account for current discrepancies. Order must be restored for the world to make 
sense. The success and duration of this stage depends on many factors including 
institutional entrepreneurship, political structures, emotions, and the social as 
well as cognitive capacity of those involved. The tangled interrelationship among 
moderating variables (power, emotions, leadership, cognition and social factors) 
is complicated. The box 'institutional transformation via sensemaking' in Figure 
3.1 clarifies the dynamics involved in institutional transformation via 
sensemaking, which essentially denotes the interactions between institutions and 
organisations at the institutional level and between institutional agents and 
stakeholders at the organisational level. All the channels and the sorts of 
influence exerted by different parties are illustrated by the directions of the 
arrows. For instance, institutions are to trigger, constrain and edit the 
sensemaking of organisations (Weber and Glynn, 2006), which is made up of 
institutional agents and stakeholders. The social negotiation processes between 
these two parties determine the outcome of organisational sensemaking and 
response, which in tum shape institutional makeover by legitimising new logics, 
institutionalising new values and formal ising new practices. This interactive 
process is ongoing and is contingent upon internal and external factors such as 
organisational characteristics and changes in surrounding external environments. 
The deinstitutionalisation process (and Figure 3.1) is complete when new orders 
are found and alternative institutions are put in place. The outcome of 
deinstitutionalisation varies from case to case as influencing factors (both 
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internal and external) and idiosyncrasies of each institution and switching events 
differ. Here, although all deinstitutionalisation processes progress through these 
five stages, each process is qualitatively distinctive with its own pace and 
destination. However, it is possible to group outcomes of deinstitutionalisation 
into two main categories: one with the substitute of new institutions and one with 
the return of previously successful institutions. 
3.2.2 Active sensemaking intensified by switching events during 
deinstitutionalisation 
Deinstitutionalisation is often associated with the introduction of new practices 
and, at the extreme, transformation in organisational form and management. 
Changes, however, do not manifest themselves in action without resistance. 
Individuals who are comfortable with and guided by schema inherent in habits of 
existing institutions, who dislike insecurity and uncertainty, are unlikely to 
welcome changes, at least in the first stage of the change process. Understanding 
of factors that prevent change, i.e. inertia or resistance to change, is therefore 
crucial for any analysis of the change process. This resistance tendency might 
deteriorate or exaggerate over time but in order for deinstitutionalisation to move 
on to the next stage, effort at mapping out plausible stories and responses is 
challenged by the urge to resist. Resistance takes different forms at different 
stages of deinstitutionalisation and its impact on sensemaking will vary 
accordingly. At the beginning, dislike of insecurity and anxiety might be the 
strongest source of resistance. As time goes on, the need for change might be 
recognised and justified, resistance then takes the form of negative moods and 
then old habits. More details on sources of resistance at each stage of 
sensemaking will be discussed later. The process of sensemaking during 
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deinstitutionalisation in this study takes into account not only the cognitive 
element but also social, political and emotive facets of sensemaking. Emotions, 
power, individual, social and organisational factors intertwine to style features of 
sensemaking and the discourse of deinstitutionalisation. The crisis-intensified 
active sensemaking process during deinstitutionalisation is illustrated in Figure 
3.2 below. 
The changes associated with deinstitutionalisation are often so pervasive, 
unexpected and lie deeply at the core of organisation philosophies and traditions, 
that their occurrence generates immense disturbance and arousal to the 
autonomic nervous system (Berscheid and Ammazzalorso, 2003). Disturbances 
created by catastrophic switching events and from these radical changes alike 
impose momentous challenges to both personal self-image and collective 
identity. There is a close link between an individual's self concept and an 
organisation's image because by practising the culture the organisation embraces, 
individuals identify themselves with and act on behalf of the organisation. If 
there is a threat to the organisation's identity, individuals with close 
identification to the organisation treat this as a threat and activate sensemaking to 
restore their self-image. The motivational function of identity construction, 
although not visible in the framework, plays a central part in sensemaking 
activities. All effort at making sense of flux stems from the need for self-
enhancement, self-efficacy and self-consistency therefore a problem must be 
directly relevant to personal goals and purposes to activate conscious 
sensemaking. 
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The emotional essence of sensemaking is premised on the presupposition that 
disturbances are the stressor of an emotional outbreak. Contradiction between new 
and existing rules, practices and values, ambiguity of new ideas and uncertainty 
inherent in the change process dominates the emotion-filled first stage of the 
sensemaking process. The intensiveness of an emotional outburst instigates the initial 
response to interruptions. Individuals overwhelmed by fear and anxiety in a situation 
beyond their comprehension are likely to circumvent the problem by denying its 
existence. In an attempt to put some meaning back into reality, the only possible way 
not to lose sense of direction is to dub challenge as a one-and-only exception and 
convince oneself that there is nothing to worry about. This psychological reaction 
can also take place at the collective level. People in the same threatening situations 
with the same negative feelings are likely to react in the same manner. Members of a 
group or a firm might put off consideration of discrepancy when they recognise that 
other members also distance themselves from it. For this reason, individually or 
collectively, a salient feature is denial. In this initial phase, response is emotion-
dominant since emotions impede rational sensemaking and actions. The 
intensiveness and pervasiveness of this phase depends on the tolerance level of 
anxiety individually and collectively. 
Significant effort is then spent to moderate emotions. Because of their intensity, 
emotions tend to be short-lived (George and Jones, 2001) and therefore subside into 
less intensive moods and substantive information processing (Forgas, 1995). Moods, 
although being less intensive, have long-lasting influence on thought and behaviour 
without disrupting them (George and Jones, 2001). When emotions are under 
control, transformation moves on to the next phase which is social, political and 
emotional as well as cognitive in nature. 
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When denial takes place at the collective level and change is brought to a halt, 
institutional entrepreneurs (managers, team leaders) who are creators and initiators of 
change express their insights and exercise power in bringing about change. This is 
the moment the political aspect of organisation sensemaking comes into play. The 
nature of activities undertaken by institutional entrepreneurs and the skills associated 
with them are central to the consequences of deinstitutionalisation because whether 
outcomes are what institutional agents wish for depends on whether they can 
eliminate resistance. Not only must institutional entrepreneurs be able to conceive of 
new ideas for change, they also need to deliver those sensible, workable ideas in the 
intended way. This requires cognitive capability, interactional and leadership skills. 
The purposes of deinstitutionalisation can only be recognised, accepted and 
supported if institutional agents are able to control collective actions by guidance, 
encouragement and imposition if necessary. Hence, the responsibility institutional 
entrepreneurs hold in facilitating transformation is sustained throughout the discourse 
of deinstitutionalisation. By emphasising this point, this framework can explain the 
source and outcomes of deinstitutionalisation and how the deinstitutionalisation 
process is all about the negotiation between institutional entrepreneurs and ones who 
have the urge to resist. 
Having discussed the first two stages of the deinstitutionalisation process, it is clear 
by now that the first phase is mostly coloured with emotions whereby rational 
sensemaking and actions are hindered by fear, anxiety and insecurity elicited from 
disturbance of deinstitutionalisation. As emotion moderation sets in, political and 
cognitive factors feature more prominently alongside emotion. Sensemaking starts 
with the noticing of cues selected and proffered by institutional agents and the 
contestation between those with cues highlighted by institutions. These salient cues 
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stand out because they represent the peculiar, the unexceptional which violates 
existing scripts. These cues, however, are not picked up single-handedly by 
individuals but rather highlighted to them by institutional entrepreneurs. The 
controlling of cues is an exercise of power and it is a part of political sensemaking. 
Resistance at this stage stems from the contradiction between cues selected by 
institutional agents that orient towards positive features of change and cues 
underlined by institutions. These cues are likely to be uncomfortable issues in the 
change process and challenges to existing institutions. The more individuals are 
committed to old habits and identified with organisational image, the more salient the 
cues stressed by institutions hence greater effort is needed to modify resistance. 
The next phase of the sensemaking process is social construction of meanings which 
is the negotiation between institutional entrepreneurs and organisational members. 
Powerful as they are, however, the outcome of deinstitutionalisation is not entirely in 
the hands of institutional agents. Individuals, who bear the direct consequences of 
deinstitutionalisation and identify with old institutions, might or might not take the 
stories notified to them willingly. Institutional agents then try to construct and 
propagate their visions to organisational members in the attempt to re-orient existing 
interpretive schemes. Drawing attention of individuals to the signs of problems 
instigates their sensemaking effort but needs to be followed swiftly by infusing some 
meaning into them. This activity is what Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991, p. 442) called 
sensegiving, which refers to the ''process of attempting to influencing the 
sensemaking and meaning construction of others toward a preferred redefinition of 
organisational reality". The notion of sensegiving is derived in the context of 
strategic change commonly found in organisational life. Plans are initiated by the top 
management team (institutional entrepreneurs), who have power, vision and 
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willpower and these insights will then be interpreted by and implemented at lower 
levels. The sensegiving of radical changes associated with deinstitutionalisation 
might range from the promotion of certain plausible stories with positive 
consequences to the favouring of rules, values, positions legitimated by these stories. 
In other words, what institutional agents are trying to do is to convey the nature of 
their vision, the value underlying it and the actual changes that they wish to achieve 
(Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991). The assumption made implicitly in this phase of 
organisational sensemaking is that institutional entrepreneurs must already be able to 
make sense of the situations before or better than sensetakers (the targets of 
institutional entrepreneurs' sensegiving) if sensegiving is ever attempted. The 
presumption that institutional agents are more competent at making sense compared 
to the rest of the workforce might not be difficult to comprehend as managers often 
have better access to information and are in a better position to form a holistic view 
of the challenges faced by organisations. Resistance to deinstitutionalisation at this 
stage is the impact negative moods have upon information processing. George and 
Jones (2001) and Forgas (1995) both discussed the significance of mood congruence 
in evaluative judgements. Their advocacy has been supported by numerous studies 
that when in negative moods caused by negative emotions, individuals pay more 
attention to negative information, have difficulty at learning such details, and make 
more negative interpretations of ambiguous information. Therefore the main style of 
thinking in these situations is critical thinking as compared to creative, expansive 
thinking in positive moods. As a consequence, whether persuasion of positive 
consequences associated with deinstitutionalisation is successful depends on whether 
institutional agents can win over the impacts of negative moods at the information 
processing stage. 
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The other half of social construction of meaning is the response that recipients of 
change have upon institutional initiatives. The outcome of this process, whether it is 
unitary or multiple interpretations, is the direct result of negotiation power and the 
willingness of both parties to participate. Visibly in direct communication or hidden 
in silent resistance, feedback from organisational members is delivered to 
institutional agents who will then revise their propositions and respond accordingly. 
Resistance at this stage arises from the distress caused by the need to abolish old 
institutions if deinstitutionalised practices are to be accepted. Insecurity related to 
changes and commitment to old habits are the most rigid organisational elements to 
transform. Whether individuals see the opportunity presented by 
deinstitutionalisation is more attractive than the cost of abandoning old beliefs 
detennines the outcome of deinstitutionalisation. The negotiation process is one of 
political nature in the sense that more powerful actors (management team) have the 
upper hand of the bargain and can use rules to coerce organisational members. 
However, the extent to which the response is the target they wish for depends on 
whether they can align their interests with those of the mass. 
Having said that negotiation is a political process, group interaction involves 
emotions and (collective) identity construction is as much an emotional reaction as 
cognitive activity. Humphreys and Brown (2002, p. 424) argue that: " ... because 
work organisations offer meaningfol explanations for anxiety-provoking experiences 
that reduce dissonance, at a deeper psychological level, in defining the social 
identity component of their self-concepts, individuals tend to draw on salient images 
they associate with their work organisation". Taking this view, there is a close link 
between self identity and collective identity; and by defending organisational 
identity, individuals preserve their own image. Vogler (2000) draws on the work by 
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Bion (1961) on emotional intersubjectivity and group processes to suggest that 
collective identity also has an emotional dimension that coexists with a cognitive 
one. The orthodox cognitive view of social actors overlooks the role of emotions and 
defence mechanisms in identity construction. Hence, analysis of conflicts must take 
into account psychological processes and strong feelings occurring within groups. 
The authors advocate that under certain circumstances, when challenged by stressful 
social conflicts, group relations are associated with unreality, hostility and suspicion 
as group members unite to respond to outsiders or even members of the group 
(Vogler, 2000). What happens is that they split good feeling (sense of belonging to 
the group) from bad feeling (anger and frustration) and project a disliked feeling 
towards the enemy to preserve the purpose of the group. In tenns of anxiety and 
conflicts caused by deinstitutionalisation, organisational members, who share the 
same feelings, might collide with each other and view actors who initiate changes 
causing disturbance as enemies. They will be sceptical rather than understanding of 
leaders. This emotional dimension of an already complicated political process 
exaggerates the conflicts and makes it more difficult to resolve. Consequently, the 
solution depends as much on the ability to relieve the group's anxiety (e.g. by 
aligning with their emotions) as it does on the politically correct answer. 
The outcome of organisational sensemaking is detennined by the level of interaction 
between institutional agents and recipients of deinstitutionalisation and also by the 
ability of institutional agents to shape collective sensemaking in the direction they 
intend. There are three possible scenarios: Interactive single account, Restricted 
single account and Interactive multiple account. Interactive single account results 
from a high degree of sensemaking from recipients in response to sensegiving 
attempts of institutional agents. However, the difference between Interactive single 
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account and Interactive multiple account is the ability to reach an unitary collective 
account when organisations are able to harmonise alternative sensemaking into one 
interpretable, accessible and legitimate account. On the other hand, Restricted single 
account differs in terms of its high degree of control therefore limited interaction 
among organisation members. In short, the outcome of deinstitutionalisation 
therefore largely depends on the ability of institutional entrepreneurs to moralise 
their stories, which in turn depends on their ability to align emotions with sensetakers 
and organisational emotional capability. In more detail, these factors are emotional 
alliance (which is believed to help institutional agents to earn recipients' support). 
leadership style (whether the sensemaking account is the product of fair negotiation 
or of power) and the willingness of other members to participate in the process. 
Each case of collective sensemaking corresponds with one particular type of 
collective action. In case of Interactive single account. the unity of organisational 
sensemaking allows the deinstitutionalisation process to develop at high pace. The 
difference is when organisational sensemaking is born out of interactive negotiation; 
deinstitutionalisation is often associated with some emergent but consistent features, 
which leads to more stable, non-contestable institutions. This is the Developed 
Scenario. Meanwhile for Restricted single account, deinstitutionalisation advances as 
intended and at medium pace (Planned scenario) because although there is only one 
legitimate account, it is the one promoted by institutional agents. Here, due to high 
control from leaders, the collective sensemaking process ends up with unitary 
account despite the fact that there might still be alternative, unwelcomed 
sensemaking. This sensemaking is likely to cause disagreement among 
organisational members and to be the origin of resistance. This is the reason why 
deinstitutionalisation is not able to achieve high speed like Developed scenario does; 
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and also, institutions that linked with Planned scenario are incoherent and 
contestable. 
In case of Delayed scenario, the low pace of deinstitutionalisation is caused by the 
failure to unify alternative sensemaking. Further negotiation (interaction) is needed 
to tum multiple accounts into one unitary account in order for deinstitutionalisation 
to advance. Meanwhile, deinstitutionalisation is halted since in Interactive multiple 
accounts case, there is no control exerted by institutional agents to restrict fair 
negotiation or to drive deinstitutionalisation forward. However, if consensus is 
finally reached, the new institutions are likely to be stable and coherent like the ones 
in Developed scenario as new institutions are the product of cooperation and 
negotiation of the entire organisation. 
3.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have proposed the conceptualisation and the model of 
deinstitutionalisation process. In doing so, the chapter emphasises the following 
points: 
1. The crisis-driven deinstitutionalisation differs from institutional change in its 
view that the breakdown of well-established institutions occurs because 
organisations underestimate or ignore the distress calls of these problematic 
systems. If the opportunities are identified and dealt with in time, less 
devastating changes would suffice. But if organisations are unresponsive to 
external environments, when troubles reach breaking point, only the 
reconfiguration of the entire system will do. 
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2. Institutional inconsistencies have destabilising effects as they create 
mounting pressures leading to disastrous situations and prompt institutional 
transformation. 
3. Switching events initiate conscious sensemaking - the best defence 
mechanism against chaos, uncertainty, ambiguity and contradiction. 
4. Institutional transformation facilitated by sensemaking is a process which is 
influenced by internal and external environments. 
5. The deinstitutionalisation process is complete when new institutions are 
formed, the features of which are shaped by organisational sensemaking. 
6. Organisational sensemaking is a social negotiation process in which success 
is contingent upon emotional, political, cognitive and social factors. 
7. The nature of crisis-driven deinstitutionalisation means that the immediate 
phase after switching events is emotion-dominated. Other factors come into 
effect later on. 
8. Each step of organisational sensemaking has its own kind of resistance. 
9. Organisational sensemaking outcomes depend on conditions such as 
leadership, emotional interaction and opportunities for multi-stakeholder 
participation. 
10. The pace and outcome of deinstitutionalisation is determined by 
organisational sensemaking. Next chapter will present the methodological 
approach and design employed to seek answers to the research questions and 
to operationalise the ideas and theoretical model of this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
On the quest for knowledge - Perspectives and methods in 
researching institutions and sensemaking 
4.1. Introduction 
The previous chapters review literature on deinstitutionalisation (chapter 2) and 
demonstrate the conceptual and theoretical foundations (chapter 3) for this study of 
deinstitutionalisation. This chapter describes the methodological underpinnings and 
operational process of data gathering and analysis. 
Therefore this chapter has the following aims: 
• to elaborate on research aims and objectives, and expand the two research 
questions, 
• to describe the research design, 
• to explain the reason for the case selection and describe the institutional 
contexts surrounding the research site, 
• to elaborate on the data collection, 
• to discuss the levels of analysis, the tools used, the procedure of data analysis 
and management, and 
• to discuss issues of validity and generalisability, limitations and 
methodological reflections. 
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4.2 Research questions and aims 
The main goal of this study is to understand the process of deinstitutionalisation and 
the role of sensemaking therein. The fundamental task hence is to capture the 
idiosyncratic dynamics of institutions ranging from the origins of deterioration to the 
consequences and manner of changes. In addition, this research emphasises the 
significance of actors' sensemaking in explaining the reciprocity between agents and 
contexts during the deinstitutionalisation process. By definition, deinstitutionalisation 
is the deterioration or discontinuity of well-established institutions. The occurrence 
of deinstitutionalisation generates interruption to ongoing flows of thoughts and 
actions. These abnormalities call for immediate attention to reinstate order and 
sensemaking is the response. In other words, deinstitutionalisation can be seen as an 
institutional process where old institutions lose legitimacy then are rebuilt but an 
important part of the transition involves the micro-level coping progress of groups of 
individuals experiencing analogous threat to their identities. In order to fully 
appreciate the mutual relationship between institutions and agents during the 
deinstitutionalisation process, it is therefore essential to understand the process of 
sensemaking therein. 
For the sake of clarification and as guidance for analysis, two research questions 
were formed. The first question, "How does the deinstitutionalisation process 
unfold?" highlights the trajectory and progression of deinstitutionalisation by 
focusing on a sequence of critical turning points and by assessing internal and 
external settings that drive the transformation of outdated institutions. If the aim of 
the first question is an overall picture at the macro level, the second one, "What 
impact does organisational sensemaking have on the pace and outcome of the 
deinstitutionalisation process?" turns our attention to microprocesses underlying 
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those institutional movements. Although institutional and sensemaking processes are 
different, there is an important connection between them as sensemaking occurs 
within the boundary of institutional and social contexts whilst cognition and 
sensemaking at individual level is one of the three mechanisms (together with 
normative and regulative) that created and reinforced institutions (Scott, 2001). The 
second research question targets this reciprocal link. The deinstitutionalisation 
process might be instigated and driven by institutional agents; however, the influence 
of other stakeholders such as employees and third parties should not be 
underestimated. Whether institutional agents and other stakeholders are in agreement 
or conflict, deinstitutionalisation is eventually the product of resistance, negotiation 
and alliance. In other words, organisations experience deinstitutionalisation as a 
collective, therefore group and organisational sensemaking are as important as 
individual sensemaking. 
In detail, to comprehend key elements of the deinstitutionalisation process, the more 
specific objective was to investigate the historical and institutional circumstances 
leading to deinstitutionalisation, the process of tension build-up, the critical events 
that intensify sensemaking and the social construction (or rather reconstruction) of 
lost meanings, through which individuals and organisations learn to adapt to new 
logics and practices. Likewise, the impact of institutional agents on organisational 
sensemaking and factors intervening in the sensemaking process were considered. 
Several related questions were developed to elaborate the two main research 
questions (based on Pettigrew, 1997). These questions acted as focal points of my 
inVestigation; on the one hand, they defined the boundary of my study while ensuring 
that all important information on internal and external factors was incorporated and 
Was sufficient for the most comprehensive examination possible. For the first 
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research question, concerning the deinstitutionalisation process, the supplementary 
questions were: 
• What are the key sequences of events? 
• What and who are the critical events and actors? And what are their main 
movements? 
• What events or contextual factors impact on this core stream of activity? 
• Is there evidence of path dependency? 
• Who are the winners and losers, supporters and disengaged of the 
deinstitutionalisation process? 
• Are there different paces of deinstitutionalisation for different parts of 
organisation? 
• What are the intended and unintended consequences of deinstitutionalisation? 
For the second research question, covering stakeholders and organisational 
sensemaking, the guiding questions were: 
• Who are the most powerful actors and what are their activities? 
• What are the influences these key actors have on the rest of the employees 
and organisational sensemaking process? And by what means are these 
influences executed? 
• What are the factors that shape individual and group sensemaking? 
• Are there different styles of sensemaking for different groups? 
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• What are the outcomes of group sensemaking for each unit? 
Since the subject of this study is the deinstitutionalisation - so called the transitional 
process of institutions, the processual approach is deemed the most suitable strategy. 
Van de Ven (1992) defines process as "a sequence of events that describe how things 
change over time" (p. 169). As such, processual analysis allows us to observe 
changes in action to offer description and explanation of what, how and why 
individuals and social interactions engage in the sequence of particular events i.e. 
deinstitutionalisation. In order to do so, it is important to recognise that historical and 
institutional contexts are a large part of processual research since path dependency 
provides causality or antecedent conditions of subsequent events and actions 
(Pettigrew, 1997). As a processual study, this thesis was hence designed to capture 
the reciprocity between agents and contexts as changes in contexts stimulate 
alternative behaviours, which in turn reshape contexts. The other purpose was to 
unearth generative mechanisms controlling processes while taking into account 
factors affecting surrounding environments. 
4.3 Research design 
Processual research seeking to understand organisational changes over a long period 
of time suits the type of design with the capacity to explicate the unfolding 
temporality element of change (Dawson, 1997). In this study, I used longitudinal 
single-cased study to capture a deep, rich and holistic picture of social settings and 
interactions among actors and variables inherent in deinstitutionalisation as well as to 
follow the trails of developing processes. 
By definition, processes are dynamic, evolving, complex with many different sets of 
factors manipulating their course, and understandably lengthy, easily lasting for 
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years or even decades (Hinings, 1997). Deinstitutionalisation process is no exception. 
Therefore, to trace the conditional path of processes over a long period of time, the 
longitudinal approach is regarded as the most appropriate for this study (Poole, 
Dooley and Holmes, 2000). Moreover, as the majority of information is about past 
events commenced long before the research begins, a crucial aspect of this 
longitudinal study is retrospective (Dawson, 1997). Accordingly, in combination 
with data gathered at the present time, I paid special attention to backdated data 
concerning the time of occurrence or perhaps even before that if antecedent 
conditions are needed. 
Understanding of deinstitutionalisation is not confined to descriptions of the 
phenomenon, however. It necessitates careful elaboration of causal conditions and 
intervening factors to explicate the origin, direction and destination of events and to 
seize the evolution and to extricate webs of interconnected forces. In light of this 
approach, aiming to investigate the process of deinstitutionalisation dating back to 
the 1990s, this study examined the process by considering historical, economic and 
social reasons underlying such development. Put differently, the target change 
process was not studied independently but was put in context to explain its existence, 
pace and trajectory. Although the focus was on deinstitutionalisation of 
organisational practices, the source of change might be the asymmetries between 
levels of contexts (Pettigrew, 1990) i.e. deinstitutionalisation happens because 
organisations are unable or unwilling to adapt to changes in the industry or economy. 
Alongside external environments, it was realised that movements from within the 
organisation play an equally important role. Since the process started in the 1990s, 
retrospective data was gathered (via interviews) from the same group of participants 
on one or more occasions about their sensernaking of past events, their initial 
80 
responses to those incidents and the measures they took in the adaptation process. In 
addition, historical and retrospective data were supplemented by current conditions at 
national and organisational levels making the connection between the past, present 
and future. Briefly, in an attempt to reconstruct the progress of deinstitutionalisation, 
a contextual approach was selected where the interconnectedness between structures 
and actions was evaluated over time. Deinstitutionalisation, then, was taken as the 
consequence of a mixture of conditions that led to switching events and a 
combination of external factors and actions within the organisations that encouraged 
transition to take a certain route. The unfolding of deinstitutionalisation was also 
traced back to previous periods by constructing retrospective accounts of recipients' 
sensemaking at that time. The collection of sensemaking accounts about the past as 
well as the present time not only resolved the issue of time in longitudinal study, it 
also helped reveal the reciprocity between contexts and agents i.e. to explore how 
structures were the products of sensemaking and actions and vice versa. 
Among several strategies of enquiry, the case study approach is the most appropriate 
for my purpose. In-depth case studies are described as a "research strategy where 
contexts are parts of the designs. Within this, a number of methods may be used, 
either qualitative or quantitative or both" (Cassell and Symon, 2010, p. 323). Due to 
their designs, case studies can provide rich and detailed information, which can be 
used for either theory-building or providing description. Certain kinds of research 
questions are more suitable for case study research, such as 'how' and 'why' 
questions or when a theory is at its formative stage and/or research is in areas where 
a phenomenon is dynamic and not yet mature. For these reasons, my research 
questions lend themselves comfortably to the case study approach as the framework 
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of deinstitutionalisation is under-developed and the nature of factors precipitating or 
enabling deinstitutionalisation is little studied. 
Moreover, the case study approach taking contexts as a major component provided a 
holistic picture of organisations (Yin, 2009) and it captured the temporal essence of 
processual research. The descriptive representation of the deinstitutionalisation case 
was done chronologically where subsequent events were interpreted as the direct 
consequence of previous incidents. For interpretive studies emphasising process 
rather than structure or content, such as this study, the storyline with a sense of 
continuity was a powerful constructive tool. The interpretive analysis method used 
for the most part in this study was focused on content as opposed to structure. The 
evaluative content-orientation demonstrated holistic insights of a single, complete 
account, which obviously did not preclude socio-psychological contexts i.e. 
individuals are not isolated but rather are individuals within society. The collected 
accounts of sensemaking of deinstitutionalisation therefore concentrated on how 
meanings inherent in extracted cues and meanings drawn out of them were 
constructed to comprehend current actions or events. 
4.4 Case selection 
The case investigated in this thesis was a state-owned enterprise operated in 
Vietnam. The focus of analysis is the transformation of institutions and there is no 
doubt that such transition has occurred in Vietnam. The country abandoned the 
communist central-planning system, which was once the core of war and economic 
survival, for a more efficient market-oriented alternative (Ashwill and Thai, 2003; 
Griffin, 1998; Melling and Roper, 1991; Litvack and Rondinelli, 1999; Roman, 
1999). Given my interest in the role of sensemaking during deinstitutionalisation and 
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other factors that might stand in the way of a smooth and quick transition, I chose a 
large, important state-owned company as a single case for investigation. It was 
sensible to anticipate that complicated connections between the company, society 
(represented by the media) and the government, its pivotal position in the 
Vietnamese economy and the fact that old institutions had been maintained for a long 
time might pose tremendously challenging obstacles if deinstitutionalisation manages 
to reach the finishing line. In short, this case was chosen for its rich content and high 
level of experience of the deinstitutionalisation process. 
Vietnam is an interesting case as the country has struggled for thousands of years 
against wars and instability that few other countries had experienced (Gainsborough, 
2002a). As with other former socialist Eastern European and Southeast Asian 
countries, the Vietnamese government has played a central role in national domestic 
activities. The socialist system was very successful once during wars and in 
stabilising the broken economy in the post-war period but in today's rapidly 
changing and competitive world economy, it no longer works. After many years of 
protection and control from the government, state-owned enterprises, the main 
engine of growth, were inefficient, over-manned and becoming a burden for the state 
budget. For survival, Vietnam restructured state-owned companies and redefined the 
relationship with the government and between public and private businesses (Wolff, 
1999). Decentralisation was one of the most important features of economic and 
social reforms that occurred throughout the area. Although each journey has its own 
characters reflecting national idiosyncrasies, deinstitutionalisation processes (of 
central-planning regime) in all these cases or other contexts share significant 
similarities in terms of antecedent conditions, progression and outcomes. 
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Since the 1980s, the Vietnamese government has focused its attention on large-scale 
refonn to accelerate the transition to a market-oriented economy. Decentralisation of 
key state-owned enterprises in conjunction with modernisation and industrialisation 
in many pivotal industries has brought Vietnam closer to truly joining the global 
economy. These transfonnations cover a wide range of cultural, economic, social, 
political and institutional issues and extend the impact to every part of the country 
and its people. It is expected that the adoption of many key elements of the open 
market (e.g. the launch of a stock market and more open trading laws) means the 
desertion of signature elements of a closed economy and Confucian culture. 
Deinstitutionalisation in cases like Vietnam, whereby some (if not all) of the most 
fundamental values and manners are questioned and abandoned, demands more than 
just simple adaptation to new things. Here, what is asked of the country and the 
people is an extensive transformation of their identities and behaviours. This process 
of deinstitutionalisation demands more than just economic or political alterations; it 
is a socio-psychological process that is uncertain in nature. The ability to cope in this 
situation depends not only on cognitive capacity but also on emotional competence, 
political and social ties. Unsurprisingly, deinstitutionalisation in Vietnam at societal, 
economic or business level alike is qualitatively different from that of developed 
countries or other organisational episodes where deinstitutionalisation only entails 
the abandonment of business practices. 
The actual research site, a formerly state-owned, bureaucratic company called 
Electricity of Vietnam (EVN hereafter) resembles the process of 
deinstitutionalisation at national level since EVN, like many other state-owned 
companies, has taken over control (from government) on operational and production 
activities and been renovating many organisational aspects (ownership style, 
84 
corporate governance, management style and work-related values) (Master Plan VI, 
2006). In addition, given its complicated web of institutional linkages (with 
government, society, media, employees and business partners), the process of 
deinstitutionalisation in EVN offers many fruitful insights because of the large 
number of actors involved, the interrelations among different forces and the 
uncertain future that puts many individuals in doubt. Due to its connection with the 
government and its pivotal position for the economy, deinstitutionalisation in the 
case of EVN takes place both at organisational level (in terms of practices and beliefs 
within the organisation) and at institutional level (in terms of the relationship with 
the government). It can be said that deinstitutionalisation in the case of EVN has two 
equally significant momentums: one is driven by outsiders i.e. the effort of the 
government and the people (via media) to alter the behaviours of key actors of the 
power sector; the other lies within EVN i.e. the will to become more competitive in 
the face of undeniable performance crisis and upcoming competition once the free 
market for electricity is open. Examination of the deinstitutionalisation process in 
EVN considering both internal as well as external factors that push and pull the 
process in different directions will disclose relative strengths of different forces and 
the nature of their relationship. Moreover, in the face of the current global and 
domestic economic crisis, external environments surrounding EVN become more 
intricate and uncertain thus exacerbate judgements and the sensemaking process. 
Conditions influencing sensemaking abilities in this context might enlighten our 
understanding about how difficulties obstructing sensemaking might slow down the 
deinstitutionalisation process. 
In contrast to the situation where the aim of the case study is to test existing theory, 
for the generation of new theory random selection is not essential (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
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So how was the case in this study chosen? Site selection in this study was led mainly 
by the highly visible or intense experience of the phenomenon under study 
(Pettigrew, 1990). It started with the deinstitutionalisation and sensemaking 
processes set out in the previous chapter. Given the emphasis on disruptions to on-
going institutions and how organisational sensemaking as a social, emotional and 
political process either paves the way or stalls deinstitutionalisation, the case with 
well-established institutions in place and significant disparity between old and new 
institutions might offer more insights. Since vast distortions are more likely to 
provoke intense emotions during sensemaking, resistance movements to protect 
previous institutions tend to be more widespread and powerful. Undoubtedly, they all 
influence how fast old institutions transfonn and what characteristics new institutions 
possess. Apart from the interest in bottom-up reactions, the role and influence of 
institutional agents as the drive behind deinstitutionalisation was highlighted in the 
theoretical framework (chapter 3). The case selected for this study indicates this 
point of reference as although deinstitutionalisation was initiated and directed by 
institutional agents, the pace and outcome was a product of collective interactions. 
The second consideration concerns the impact of sensemaking and the transition of 
the deinstitutionalisation process. The word 'transition' implies the act of passing 
from one state to the next and to capture sensemaking at that crucial moment, the 
case chosen should still be in the process of changing but ideally near the end of its 
course where institutions to some degree take its new fonn. It pennits a holistic 
comparison of two states without sacrificing present sensemaking. Having said that, 
to trace deinstitutionalisation in its initial stage, collection of retrospective 
sensemaking must be feasible. The final decision of case selection, however, was 
also influenced by ability to negotiate access. For this reason, there might be other 
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cases qualified for the categorisation above; the actual case in this study was chosen 
due to the available connection between the researcher and the company. 
4.5 Data collection 
Data was primarily qualitative and collection was intensive over five years and 
divided into two periods (2006 - 2007 and 2008 - 2011). Given the amount of data 
required in longitudinal single-cased study, I used multiple sources from both 
primary and secondary categories. Two main sources were documentation and semi-
structured in-depth interviews with the aid of observations. I will give more detail on 
these after the sampling methods section. 
4.5.1 PUIposive. theoretical and networking sampling 
To increase the validity and reliability of research, it is crucial to ensure that a valid 
method of sampling was used. Since case studies are sometimes criticised for their 
lack of generalisability and single cases come in for particularly strong criticism, 
researchers solve this generalisability issue by making comparative analysis between 
chosen units. This is known as purposive and theoretical sampling techniques 
(Silverman, 2010). In contrast with research that relies completely on random 
sampling, randomness is not the main concern of theoretical sampling. Such 
sampling procedures are used to ensure samples make good representatives of the 
whole population with the intention that broader inferences are gained. Apart from 
quick and easy access, participants and groups are chosen where the process being 
studied is most likely to occur and to demonstrate the robustness of theoretical 
propositions across different settings (Denzin and Lincoln, 2010). This way, although 
only one single case is examined, greater insight can be gained by considering 
various types of unit reactions. Each of these units represents a type of background 
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that is most likely to incur in particular activities. In the organisational context, units 
can be departments, teams or groups of people sharing a view, attitude or behaviour 
(leaders versus nonnal employees). These units are selected to make sure they 
represent as wide as possible a collection of settings. 
Participant selection was done prior to the second field trip in March 2010. In 
keeping with the theoretical framework, two main categories were taken as the focal 
point: sensegivers/institutional agents and sensemakers/receivers of institutional 
change where managers and heads of departments played both roles and employees 
as sensemakerslreceivers only. Since generalisability increases with larger sample 
size, my intention was to interview as many sensegivers as I possibly could. To 
acquire consent, letters were then sent and calls were made to all five managers, 34 
heads and deputy heads of 17 departments. As a result, three managers and 15 heads 
agreed to take part, the majority of who were senior and experienced persons. 
With the rest of the employees, besides a group of five employees whom I had 
personal contact with from a previous project, networking was used as the strategy to 
increase the size of my sample. This is the technique where researchers ask 
participants for recommendations of other appropriate individuals (Saunders et al. 
2007). As a result, 50 additional contact names were acquired and contacted for 
involvement in this study. Of 50 names that were contacted, 15 agreed to be 
interviewed. Snowball sampling was discontinued at interview ten when the next ten 
interviews had been scheduled, totalling 20. Although networking might be biased to 
a certain extent in case participants only recommend people with similar points of 
view, this technique still has credit in demonstrating the pervasiveness of the process 
under study. Moreover, recommendation bias was possibly minimised as initial 
participants were deliberately asked to suggest people with similar views as well as 
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those who might think otherwise. The duration each participant had stayed with the 
company varied, however, the threshold was set at 16 (years) for the sake of 
comparison between seniors who personally experienced deinstitutionalisation at 
critical point and those did not. 
Table 1 Summary of participant background 
Categories Total Work history (years) 
< 16 >16 
Managers 3 0 3 
Team leaders 15 2 13 
(Head and 
Deputy) 
Employees 20 5 15 
Additionally, purposive sampling techniques were applied to department selection. 
Out of all nine departments that participants came from, I chose to examine in more 
detail three departments: International Corporation, Emulation and Propaganda and 
Corporate Planning, which had the most members taking part in this study or had 
recently undergone big changes. This decision was motivated by the amount of data 
provided by the large number of participants in each case, enough to alleviate within-
units analysis (within department) as well as between-units (between departments). 
Put differently, sensemaking of the leader versus the workers of the same department 
and sensemaking of leaders and non-leaders across the three departments were 
compared and contrasted. This choice of departments was also theoretically oriented 
since it was expected that different communication and leadership styles might affect 
collective sensemaking and behaviours hence deinstitutionalisation in different 
departments. 
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4.5.2 Documentations and historical analysis 
Documentations and historical analysis discover what happened in the past and 
provide prior knowledge for interviews and observations (Marshall and Rossman, 
2011). Historical analysis is especially useful for under-developed topics for it 
fosters relationship establishment among variables and causal linkages among 
events. It also provides a chronological order of events that helps in the 
reconstruction of the whole process of deinstitutionalisation from start to end. A list 
of all information sources is included in Appendix A. 
To ensure the reliability of analysis, I used a variety of sources including government 
websites, published reports by independent organisations (e.g. World Bank), archival 
data of public sources and company resources. Similar to participant sampling, 
documentation is also a selective process. Out of all available documents related to 
the case study and its external conditions, attention was paid to critical events 
(restructuring) and their implications for institutions of management practices, not 
financial or developmental aspects of these changes. Also, only documents regarding 
conditions that might directly contribute to the deinstitutionalisation process in the 
case were considered. From sources such as government websites and social and 
cultural literatures, information was gathered on the economic and social conditions 
of Vietnam, government schemes for the electricity industry as well as public and 
media opinions about the restructuring. Documents about the case consisted of 
company annual reports, websites, newsletters, sector magazines, codes of conduct, 
guidelines for implementation of responsibilities and changes specifying the chain of 
command and sphere of communication. 
At preparation stage, before data collection and analysis were conducted, extensive 
documentary data was collected providing information on existing institutions and 
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sources of deinstitutionalisation (disruptions to sensemaking flows) and sources of 
influencing factors (government intervention, impacts of media, social expectation 
and so on). This collection and analysis of historical documents was crucial as it 
helped me identify key actors and critical events in the deinstitutionalisation process. 
These individuals and events were the focus of my subsequent interviews and further 
data collection. Therefore, this step defined units of analysis, levels of contexts 
(external and internal) and the time frame for this study. As the process went on, 
documentations were replaced by interviews and observations as the main sources 
for materials. However, news and policy updates were continued to be collected, 
interpreted and incorporated into the analysis if relevant. 
4.5.3 Semi-structured in-depth interviews triangulated with observations 
In-depth interviews are the most suitable methodology to get participants' point of 
view while observations can verify the accuracy of such claims and allow researchers 
to reflect on their role as an insider. Semi-structured interviews give researchers the 
flexibility to manage an unexpected turn of responses while still ensuring that 
interviews focus on a series of chosen topics. Meanwhile, observations of 
organisational activities and group communication offer infonnation about particular 
settings and interaction between subjects (Marshall and Rossman, 2011). 
Combining interviews and observation facilitates the cross-variation of data and the 
integration of contextual observations with attitudinal data from interviews (Dawson, 
1997). This is a crucial step in ensuring validity of longitudinal data and study. 
Observations of organisation practices should be verified in interviews or vice versa. 
Disconfirmation can be used as guidance for further interviews and theory testing. 
These two techniques also provide backup for one another when data collection on a 
particular issue appears to be difficult. 
After the research questions were fonnulated and adequate knowledge was gained on 
past and present institutional and organisational contexts, I moved on to collect 
infonnation from participants. Primary data were collected directly through 
interviews and indirectly via observations of company activities. Interviews were 
recorded when allowed by interviewees and then transcribed. In total, there were two 
visits (in 2009 and 2010), 33 internet conversations, 42 face-to-face interviews and 
10 email exchanges. Some participants were interviewed more than once. The first 
round of collection of documentations and internet conversations was first carried out 
in 2007 (when I researched my MA thesis which was about the same topic as this 
PhD thesis). The second round of data collection took place from 2009 until 2011. In 
March 2009, five interviews were done with one manager, one head of department, 
two senior and one junior employee, lasting between 30 minutes and 1 hour. At this 
time, theoretical and conceptual frameworks were mostly completed and these five 
interviews aimed to test initial theory. The findings of these data were incorporated 
into theory development and were mainly exploratory. The main collection was 
carried out in March 2010. This time, I did 37 face-to-face in-depth interviews, the 
majority of which were individual interviews with one focus group of two 
participants. The duration of face-to-face interviews varied considerably, ranging 
from 20-30 minutes with young employees to approximately 2 hours with managers 
and heads of department. Much data from young employees were necessarily thin 
and were about present state since they did not experience transfonnation when it 
first started. It was scheduled that participants from the same department were 
interviewed consecutively and heads of department were last. This was aimed to take 
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issues raised by the previous participant into discussion in the next interviews. In 
addition, questions were checked constantly to incorporate emerging themes and to 
set aside saturated issues. Interviews with managers took place when all interviews 
with employees finished and questions were carefully reviewed beforehand because I 
neither had a second chance nor a great amount of time with managers as I had with 
employees. I could come back for more information with employees if needed. 
Interviews were conducted in an empty meeting room and were recorded. When 
recording was not possible, extensive notes were made and subsequently typed up. 
For this study, semi-structured interviews mainly aimed to put together participant 
accounts of the events that triggered the deinstitutionalisation process and its impact 
on organisational practices and philosophy. Semi-structured interviews centred 
around important past events and current issues, focusing on different ways by which 
meanings were socially constructed such as negotiation, coercion or persuasion. 
Participants were encouraged to recall their emotional response to the anxiety caused 
by disruptions of routines and delegitimacy of well-established values as well as the 
progression of any group or individual coping therapy. Special attention was also 
paid to the ways these emotions affected sensemaking and the course of behavioural 
alteration. Seeking to integrate the political side of organisational sensemaking, 
participants were asked to rank the credibility of different sources of information 
from which they might collect cues and possible explanations including government, 
managers, heads of department, colleagues and the media. These were mutually 
exclusive sources of sensegiving if they differed and the winner played a crucial part 
in shaping organisational sensemaking and deinstitutionalisation outcomes. With the 
anticipation that deinstitutionalisation processes in different departments might have 
their own momentum and trajectory, further details were collected on how 
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departmental characteristics (communication and leadership) influenced 
sensemaking and motivations for changed behaviour. This comparative analysis 
helped understand how leadership, communication and group coping patterns of 
different departments with diverse accounts of sensemaking might alter the pace and 
outcome of the deinstitutionalisation process in different areas of the same 
organisations despite the fact that they experienced the same pressure to 
deinstitutionalise. 
Since interviews were semi-structured, these questions were guidance only; 
participants were encouraged to mention any issues they deemed important to the 
subject under study. Further questions were also raised to find out why this was the 
case and how this affected sensemaking and deinstitutionalisation. Initial interviews 
were more exploratory in nature to aid theory-building but became increasingly 
focused over time to test the robustness of the theoretical framework. Repetition in 
response from further participants was taken as a sign of saturation and at that point 
the interview process ended. Interview questions are included in Appendix B. 
Observations were intended to supplement or to validate interview data. 
Observations lasted between 30 minutes and 2 hours depending on the type of 
activities and the time available. Overall, I observed 27 group processes and formal 
meetings/discussions, of which 21 were informal and six formal. During 
observations, I paid special attention to the ways members of the same departments 
interacted, between different departments and between leaders and employees in 
addition to how meanings of concepts were constructed and shared. Any emotional 
or relational influence and the means to exercise them were also recorded. 
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Table 2 Summary of data sources 
Interviews 
Managers 
Heads and Deputies 
Employees 
Email exchanges / internet conversations 
Formal 
6 
25 
30 
Heads and Deputies 3 
Employees 25 
Observations 
Formal team meeting / discussions 2 
Group processes 4 
4.6 Data analysis 
4.6.1 Multi-level analYSis 
Informal 
3 
5 
15 
15 
14 
7 
A clear definition of unit(s) of analysis helps set the boundaries of the research but 
identifying the contexts in which the phenomenon of interest occurs is equally 
important. Indeed, the ability to deal with contextual conditions is the advantage of 
the case study method (Yin, 2009). The main unit of analysis in this study is the 
deinstitutionalisation of organisational management. This process can be found in 
cognitive, regulative or normative aspects of the organisational institutions therefore 
sensemaking accounts, regulations and rules, norms and values were defined as 
subunits of analysis and required data collection and analysis at corresponding levels. 
Because each of these subunits is individualistic and interpersonal activity at the 
same time, multi levels of contexts were studied. In other words, analysis was 
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performed at two levels: organisational and individual. A single study can investigate 
more than one level of analysis, using either the top-down or bottom-up approach 
(Scott, 2001). However, these two approaches can be complementary to one another 
and the combination of both approaches should be beneficial. By using the top-down 
and bottom-up approaches simultaneously like this, the collected data in this study 
provided a holistic view of institutional impacts as well as interpretations and 
responses from both initiators and receivers of deinstitutionalisation. The 
investigation of the complex interactions among institution-creating factors or the 
resolve of conflicts and institutional pressure will be more fruitful considering both 
sides of the coin. 
4.6.2 Content analysis 
Content analysis is a technique that allows researchers to analyse unstructured data in 
terms of their meanings, symbolic expression or expressive role and attitudes 
(Krippendorff, 2004). Krippendorff (2004) suggested six analytical constructs of 
content analysis in terms of their uses and inferences made from them. The 
categories are extrapolations, standards, indices and symptoms, linguistic 
representation, conversations and institutional processes. 
One of the most straightforward uses of content analysis is the extrapolation of 
patterns and differences. The pattern/difference that was the focus of this study is the 
way participants make sense of deinstitutionalisation, their subsequent behavioural 
changes and impacts on the deinstitutionalisation process. Patterns of sensemaking 
were inferred from the recurrence of particular themes found in the majority of 
responses and differences were identified from characteristics of deviant cases. 
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Other relevant uses of content analysis for this thesis are standards and indices of 
institutional processes. The application of standards for identifying and evaluating 
the existence and extent of deinstitutionalisation involved comparing changes in 
rules, values, norms and sensemaking of EVN at employee and organisational levels 
against previous institutions. These changes were also used as Indices and Symptoms 
describing transitional institutions or associating two variables such as sensemaking 
and outcomes and paces of deinstitutionalisation. For example, I used the presence of 
a reference as an indicator of a participant's awareness or knowledge (e.g. the 
deinstitutionalisation rationale, the role of managers or the new concepts that 
deinstitutionalisation introduced); the frequency of occurrence as an indicator of 
importance (e.g. the role of different agents in collective sensemaking); the use of 
favourable or unfavourable adjectives as indicators of attitudes; and frequency of co-
occurrence as indicator of strength of association between two variables e.g. between 
sensemaking and deinstitutionalisation outcomes and paces (Krippendorff, 2004). 
4.6.3 Data analysis procedure 
For better clarification, data analysis was separated into four stages. 
Stage 1: Constructing narratives of the deinstitutionalisation process 
During this initial stage, I first developed an account that chronicled the process of 
deinstitutionalisation in EVN. The narrative was reconstructed using five episodes 
(old institutions, antecedents, switching events, institutional transfonnation and 
alternative institutions) of the deinstitutionalisation as the core categories. Using both 
documentaries and interviews, data were collected accordingly to elaborate the 
dynamics of these categories. Critical (switching) events were identified by analysing 
external sources such as the government's master plans for equitisation and the 
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development schedule of the competitive electricity market or they were directly 
inquired about in interview questions. These included internal issues such as 
perfonnance problems, changes in political agenda, business objectives, human 
resource management or managerial practices, or changes in conditions of external 
environments that had direct impact on the company. These events were crucial for 
the understanding of the deinstitutionalisation process because they represented 
sensegiving opportunities for institutional agents (about the existing problematic 
institutions and the benefits gained from deinstitutionalisation) and sensemaking 
occasions for those involved in the deinstitutionalisation process. 
The aim of this stage is to answer question 1, "How does the deinstitutionalisation 
process unfold?" which focuses on the description of sequences of events. The 
sequential patterns were vital to the explanation of the phenomenon because 
narratives also created a picture of the underlying causal linkages, generative 
mechanism and evaluative contexts by creating a chain linking events together 
(Elliott, 2005). In particular, this narrative described "who did what and when" 
(Maguire and Hardy, 2009) and how their accumulating actions led to 
deinstitutionalisation in EVN. In addition, a cross-sectional analysis highlighted the 
progressive nature of deinstitutionalisation. Comparative analysis of two consecutive 
periods (pre-1994 and post-1994) helped evaluate the pervasiveness of 
deinstitutionalisation and reveal characteristics of the new management institutions. 
The temporal classification of two periods was based on the historical event that 
marked the inception of the Electricity of Vietnam Corporation and the end of the 
bureaucratic era. 
Stage 2: Constructing sensemaking accounts and emotional responses of participants 
First, sensemaking accounts were constructed about how participants viewed major 
events that led to deinstitutionalisation at EVN and the subsequent change process. 
This step started with listing of switching events, all changes in rules, values and 
practices or organisational issues arising since those events took place. 
Organisational issues were defined as having broad consequences to the organisation 
as a whole, not subgroups of its members. The list was then shortened by eliminating 
those matters only available from a limited source or not considered of great 
significance by participants and was modified on the basis of interviews with 
participants. 
For each event, issue or change, the participants were asked about their opinions 
and/or adapting mechanisms during interviews. These points of discussion were the 
transformations of cognition (the discourse of shared meanings of new norms, rules 
and practices), the main sources of information used for sensemaking (external 
sources vs. leaders vs. colleagues) and most importantly, the social negotiation of 
new orders. Attention was also directed at the role and activities of institutional 
agents who keenly promoted deinstitutionalisation by proffering associated benefits 
with successful outcomes and emphasising the costs of retaining old inefficient 
institutions. During interviews, participants were asked to evaluate the credibility and 
effectiveness of these activities. The issue of trust and leader credibility played a 
crucial role in determining whether participants took the views of institutional agents 
and supported the deinstitutionalisation process. Failure to execute efficient 
sensegiving might jeopardise the whole process. In terms of sensemaking at 
organisational level, participants were asked to describe communication in general 
and in their departments in particular. Negotiating order and scope for employee 
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involvement was underlined. Overall, sensemaking accounts represented individual 
views on organisational coping strategy. Their evaluations on sensegiving activities, 
leader credibility, communication and participation opportunities detennined how 
and which sensemaking account(s) were more attractive to them. 
Cognitive adaptation is not the only coping strategy that organisations use to deal 
with changes; it has been proven that emotional sympathy and emotional contagion 
help organisations unify differentiated sensemaking accounts (Bartunek et ai, 2006). 
Hence, in addition to sensemaking, emotional responses are the other important 
elements. Recognising that resistance to change phenomena has as much to do with 
psychological need as people's dislike of uncertainty and the exploration of emotions 
provides more complete understanding of organisational changes and 
deinstitutionalisation (Mossholder et ai, 2001; Baruch and Lambert, 2006; Vakola et 
ai, 2003). I therefore sought to construct accounts of initial emotional response and 
processes of emotional coping. Emotional response is a story that describes the 
provocative nature of emotions and its background which helps explain subsequent 
actions and how they turn out (Lazarus, 1994). Just as emotions playa part in 
understanding behaviours, coping strategy encompasses emotional-focused as well as 
relational- and informational-focused processes. These mechanisms intertwine and 
impact upon one another as individuals move from one emotional and relational 
context to the next. In the context of deinstitutionalisation, for which massive 
transformation is required, intense feelings will be provoked, especially negative 
emotions caused by unfavourable conditions such as anxiety, hostility, anger and 
depression. In the construction of emotion responses, relational and institutional 
background cannot be overlooked as they provide antecedent conditions explaining 
the origins of such emotions and therapy possibilities. To put these insights into 
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practice, participants were asked to talk about their personal goals, to comment on 
past events and processes of change. In particular, they were encouraged to express 
personal feelings and how they dealt with them. 
Stage 3: Identifying patterns and themes 
The next stage of the analysis involved identifying the main narrative themes, 
patterns and dissimilarities among narrative accounts. By searching for patterns and 
themes, this analysis moves from surface levels to deeper levels (Pentland, 1999, 
p.719) thereby offers causal description and explanation (Elliot, 2005) between 
variables at a later stage. Without categorisation, accounts simply appear as 
alternative stories of the same deinstitutionalisation process; deeper meanings about 
causality and generative mechanisms underlying different sensemaking accounts 
would have been overlooked (Elliot, 2005) and explanations of variations in response 
to deinstitutionalisation initiatives would not have been possible. 
The case study was organised around four meta-themes: a) loss of efficiency and 
effectiveness; b) loss of value and meaning; c) loss of legitimacy and d) loss of trust 
(in leaders and sensegivers). The loss of efficiency and effectiveness was meant to be 
supported by evidence like apparent performance and functional problems, 
bottlenecks, impractical goals and routines. In comparison, the loss of value and 
meaning was more subtle and less visible to the naked eyes. Evidence pointed to the 
deterioration of shared values would be the presence or in more serious case, the 
promotions of new values. These values must gain sufficient influences among 
organisational members to be considered as alternatives. The loss of legitimacy could 
range from mere expression of doubt to the direct confrontation of the old ways. 
Evidence of which fonn the loss of legitimacy took signified the extent to which 
101 
replacement was likely and perhaps also the moment when this would occur. Finally, 
the loss of trust in leaders and sensegivers would be reflected in the fact that 
employees sought another source of sensegiving or gave outspoken expression of 
distrust. These four themes were the underlying guide in the construction of this 
narrative case. 
In searching for patterns of organisational sensemaking, I focused on the 
consistencies in the ways by which leaders (institutional agents) disseminated their 
opinions and orders, how other stakeholders communicated to each other and to 
leaders as well as the origin of the main sources of information that subsequently 
formed their sensemaking. Additionally, I was looking for evidence, or the lack of it, 
of emotional bonding as a way of self-defence towards hostile situations. If these 
bonds existed, the evidence would be indicated by harmonious cognition and mutual 
communication. Otherwise, lack of empathy and sympathy would result in conflicts 
or disagreements. 
Given the amount of information sought in case studies, multi-case design is believed 
by some researchers to be best able to accommodate high demand of data. However, 
sophisticated and well-designed, single-case can also offer rich information. To deal 
with single case constraint, I built a comparative element into the design to allow for 
better exploitation of data. This is known as between-units and within-unit analysis. 
For between-units analysis, data were categorised into departments for comparison 
whereas within-unit analysis required contrasting leaders against employees within 
same department. Comparative analysis revealed more dimensions of the same sets 
of data than when no comparative element was employed. In doing this, the role of 
contexts was highlighted as within-case comparative analysis allowed "the possibility 
to explain how and why variations in contexts and process shape variability in the 
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observed outcome" (Pettigrew, 1997, p. 342). Within case comparative analysis not 
only examined different angles of data, hence a more comprehensive understanding, 
categorisation of data into groups linked analysis to variation in outcomes of the 
deinstitutionalisation process. This is one of the most important purposes of 
processual research since it would be pointless to analyse a process without 
discussing its consequence or impacts, which acts as a focal point for the whole 
investigation (Pettigrew, 1997). 
Stage 4: Identifying causal linkages and generative mechanisms 
During this final stage, I identified causal linkages between sensemaking and 
deinstitutionalisation outcomes as well as underlying mechanisms (which is the 
manner in which a cause generates its effect (Elliott, 2005) that drove the 
deinstitutionalisation process. This last stage of analysis aimed to provide an 
explanation, not just a description, for the generative structures enabling and 
constraining the process of deinstitutionalisation. In order to understand the 
relationship between sensemaking and deinstitutionalisation, I also took into 
consideration the contexts in which this causal relationship held (or failed) and a 
complex set of internal and external factors that manipulated the connection. 
Handling the combination of multi-level, past and present data might be a heavy task 
since it is difficult to disentangle the complicated process into interpretable units for 
description and explanation. Moreover, to explain the role of sensemaking during the 
deinstitutionalisation process, a link between sensemaking narratives and 
deinstitutionalisation outcomes must be established. To deal with these, researchers 
use the strategy described in Langley (1999) as Temporal Bracketing for theory 
building and data analysis. As Langley suggested, "with this strategy. a shapeless 
103 
mass of process data is transformed into a series of more discrete but connected 
blocks" (1999, p. 703). Applying this technique, the deinstitutionalisation process 
was separated into periods or phases (if there is a sense of continuity between 
periods), which acted as units of analysis for further data sensemaking and 
theoretical testing. This approach was especially useful since reciprocity was 
expected between agents and contexts and when the interacting mechanism was 
integrated into theories. The breakdown of data into continual periods enabled the 
investigation of how actions in one period affected contexts which in turn changed 
actions in the following periods (Langley, 1999). A comparison between periods also 
revealed distinctive features of each period and the pervasiveness of change in the 
present. The analysis looks like this: 
Phase 1: Deinstitutionalisation initiated 
• Antecedent conditions 
• Switching events 
• Reaction strategies 
• Intervening conditions Phase 2: Deinstitutionalisation continues 
• Consequences ..-z .. =C::::====:::>=== • Antecedent 
conditions 
• Switching events 
• Reaction strategies 
• Intervening 
conditions 
• Consequences 
104 
Based on historical accounts of the case, I identified critical events to 
deinstitutionalisation and decomposed the time span into two main parts: pre-1994 
and post-1994. Comparison of the two periods enabled the evaluation of factors and 
critical events that set off deinstitutionalisation, described features of old institutions 
(pre-1994) and the course of deinstitutionalisation that followed (post-I 994). The 
examination of antecedent conditions, the stimulating events occurring in 1994 and 
their impacts on institutional contexts at that time helped to explain the change in 
behaviours and organisational practices led to change in institutional contexts in 
subsequent periods (deinstitutionalisation). 
4.6.4 Data management 
Field notes are an important part of research (Toren, 1996; Mintzberg, 1979; Van 
Maanen, 1979) as they provide a detailed and complete view of the interviewing 
process to improve validity/reliability and are an opportunity for self-reflection 
which is also a critical part of the interpretive process of analysis (Van Maanen, 
1979). It is essential, however, to ensure that more accurate recording of events is 
clearly separated from the researcher's own impressions and interpretations although 
both of these types of data are vital for analysis. 
Spradley (1979) suggested making four types of notes to ensure good data 
management: short notes at the time, expanded notes as soon as possible after each 
field session, a research diary with problems and ideas and a record of analysis and 
interpretation. These notes form the basis for further analysis hence data must be 
managed properly for easy retrieval. Strategies to create these are explained in Table 
3 below. 
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Table 3 Data Management based on Note-taking Guidelines by Spradley (1979) and 
Data Management Practices by Richards (2005) 
Note-taking Note-taking strategies -Interviews Note-taking strategies - Case 
guidelines 
Short notes at • Take notes and record interviews 
the time 
• Take breaks to record and think 
over significant events 
• Notes taken during interviews on 
points of interests to refer back to 
at a later point or during 
interviews 
Expanded notes • Immediately after each interview, 
as soon as record descriptions of events for 
possible after the day and impressions of the 
each fieldwork participant and interview process 
session 
• At the end of field week, record a 
description of the week as it 
proceeded and changed over the 
week 
Research diary • At the end of each field week, 
with problems record interpretations of events 
and ideas as separate from descriptions. 
coming out of 
the fieldwork • Record ideas and Issues 
resulting from reflection over 
the course of field work 
• Keep a list of Interesting Ideas 
and themes coming out of 
Interviews and introduce It in 
the next Interview 
Record of • Keep a record of significant or 
analysis and interesting ideas as well as 
interpretation problems as they occur 
• Make one memo for each 
document and its relevance 
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4.7 Validity and generalisability 
4.7.1 Problem of social desirability bias 
One of the problems with the validity of qualitative and process research is social 
desirability bias (Weaver et ai, 1999). This is where the subjects of the investigation are 
individuals who have the need to demonstrate that they fit in with social expectations, 
regardless of their true points of view. This problem might distort interview data as 
participants might not reveal true stories or might alter behaviours to suit expectations, 
or to match the behaviours that managers or other employees consider desirable. The 
triangulation of interviews with observation enables me to partly address this 'truthful or 
politically corrected answers' issue. Additionally, in the introduction prior to interviews, 
confidentiality was assured and the purpose of the interview was emphasised, i.e. that 
information would only be used for this research and would not be viewed by any third 
party without the participants' permission. Although this does not guarantee that the data 
is unbiased, all necessary measures have been taken to ensure the research meets all the 
criteria for sound research. 
4.7.2 Internal validity of processual research 
First and foremost, this study is a processual research study, longitudinal, single-cased 
with the application of multiple methods. The design is complicated to enable 
comprehensive and holistic description and explanation of the deinstitutionalisation 
process. But how do we judge the quality of processual research? According to 
Pettigrew (1997), if a processual research study has the following features then it is 
internally consistent: 
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1. Embeddedness, studying processes across a number of levels of analysis 
2. Temporal interconnectedness, studying processes in past, present and future 
time 
3. A role in explanation for context and action 
4. A search for holistic rather than linear explanations of process 
5. A need to link process analysis to the location and explanation of outcomes 
The first condition, embeddedness, indicates that social and organisational processes are 
surrounded by contexts, therefore studies of processes should include analysis of 
environments outside and within the organisational sphere. The relationship between 
processes and contexts is reciprocal as one produces and is produced by the other. 
Accordingly, my study of deinstitutionalisation, which is the changing of organisational 
institutions, is linked with higher level analysis (changes in economical, social and 
political structures at national level) and lower level analysis (cognition and emotions at 
individual level). The sources of deinstitutionalisation are the "asymmetries between 
levels of contexts, each with their own momentum, pace and trajectory" (Pettigrew, 
1997, p. 341). Hence, if the pace of organisational adjustment is slower than the pace of 
sectoral and/or national changes, outdated organisations eventually must 
deinstitutionalise. For this reason, in my design I drew on multiple levels of analysis: 
institutional, organisational and individual. 
The second condition, temporal interconnectedness, highlights the importance of path 
dependency in processual research. To understand the sequence of events is to search for 
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underlying logics and mechanisms which make the past a crucial component of the 
present and future. Antecedent conditions of change not only offer cause-effect linkages, 
they might provide insights on outcomes of process. Appreciating the history of a case, I 
designed this thesis as a longitudinal, single-cased study which used documentations and 
historical analysis among other methods. 
If the first condition emphasises the connection between levels of contexts, the third 
condition is about duality between context and agency. This duality (Giddens, 1979) 
implies that structures do not simply constrain actions but rather are involved in its 
production. Therefore, it is theoretically and empirically possible to examine how 
changes in contexts affect agency and how agents utilise their power to restructure 
contexts. To capture this duality, I used Temporal Bracketing Strategy (Langley, 1999) 
which comprises comparative analysis between two consecutive periods to learn how 
changes in actions caused by erosion of institutions in the previous period answer for the 
condition of the institutional context in the subsequent period. The nature and pace of 
deinstitutionalisation is the direct consequence of this duality between structure and 
agency. 
The fourth condition, holistic explanation of process, recognises the multifaceted nature 
of social and organisational processes. To explain the de institutionalisation process, it is 
not sufficient to only identify key influencing features; the real task is to understand how 
they interact in a particular organisational setting. In other words, the search is for the 
conditions that connect features of contexts and process to variation in outcomes 
(Pettigrew, 1997). To utilise case details to their maximum and to account for variation, 
I introduced comparative indicators of deinstitutionalisation pace and forms of collective 
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sensemaking. Differences in contexts were also explored by comparison between 
departments, between different organisational aspects and between sensemaking of 
supporters and the disengaged from the deinstitutionalisation process. 
The final condition obliges process researchers to set boundaries by having outcomes 
and is a natural requirement if processua} research aims to explain why and how 
outcomes are shaped by different process features. 
4.7.3 Generalisability 
Generalisability is one of the most important requirements of research and case studies 
in particular concerning the usefulness of research findings to other settings. This 
condition stems from the fact that most research studies were carried out using a sample 
instead of the whole population. This task is crucial if single cases wish to make a 
substantial theoretical contribution. This study employed purposive and networking 
sampling techniques to ensure that the sample of participants represented a wide range 
of settings, illustrating the robustness of theoretical propositions. In addition, 
comparative analysis also increases the exploitation of data across different units thus 
taking into account variation of consequences of the same process. 
4.8 Limitations and methodological reflections 
There is no perfect method, only one that is the most appropriate and well-applied for a 
certain topic. It is thus important to be reflective and explicit in terms of potentially 
problematic areas of study. For this reason, this section will discuss the main limitations 
of this study, which will then form the basis for further research directions in the next 
section. 
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For this research, interviews and transcripts were done in Vietnamese and translated into 
English when needed. Due to the language barrier, it was sometimes difficult to find the 
perfect English connotation for specific Vietnamese terms and expressions. Although I 
made every attempt to make the translation as close to its original meaning as possible, it 
cannot help losing something in translation. To compensate for this, I always provided 
the original versions of idioms and old sayings, which were particularly hard to translate, 
alongside my interpretations. Secondly, the Vietnamese language tends to favour the use 
of discreet, subtle and indirect words to avoid losing face or making someone lose face. 
It can be misleading if researchers are not familiar with this custom. Fortunately, being 
raised in Eastern traditions and having undertaken education in England since the age of 
seventeen, I was able to comprehend many idioms and expressions interviewees often 
used to describe their opinions and feelings, as well as able to find suitable analogies to 
communicate with an English-speaking audience. 
Another drawback of doing research in Vietnam was the difficulty of applying general 
rules to interviewing situations in Vietnam. A large number of interviewees felt more 
comfortable if interviews were treated as friendly talks rather than formal research 
therefore the most valuable information was gathered from informal conversations in 
out-of-work environments, which were recorded by notes rather than on tape. 
Various measures have been taken to ensure the reliability and validity of retrospective 
sensemaking accounts offered by the participants in this case. To improve fact-checking 
capacity, oral narratives (from interviews) were triangulated with narratives from 
documentaries such as national and international newspapers, academic journals and 
reports written more recently as well as at the time of the events in questions. By 
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analysing such a large and diversified collection, the reconstruction of past history could 
be trusted to offer a rich yet consistent reflection of reality. 
As a qualitative research, this study cannot avoid the common criticism against all 
qualitative methods where the data is dubbed 'subjective' hence unreliable. One might 
have even more reason to doubt the reliability of retrospective sensemaking as the key 
method for gathering data about the past, especially in this case when participants were 
asked to recall perceptions, motivations and emotions towards events occurred nearly 
three decades ago. At first glance, any attempt to recreate such an account seemed 
questionable at best. Fortunately, the retrospective sensemaking element in this case 
should not have to share such a dire fate. Towards events filled with powerful emotions 
and life-changing consequences like those of this case, it came as no surprise if the 
human brain was able to recall details with precision like they happened just yesterday. 
Besides, the subjects under question (opinions, emotions and reactions before. during 
and after the economic reform in 1986) were not of sensitive nature (at the time of this 
study) and offered no personal or political gains. Neither threat nor motivation was 
presented for participants to conceal their most truthful thoughts. I had every reason to 
believe the accounts were legitimate but as a precaution, I kept in mind a series of 
questions: Does the participant have any motivation to not answer honestly? How close 
was the participant to the event? How informed was the participant about the event? If 
yes was given to any of these questions, I would proceed the interpretation of the data 
with caution. 
Historical revisionism is the reinterpretation of orthodox views on evidence, motivations 
and decision-making processes surrounding a historical event (Miller, Vandome and 
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McBrewster, 2010). Revisionist approach to research thus entails a refinement of 
existing knowledge about a historical event (Gall, Borg and Gall, 1996). This study 
adopted this revisionist approach in the attempt to create a more elaborate view of the 
impacts the economic reform exerted on organisations and their employees. By using 
new information (interviews) and the new concept of crisis-triggered 
deinstitutionalisation to reinterpret the transitional journey, this thesis aimed to 
reconstruct and portrait a different side of the process whereby the emphasis was not on 
the controversies of political struggle or economic endeavours but on the transformation 
of management institutions within organisational setting instead. 
One of the most fundamental problems with historical revisionist approach is its heavy 
reliance on secondary historical materials. For historical subjects of great significance, 
large literature is commonplace, which in many cases might be wide enough to support 
contradicting interpretations. Hence, the reliability of such data collection and the 
authenticity of conclusion might be called into doubt. To counteract this problem, two 
procedures were employed. Firstly, the sources used for analysis (independent journals, 
public speeches, national newspapers, company reports, and websites) were clearly and 
overtly stated. In doing so, I made explicit in the context of study the potential source of 
biases should they arise. This, however, was unlikely since the triangulation of various 
archival sources should provide ample evidence for the authenticity of such data. 
Secondly, it was intended that some effort would be committed to explain 
inconsistencies within the historical record, such as it appeared. Proceeding from this 
standpoint, I would then place significance on common threads of reconstructed 
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narratives. The whole purpose was to ascertain regularities in the data were recognised 
while not overlooking points of contradiction. 
The fmal limitation of this research was the limited time and resources available for data 
collection, which was carried out at the Northern Headquarters of EVN (which has three 
headquarters in the Northern, Middle and Southern parts of the country). This was an 
inevitable setback of choosing a case study abroad but the merits offered by the case in 
this particular topic outweighed this issue in my opinion (the rationale for case selection 
was discussed in detail in section 4.4). Moreover, I had taken extra caution in my 
interpretation and presentation of analysis so that data were developed as abstractions 
hence open to generalisation. One might question the credibility of the sample used; 
however, there was no apparent reason to suggest a marked regional difference because 
the historical, institutional and cultural backgrounds were the same. Replicate studies in 
the other two regions should easily be able to confirm this. 
4.9 Conclusion 
In summary, this investigation of deinstitutionalisation usmg the sensemaking 
perspective adopts a qualitative approach using longitudinal and single-cased study 
strategy, multiple methods of data collection including interviews, observation and 
documentation, and Temporal Bracketing and narrative approaches for data analysis. I 
have used five principles for quality evaluation (Pettigrew, 1997) to demonstrate that 
this thesis is theoretically and methodologically sound as it meets all the criteria of a 
sound processual and qualitative research. 
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In providing a detailed discussion on research design, data collection and analysis, this 
chapter highlights six points: 
1. Processual research is suitable for research objectives of investigating the 
under-studied topic of the deinstitutionalisation process via sensemaking. 
2. A multi-method approach is appropriate for gathering operational data in this 
topic. 
3. The design which has longitudinal and single-cased elements is well-suited. 
4. The research site is suitable for this topic. 
5. Activities were selected to ensure validity and generalisability of theory, data 
collection, management and analysis. 
6. Analysis is systematic, holistic and detailed to ensure the most 
comprehensive understanding possible. 
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CHAPTERS 
Contexts, logics, features and inconsistencies of old institutions 
5.1 Introduction 
Previously in methodology chapter, the strategies, methods and procedures used to deal 
with the two research questions were explained. The empirical evidence, presented in 
four chapters, rested on the settings of a country with Confucian heritage and destined 
encounter with Socialism. The organisation under study, a state-owned electricity 
enterprise, established during the war primarily to facilitate resistance campaigns and 
evolved into a pivotal growth engine under peaceful Socialist regime still held 
Confucian traits close to the heart. The exploration of these well-established, deep-
rooted institutions, one could be traced back thousands of years and their 
deinstitutionalisation journey promised intriguing and rich discoveries. In particular, this 
chapter began to address the first question developed at the end of chapter two and 
repeated below: 
Research question 1: How does the deinstitutionalisation process evolve? 
Regarding the entire discourse of deinstitutionalisation, this chapter, first and foremost, 
is concerned with providing broader cultural and institutional contexts, which layout the 
foundation for old institutions (pre 1975); secondly, it seeks to understand the 
underlying problems that openly or insidiously instigate institutional makeover. Chapter 
6 uncovers switching events, institutional agent sensemaking and their implications on 
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industry and organisational restructuring during de institutionalisation process. Chapter 7 
focuses on analysing organisational sensemaking transformation, which inevitably leads 
to the arrival of new management institutions. The final part of analysis, chapter 8 looks 
at the process of social sensemaking and the ways it exerts influence on 
deinstitutionalisation, in terms of outcomes and pace. 
Analysis in his chapter drew mostly from documentations but interviews assisted in 
identifying crucial milestones in the flow of events. The chapter begins with the 
discussion of evolution of institutional logics through time, up to the point of 
independence in 1975, which institutions were taken as Old Institutions. Tracing the 
traits, the analysis pinpoints indigenous agricultural traditions augmented by Confucian 
values as the core of the original national identity. The strand of analysis in this chapter 
do not overly focus on the impacts left behind by wars against France and the US, but 
mainly on how these wars directly contributed to the arrival of Communism, which 
provided underlying principles, beliefs and operational system (central planning) 
necessitate for the fights and economic development in peace time. The interactions 
between agricultural/Confucian institutions with those of Socialist/central planning 
institutions were also considered, which led to the complete description of Old 
Institutions at the end of 1975. Whether it was amalgamation or elimination of old ones, 
the outcome stemmed from the level of comparability of their institutional logics and 
core values. The analysis then examined the implication of these broad institutional 
contexts in organisational setting, as represented by management institutions at EVN. 
The second element of this chapter involves the analysis of inconsistencies inherent in 
the existing institutional logics and value system which are prone to challenges. The 
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interplays of various antecedent conditions (political, economic and social) eventually 
led to deinstitutionalisation were traced over time. In doing so, the effects of critical 
events, placed in a chronological order, on the delicate balance of these conditions at 
each interval were emphasised. The purpose of this part of analysis was also to discover 
hints of changes in institutional logics. Whether manifest at this stage or not, these subtle 
changes originated subsequent institutional transformation hence deserved attention. The 
chapter ends with discussion of moderating factors that likely to impact on the whole 
transition, which leaves chapter 6 to examine deinstitutionalisation in detail, starting 
with switching event of economic reform in 1986 and the aftermaths. 
5.2 The evolution of old institutions (up to 1975) 
Although historical and cultural analyses are not the main purpose of this thesis!, 
nevertheless traditions and institutions of logical thinking give valuable insights into the 
past, direction and goals intended for the country and state-owned enterprises like EVN. 
The traits discussed below have been national quintessence since ancient time and many 
were symbolised during war and difficult times to inspire nationalism. As time passed, 
outdated values were replaced with new ones; some were altered to accommodate 
modem world thinking and some remain mostly the same but after all, they represent the 
evolution of Vietnamese traditions and most importantly the foundations of Vietnamese 
society. 
Vietnam has a wide variety of traditions and beliefs. These traditions are a mixture of 
those brought from the outside and those of several native groups. Overall, there are two 
I A brief discussion of Vietnamese history and economic development can be found in appendix E 
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major kinds: indigenous and Chinese-influenced. This is not surprising in any way since 
Vietnam was under Chinese domination for a thousand years, followed with a century of 
French colonisation and American invasion. Despite being in power for so long, 
however, imported foreign religions failed to exterminate local folk beliefs. Instead, they 
intermingled and new traditions emerged with the best features of both sides. Localising 
foreign logics was a deliberately selective process to enhance national identity because 
Vietnamese society and people remain true to their native agricultural traditions to 
present days. 
5.2.1 Prior-to-20th -century institutional contexts: the dominance of agricultural -
Confucian institutions 
Vietnamese traditions and beliefs come from a wide variety of origins. Over the years, 
these rich traditions converge and create a unified national ideology and philosophy. The 
oldest-established of all is indigenous institutions of agricultural society. Closely related 
to natural phenomena and originates from agricultural practices with the preference of 
stillness over movement, Vietnamese philosophy embraces relations (described by 
doctrine of yin and yang), illustrated by harmony-enduring and consensus-building 
lifestyle (Lich Su Viet Nam, 1971). Individuals are believed to be born into the world as 
part of society therefore must not disregard their responsibilities towards others. This is 
why community is supreme over individual interests and respect and opinion of the 
community is crucial to the life of each individual (Chapter by Pham, D. N. in Gillespie 
and Nicholson, 2005). 
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Another distinguished quality of traditional Vietnamese is the thoughts of dualism - a 
way of thinking that tied to emotional experiences rather than rationalism (Chapter 5, 
Ashwill and Thai, 2005). In terms oflogical thinking, Vietnamese style in general can be 
described as holistic and experience-based, which are analogous to what Haley and 
Haley (2006) suggested about the Chinese. Vietnamese people always look for 
relationships with surrounding problems before generating solutions; and they accept 
multiple realities and truth. There is no predominant reality to limit strategic decisions 
thus enabling flexible thinking and tailored solutions to environments. On the other 
hand, by emphasising experience and analytical preference, Vietnamese philosophy 
lacks rigorous decision rules based on formal explanatory models. 
Generally speaking, dualism is a flexible, adaptable, and peace-making way of thinking 
and living, that highly values emotional ties and attachment to family and community. 
This relations-based bonds smooth settlement of conflicts and facilitate versatile 
reactions. It might well be one of the reasons why Vietnamese (and Asian in general) 
behaviours are strongly sensitive to emotions, especially ones that are group-related 
(Berrell et ai, 1999). Evidences of emotional impacts and relations are in abundance, 
ranging from emotional dependence among family/group members to organisational 
institutions such as face-to-face, personal communication and relation-embedded 
management and working style. Vietnamese people are more comfortable with personal 
communication (Vuong and Tran, 2009) since it is believed that notion of trust can only 
be formed and sustained by social or personal interactions. 
Exogenous religions like Confucianism did not arnve until Chinese millenary 
domination (206 B.C. - A.D. 938) (Slote and De Vos (1998). The main aim of this thesis 
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is neither to analyse the implications of all religions nor to debate which religion has 
greater influence in the country's development. All religions contributed to the 
development of Vietnamese traditions and society (McLeod and Nguyen, 2001) but only 
Confucianism offered clear, articulate political system and social orders. This is why 
Vietnamese elites adopted Confucian court system in the 11 th century (McHale, 2004) 
and Confucianism continued to exert influence in political, social and business matters 
to present days. 
Vietnamese people did not stick blindly to Confucianism. Instead, it fused with the spirit 
of Buddhism and Taoism to make their ideology more open, closer to the people and 
more harmonious with nature (McLeod and Nguyen, 2001). Confucianism gradually 
conquered all aspects of social life and widespread practices of Confucian beliefs were 
evident in political structure and the system of education and examinations since 
eleventh century. However, Confucianism was only accepted to Vietnam in selected 
elements, particularly on politics and morality, rather than its entire system (Reading, 
1990). It can be said that Confucianism had great bearing on Vietnamese traditions but 
the influence was not as profound compared to Japan (Rainey, 2010) or the original 
Chinese version (McHale, 2004). So, why Confucianism has been broadly accepted into 
Vietnamese society? The answer lies in similarities between norms of agricultural life 
and Confucian values. While collectivism - a sense of belonging in a group whether it is 
family, village or country, harmony and consensus-keeping are the bonds making 
agricultural community a cohesive society, Confucianism offers analogous key notions 
like Five Virtues (Honesty, Benevolence, Wisdom, Loyalty and Propriety) (Warner, 
2000). This is how a gentleman distinguishes himself from an uneducated man, by being 
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truthful, kind to others as opposed to violence, with good manners, knowledge and 
loyalty. In Vietnamese interpretation, "Benevolence" - nonnally referred to as a 
respectable virtue, is thought highly of and has acted as guideline for rulings as well as 
saving the country (Jamieson, 1993) whereas Loyalty meant being loyal to the nation, 
not just to the ruler. In a nutshell, according to Confucianism, individualisation and 
socialisation are two interconnected parts of the same process. Also stated in Confucian 
teaching, an individual is bounded by Three Submissions dictating the relationship 
between Rulers - Ruled; Father - Son; Husband - Wife (Warner, 2000) where the latter 
must obey orders from the fonner without questions in exchange for protection, security 
and life-long care. The precedence of superiors (rulers/fatherlhusband) over subordinates 
(ruled/son/wife) is absolute and unchanged. 
So, what are the institutional logics underlying Confucianism? In a nutshell, Confucian 
ideology advocates the collectivist ideology that the family, not individual, is the basic 
unit of all social organisations (Hofstede, 1991; Slote and De Vos, 1998). A person 
hence does not exist in isolation of his/her outer community but plays an integral part of 
a larger system where people survive and flourish together. Basics of social and 
economic activities are not derived from competition, but on principles of cooperation, 
coexistence, and mutual support. This 'one for all' mindset in Confucian traditions 
emphasises notions such as harmony, reciprocity and respect. In other words, "do not do 
to others what we would not want others to do to us". Since social harmony depends on 
a tightly hierarchical system of duties and responsibilities, disruption of harmonious 
social relationships and damage to the underlying hierarchical social structure must be 
avoided at all costs. In a Confucian institution, nothing is more dangerous than the loss 
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of harmony. Because adaptation to collectivity is required, this also means abandonment 
of self interests for the sake of mutual trust and social benefits. Opportunistic activities 
would immediately render the actor an outcast of society and strip hirnlher of all respect, 
which is the most degrading thing one person could experience. This consensus 
ideological logic is the most prominent in the preferential goal of conflict resolution 
where economic gains could be sacrificed for the sake of stability and harmony. 
All in all, agricultural and Confucian traditions are comparable in terms of both logics 
and core values. It could be said that the merging of the two led to the birth of typical 
norms, values and behaviours of Vietnamese people, which influence continued even 
after Confucianism was taken over by Communism in the 20th century. 
5.2.2 20th century institutional contexts: the arrival of central planning and the 
emergence of hybrid Confucian-central planning institutions 
In the 19th century when Vietnamese feudalism faded and Chinese civilisation declined, 
Western culture began to fmd its way to Vietnam. Late 19th century, France, traumatised 
by defeat during the Second World War, saw the Vietnam War as a way to re-establish 
its standing in the world. Believing in its "rise to globalism", America followed French 
footstep into Southeast Asia (Roman, 1999). At this time, Confucian values, which are 
arbitrary and lack of systematic rules failed to provide action plans to free the country. 
During this chaotic and dark time, Vietnamese intellectuals and people turned to 
socialist ideas in the hope to win independence. Communist principle of equality gave 
people hope for a brighter future, its timely arrival and its wise decision to borrow 
Confucian values and ethical standards to mobilise the mass helped the Communist 
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Party gain the support of the people and eventually led to victory (Chapter by Pham, D. 
N. in Gillespie and Nicholson, 2005). The era of modem Vietnamese culture took shape 
in the 1930s and 1940s when patriotism and Marxism-Leninism flourished. With 
pressing urge to integrate into the world's modem civilisation yet detennined to preserve 
national identity, Vietnamese society was ripe to reach a new historical peak. At that 
time, Marxism-Leninism combined with nationalism became momentum of historical 
changes as it provided a potentially powerful new lever for revolutionary change (Porter, 
1993, p. 7). Indeed, the future of the country and its people turned a new page the 
moment communism and socialism hailed the new national ideology. The appropriate 
question must be asked now is what happened to Confucian/agricultural-based 
institutions once Communism was in power. Did socialism replace Confucianism as the 
new institutional logics? Or did they somehow merge together to create a hybrid form 
contained elements from both? To answer, we must first look at key principles of 
socialism and the implications they have for Vietnamese society and economy. 
At one level, the egalitarianism principle of Marxism-Leninism rejected Confucian 
social hierarchy and views of class but both gave legitimacy to the collective over those 
of the individual (Porter, 1993). This convergence of Marxism and Confucianism in 
reference to supremacy of public interest and duty of the state to serve its people 
explains why Confucian authoritarianism also contributed to Asian Communism 
(Peerenboom, 2002). In addition, the resistance war against the French gave the 
Vietnamese Communist Party the perfect opportunity and justification for centralisation 
of power as it was advocated that authority must not be divided and diffuse during the 
resistance. The bureaucracy was held together purely by the force of ideology and 
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coercion as party members firmly believed that their undergoing of hardship served the 
interests of the party, the people and the common good. This was referred to as 'socialist 
sense of superiority with the destiny to save mankind' (Komai, 1992, p. 50). This notion 
of institutional logics, that dictated that socialism was far better-suited for the task than 
capitalism, which had 'passed the stage where it could contribute to the progress of 
society and already showed many signs of decay', (Komai, 1992, p. 51), was one of the 
most important elements of the ideology. It was firmly believed that the supremacy of 
socialism was derived from its intrinsic properties to deliver prosperity once the initial 
period of hardship was overcome, not from its better economic policies or its ability to 
call forward sacrifice among other merits. Put differently, even if socialism did not 
flourish at some point, its triumph was inevitable hence prosperity would arrive sooner 
or later. Ultimately, this blinding yet extremely powerful faith was single-handedly 
responsible for the prolong presence of socialism in Vietnam, which nearly cost the 
country its civil development. One crucial ingredient of socialist institutional logics was 
its views on human nature and morale. By principle, socialist system transformed people 
into self-sacrificing, noble individuals who put the common good above all else; and 
individualism was immoral therefore must be eradicated if social justice and equality 
were to be achieved. Another important component of socialist system was dictatorship 
of the proletariat and the role of the state (Kornai, 1992). The logic emphasised the 
support for working class against bourgeois, however, the peasants was represented by 
the party and did not exercise power directly. And so, the state was the 'vanguard' of the 
society since it had proven its ability to lead during fights against enemies. This ideology 
could only lead to one conclusion, that is, the mass's interests would be decided for by 
the state - the people's guardian. Latent in this power structure, however, was the 
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protective role of the leaders, somewhat similar to that of the paternalistic father figure 
in Confucian philosophy, another similarity between the two institutional logics. This 
was one of the 'justifications for centralisation and bureaucratic organisation of power' 
under socialist system (Kornai, 1992). Correspondingly, the main governing principle of 
socialist system was supposed to be democratic centralism where members are allowed 
to express opinions freely but obliged to put party resolutions and instructions, once they 
are made, into practices (Porter, 1993; Gainsborough, 2002a). In reality, however, the 
implemented practices were somewhat closer to bureaucratic centralism rather than 
democratic centralism. These institutional characteristics of socialist political system 
predictably shaped the attitudes and behaviours of officials at all levels. The absence of 
democratic processes established bureaucratic patterns that continued even after peace 
was restored. This is one of the most distinctive features of socialist institutions: 
bureaucratic and authoritarian leadership, which runs national political system as well as 
organisational management. 
Like any institution, Socialist institutional logics entailed their own selection of values 
and norms. Among others, discipline, voluntary sacrifice, vigilance, absolute loyalty and 
obedience were the most highly valued (Komai, 1992). Specifically, commands and 
political decisions must be followed without question; independence must be avoided, 
self-interest must be subordinated to common interests and alert against external 
'enemies' must remain high at all time. The source of legitimacy was derived not so 
much from hislher competencies as it was from political reliability, loyalty, fidelity and 
ideology, which in essence could compensate for lack of abilities or professional 
expertise. This notion of rewarding not only demoralised motivations, destroyed 
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originality and critical outlook but also bred an army of corrupted, calculating and ill-
equipped bureaucrats who had eyes for nothing but power and self gains. 
5.2.3 Institutional contexts at organisational level: Management institutions at 
Drawing from the above discussion of broader cultural and institutional settings, this 
section offers an alternative look from a different angle by analysing how these 
institutional logics, ideologies and ideals are applied in organisational context. That is, 
how Confucian and central planning institutions were translated into management 
values, norms, routines, practices, philosophies and organisational interactions, which 
essentially made up an archetypal SOE of this period. The first and most distinctive 
feature is the norm of collective orientation. Translating into modern day's 
organisational institutions, many Vietnamese businesses still practice collective decision 
making (Ralston et ai, 1999; Hung et ai, 1999) and group performance appraisal (Zhu, 
2002). In EVN, management practices emphasise teamwork and the essential team spirit 
in all aspects such as decision making, task sharing, group rewards and appraisal. 
Performance based salary system promoting individuals' interests is not popular since it 
neither matches the purpose nor goal of collective orientation. Appraisal informally (not 
too reliable on guidelines) bases on effectiveness and harmony of team working rather 
than on individual contribution. The underlying reason is the highly valued titles, status, 
and formality in Vietnamese society. People place great importance on fitting in 
harmoniously and avoid causing the others to lose face (i.e. to derogate others 
reputation). In conflicts, win-win situation is preferred. The issue of "face" complicates 
performance feedback in businesses like EVN because objective and straightforward 
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appraisal might incur disagreements. In such situation, accurate evaluations might likely 
lose to harmony preference. This collective nature of human resource management could 
be partially explained by one similarity between EVN (and general Vietnamese) 
managers and Chinese managers; that is distaste towards uncertainty caused by conflicts 
and disputes (Worm and Frankenstein, 2000; Davis, 1997). In general, Vietnamese 
traditions tend to avoid uncertainty. As people feel threatened by ambiguous situations, 
employers try to avoid these situations by providing greater job stability, establishing 
more formal rules, and rejecting nonstandard ideas and behaviour. 
In organisational settings, managers and employees alike are relation- rather than task-
oriented (Berrell et ai, 1999). This practice fosters a trusting, reciprocal and long-lasting 
relationship within organisations since strong loyalty and close ties can prevent agency 
problem. Moreover, trust, which is built via socialisation prior to and during 
employment, mitigates the need for monitoring system. This style of management, 
performance monitoring and appraisal (or the lack of it) in EVN and other businesses in 
Vietnam sheds some lights on why informal rather than formal evaluation is more 
widely used (Vo and Dinh, 1997; Quang and Dung, 1998) and social outcomes such as 
harmony maintenance is considered more important (Kamoche, 200 1 ). 
Like other state owned businesses, EVN is surrounded by a web of relationships 
manifested at different levels. Together with interpersonal relations within the firm, 
EVN also establishes a network with government authorities and officers. During this 
transitional period where law and institutional foundations are neither fully established 
nor properly implemented; and government policies and regulations are incoherent and 
open for interpretation, networking seems to be the best strategy to minimise risks and 
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uncertainty. Hence it is not surprising for EVN to rely on connections with government 
for resources, privileged treatments over private participants and favourable policies 
such as delayed introduction of competitive market. Until now, this linkage proved to be 
among the most pivotal factors that guarantee EVN's survival and development. 
In organisational context, other features of Confucian management institution include 
authoritarian, paternal management style, norms of dependence, respect for hierarchy, 
certainty preference, face to face personal communication, collective orientation and 
consensus-building. Some of these norms mirror those of agriculture-originated 
institutions discussed above (such as the importance of relations and personal 
communication, collective and consensual behaviours) hence shall not be repeated here. 
According to Hofstede (1980), Vietnamese culture can be described as high power 
distance, high collectivism, moderate uncertainty avoidance, and high context. High 
power distance characteristic is present in the daily life of Vietnamese as well as in 
business. In the family, the father has the highest rank and makes all kinds of decision 
for the whole family. In organisations, managers are supposed to take up the role of 
father, providing guidance, protection and punishment if required, a very similar model 
to that of the Chinese (Redding, 1990). A clear superior - subordinate relationship 
means that obedience from lower level is expected in all circumstances. Like Porter 
(1993, p. 4) put it, "Confucianism was a rigid hierarchical political ideology that posed 
the patriarchal family as the model for the political system and treated ordinary subjects 
as incapable of making decisions". This indeed is the making of an authoritarian regime. 
In addition, exceedingly close supervision and limited authority given to subordinates 
often leave employees demotivated and passive, yet is acceptable, if not desirable, under 
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authoritarian leadership. Latent in this is the nonn of dependence where employees wait 
for directions instead of initiating ideas, which can be taken as disobedience, as well as 
an utmost respect for hierarchy, arguably slightly too much so for a healthy business 
development. In sum, it is not unfounded to say that for such a culturally embedded 
country, institutions in Vietnamese management centres on human relationships. 
Predictably, traditions and society are among the most powerful institutions influencing 
businesses like EVN, alongside linkage with government. 
The second part of old institutions (prior to 1975) consisted of those of socialist origins 
including egalitarianism; bureaucratic - authoritarian leadership; central-planning, 
command-based mechanism; fIxed input allocation and output targets; low level of 
delegation and top-down communication,; not transparent, regulated personnel policy; 
incentive-deprived quality control; lack of management and entrepreneurship skills; lack 
of fInancial, marketing, operational conducts. Some of these characteristics were close to 
Confucian counterparts such as leadership, delegation and communication hence would 
not be repeated. The discussion in the next section would focus on operational and 
strategic elements of central planning institutions. 
Under socialist regime, the ovelWhelming role of the state was implemented by central 
management. The economy was essentially command-based ran by central planning 
apparatus via a system of forced instructions (Komai, 1992, 2009). Fforde (2007) 
provided a thorough analysis of central planning mechanism in SOEs after the war. On 
the whole, SOEs had no control over any aspects of business including planning, 
fInance, resources, prices or labour contracts. Functional authorities such as Ministry of 
Finance allocated economic resources to priority areas and inputs (scare resources and 
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fuels) were delivered to SOEs following planner instructions. This constraint on input 
choice and distribution channel of outputs meant that instead of calculating the best 
input mix to secure efficiency, SOEs were only required to fulfil legally binding plan 
targets detennined by the plan given. Hence, SOEs were neither cost minimisers nor 
profit maximisers, (Fforde, 2007, p. 69) as their performance was assessed by end-
contract targets rather than productivity or profits. The allocation of inputs, nevertheless, 
was not always stable and secure, forcing SOEs to try maximise input stocks in case 
output targets were threatened. In other words, capital inputs did not have fixed 
constraint on output gains. In addition, prices were set only for the sole purpose of 
controlling resource flows and ensuring adequate state revenues, thus not reflected true 
production costs in any way. This was the bureaucratic accounting as opposed to the 
efficient economic accounting system. Latent in this input-output imbalance situation 
was the opportunities to capitalise on under-the-table transactions since extra outputs 
meant profits in black market where values were much higher than state prices. Clearly, 
SOEs under bureaucratic control were not equipped with any of the scientific, modem 
type of management. Entrepreneurship skills such as planning and organising were 
replaced by mechanical, uncreative mode of working. 
Another state controlled aspect was recruitment and dismissal of personnel. Labours 
were allocated according to state plans and specialised units (finance, planning, 
organising etc.) were directly responsible to supervisory line ministries. The passivity of 
SOEs in every crucial activities destroyed entrepreneurship among unit heads and 
deprived incentives for demand side management at all level of SOEs. Needless to say, 
concepts such as customer relations, fmancial management and planning, demand-
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supply management were all alienated ideas. Simply, there was neither need nor desire 
for them. After all, a long period of wartime production and now bureaucratic control 
meant people got used to acting under the command and having no clear responsibilities. 
Summary of broader institutional contexts, management institutions at organisational 
level and their features are presented in Table 4 below. 
Harmony Maintain harmonious social 
Stability relationships 
Cooperation Preserve hierarchical social 
Reciprocity 
structure 
Consensus Adapt to the collectivity 
Obedience Restrain self-interest for the 
Agricultural! Respect 
benefit of the group and 
Confucian Trust 
community 
Loyalty Avoid conflict at all cost 
Conscience Precedence of the old/superior 
Sympathy over the young/subordinate 
Duty Build mutual trust and eliminate 
opportunistic activities 
Discipline Political line must be followed; 
Willing decisions endorsed; commands 
obeyed 
sacrifice 
Vigilance 
Subordinate self-interests for 
Socialist higher interests 
(central Political 
planning) Reliability Be conscious against internal and 
external foes 
Loyalty 
Compliance 
Reject all capitalist influences 
dence, critical 
Features of Organisational 
Management 
Collective-orientation 
Harmony and consensus-building 
Certainty preference 
HolistiC, experience-based logical 
thinking 
Relation-based, emotion-
susceptible behaviours 
Personal, face-to-face 
communication 
Authoritarian - Paternalistic 
leadership 
Norms of dependence 
Respect for hierarchy 
---' . - ~ ~
Egalitarianism 
Bureaucratic - Authoritarian 
leadership 
Command-based mechanism 
Fixed input allocation and output 
targets 
Low level of delegation and top-
down communication 
- - ~ ~ .. ~ ~ _._-... ~ ~
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I 
outlook are traits of i n d ~ i d u ~ l i s ' ; , , I 
disrespect, indiscipline, 
destructiveness 
Replace private ownership with 
public ownership 
State planning to overcome 
erroneous allocation of resources 
caused by markets 
Eliminate competition as it 
impedes innovation and is waste 
of resources 
Not transparent, regulated 
personnel policy 
Incentive-deprived quality 
control 
Lack of management and 
entrepreneurship skills 
Lack of financial, marketing, 
operational conducts 
Lack of profit- and customer-
orientation 
5.3 Deinstitutionalisation antecedents: post war crisis (1975 -1985) 
"Political, functional and social mechanisms both within and beyond the organisations 
are proposed as determinants oj deinstitutionalisation" (Oliver, 1992, p. 566). Indicators 
of deinstitutionalisation are those that signify the deterioration or discontinuity of 
established activities. Institutionalised behaviours are under threat of replacement when 
existing rule-like orders lose status. Oliver (1992) suggests three major (external and 
organisational) sources of pressure on mature institutionalised practices: functional , 
political and social. 
For better clarification, assessment of antecedent conditions to deinstitutionalisation of 
central planning in Vietnam and in EVN will be divided into external and internal 
categories where external factors cover perennially poor performance (high inflation, 
low output growth, social unrest) exacerbated by termination of external financial aid; 
whilst internal category looks into functional problems (inefficiency and outdated 
practices) leading to bottom-up fence-breaking behaviours from within SOEs. 
133 
After the war ended in 1975, Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) devoted their attention to 
rebuilding the country as socialist state based on the model previously applied in Soviet 
Union and China. Its socialist transformation was not viewed in economic terms but 
primarily social, as the main rules were to eradicate private ownership and trade, 
centralisation of industries and collectivise agriculture (Nguyen and Cooper, 1983). But 
the system could not deliver the prosperous and industrialised future promised by the 
Party. Rigid command economy and impractical allocation of resources failed to live up 
to expectation as the disparity between outcomes intended with central planning 
measures and the real 'outside' market gradually became too apparent for the 
government to ignore. At the heart of the problem was the official pricing system and 
lack of incentives for increased output and productivity. Distrusting markets, planners 
set prices at low level in order to maintain low wages and boost state owned enterprises 
profits to finance state investments (Hy, 2003). Meanwhile, scarcity of inputs meant they 
were offered at much higher prices at 'outside' or 'black' market, encouraging the 
diversion of state-supplied goods to this secondary economy and shifting workers 
devotion to these 'outside' activities. Distribution of income also created problems for 
productivity since wage was highly egalitarian and every worker was entitled to the 
same benefits regardless of efforts or ability. Moreover, workers were not under the 
pressure of losing jobs since the state also guaranteed life-long employment. The size of 
'black' market continued to grow and became an important part of the economy 
signalling the incapability of central planning system to fine-tune the economy. Pike 
(1981) gave a precise and comprehensive account of the depressing shape Vietnam was 
in during the later 1970s, arguably even worse than during war. Among the poorest and 
most damaging decision makings were [. . .] inappropriate high-level plans. overly rapid 
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collectivisation of agriculture, deliberate destruction of existing domestic trade system 
f. .. J, loss of technical skills through the expulsion of middle class { ... J, economic 
mismanagement resulting in insolvency of enterprises, supply and distribution 
breakdown. lack of investment capital f. .. J and economic corruption. (p. 86). Poverty 
was widespread as shortage in food (estimated 20% shortfall for 1980), consumer goods 
(dropped 50% in the last five years) and raw materials intensified (Pike, 1982), 
(McWilliams, 1983). 
But why could the government persistently defend the system despite its undeniably 
disappointed state? Three factors explain why in the face of economic failure and 
increasing social unrest, central planning survived until the moment it finally met its 
demise in 1986: first, there existed no clearly superior alternative at that time; second, 
foreign aids from Soviet Union masked the scale of problems and third, the opposition to 
reform by one of the most powerful party leaders, the in-office Party General Secretary 
Le Duan. Having Soviet Union as the major supporter and sponsor of Vietnam War 
against French and American as well as the chief agent of communist regime, vep also 
turned to Soviet Union for guidance in economic matters. In the early 1970s, Soviet 
Union continued to advocate socialism and its ultimate stage, communism as the 
superior over markets on the quest for modernisation. With this impression, vep was 
left with little choice but to continue with central planning despite mounting concerns. 
Besides, at that time, the government was hardly willing to investigate the extent of 
problems since aids from Soviet Union meant inputs, no matter how scarce, were still 
available. Perhaps, the easier choice then would be to view the problems as transitional 
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rather than having to question deep-root beliefs and expectations of the system that won 
the country its independence and freed the people from capitalist exploitation. 
Without government intervention, tremendous tension accumulated in price and 
distribution systems, 'fence-breaking' behaviours had become universal, no longer a 
merely isolate occurrence or confining to small number of people (Fforde, 1989, 1996, 
2003). The majority of workers continued to focus on 'outside' activities more than state 
business and 'black' input market was thriving. Although these fence-breaking activities 
were illegal, shortage was so severe and widespread that even managers turned blind 
eyes so that workers could make extra living to survive. As for managers, while outputs 
were limited by planning targets and wages did not suffice even the most basic needs, as 
heads of cooperatives, desperate managers committed their own 'fence-breaking' to 
solve dire situations (St. John, 2006). Alongside 'official' output targets, managers 
started the use of allocated inputs to make additional products then sold at 'black' 
market for higher prices. Extra production not only improved living standards for 
everyone, extra outputs helped balancing yearly targets since inputs were unreliable and 
sometimes failed to make delivery. Latent in this situation is the irony of state economy: 
centralised planning and collectivising resources neither brought prosperity nor proved 
the supremacy of state over markets, instead it provided the motivation and opportunity 
for entrepreneurship to nourish and unexpected development of a market-based 
economy. Faith in the regime began to weaken and even the government came to realise 
the magnitude of their mistakes, although they were yet to admit it openly. Commitment 
to socialist transformation remained strong even though the leaders went from one grave 
mistake to another resulting in devastating consequences for the economy. Referring to 
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the failure to achieve targets in this period, Pham Van Dong2 later admitted that they 
were "too ambitious" (McWilliams, 1983). 
Fortunately, the table turned significantly when in 1979, the VCP agreed to loosen state 
controls and granted private enterprises incentives in agriculture and industry (Donnell, 
1980). The decision was brought about partly by Soviet Union aid cuts in 1978-1979 but 
the 1979's policy refonn was mainly detennined by internal factors i.e. terrible state of 
the economy (Fforde and de Vylder, 1996). In effect, this showed the first sign of 
struggle between ideology and pragmatic policies (Chanda, 1984) as the Party could no 
longer discard the urge for economic system adjustments. However, the decision did not 
come easy as any decentralisation measures implied direct attacks on socialist ideology. 
It was then purely the matter of balancing between attaining economic recovery while 
ensuring socialist transfonnation feasible in the near future. In a way, it is not unrealistic 
to call this a compromise between boosting productivity and growth and allowing state 
organisations sufficient time to improve capacities required for socialist transfonnation 
(Duiker, 1986). The stance was then reinforced by Decision 25/CP in 1981. Decision 
25/CP could be seen as the first attempt of deinstitutionalisation of central planning as 
"it provided guidelines for the development of initiatives and financial autonomy in state 
enterprises. Recognising earlier 'fence-breaking' practices, these initial reforms 
allowed factories to acquire and employ resources r .. .] to increase supply outputs as 
long as they reported all activities outside official plans" (81. John, 2006, p. 46). 
Outcomes were mildly optimistic: growth increased slightly and for the first time since 
1975, the country was self-sufficient in terms of food (Duiker, 1985). Economic 
2 Prime Minister of united Vietnam (1976-1987) 
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improvement, on the other hand, angered Party members who blamed the liberating 
policy for putting socialist transformation in jeopardy. As a result, recentralisation was 
called forth (Fforde, 2003). Collectivisation accelerated but not enough to offset the 
expansion of private sector as product contracting3 also increased. For the past few 
years, the Party and the government made great attempt to juggle with economic 
reconstruction and finalising the last stage of socialism before becoming a true 
communist country. However, the revived emphasis on collectivisation and the 
inconsistent price controls truly began to take toll. Inflation was spiralling out of control 
to the point where trade was suspended in some areas while rationing of food and other 
consumer goods was reintroduced (Esterline, 1987). As economic performances 
worsened, concerning voices were harder to be silenced. Several figures with liberating 
ideas and open attitudes to reform started to come forward, instigated by Tran Phuong, 
Minister of economic affairs (1981-1982). Considered as the first promoter of pragmatic 
approach, in May, 1984, he conceded during interviews with foreign newspapers that 
"the regime was currently facing severe problems and the mixed econom/ would 
remain in effect for several years until the state was able to playa leading role in the 
distribution and circulation of goods" (Duiker, 1985, p. 99). However, the Party General 
Secretary (the highest post in state apparatus) at that time was Le DuanS, who was 
deeply devoted to socialist ideology and determined to see transformation reaching final 
stage. One might say that the Party was ignorant to not comprehend the depth of 
problems or too divided to act collectively. For whichever reason, they failed to face 
3 The system where peasants could make arrangements to lease land within the collective in return for 
other products (Duiker, 1985) 
4 Referring to the current dominance of 'black' market over retail and wholesale of goods 
S Party General Secretary (1975-1986) 
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reality. As the consequence, Vietnam suffered economic setback that could have been 
replaced by economic development if the Party and the government were able to act 
decisively and timely. A summary of key events during 'antecedent' period is provided 
in Table 5 below. 
• 1975 - 1977: Centralisation of industries, rigid command economy and mismanaged 
allocation of resources led to hyperinflation, material shortage, thriving 'black' 
market, fence-breaking and ultimately system failure. 
Explanations for inactions: absence of superior alternative, foreign aids 
masked the magnitude of problems and fierce opposition to refonn from 
conservative Party members. 
• 1978 - 1979: first domestic crisis 
• 1979: first loosening of state controls - private enterprises incentives granted in 
agriculture and industry 
• 1981: second loosening of state controls - Decision 251CP legalised auxiliary plans 
and created early initiatives and financial autonomy in SOEs 
• 1982: recentralisation due to pressures from conservative members 
• 1983 -1985: economic conditions worsened, reformists began to come forward 
Explanation for inactions: absence of superior alternative, foreign aids and 
opposition to reform by incumbent Party General Secretary Le Duan 
5.4 Deinstitutionalisation and moderating factors 
Deinstitutionalisation refers to the process where taken-for-granted practices are 
discarded, not "merely because better options present themselves" (Ahmadjian and 
Robinson, 2001 , p. 627), but because they become delegitimated hence have lost their 
meanings. If switching events are powerful enough to overcome resistance of old 
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institutions, the end-product of deinstitutionalisation will be a new set of orders 
reinstitutionalised to fill the logic gap and restore the disrupted mental framework. How 
could such legitimate ways of thinking that lay the foundation for smooth functioning of 
social orders ever get devalued without collapsing the whole system of thoughts? 
Maguire and Hardy (2009) suggest it is done through "problematisation", i.e. by 
"substantiating and dramatising the ineffectiveness and injustice of existing system" 
(Colomy, 1998, p289); in other words - to "produce and distribute texts to promote 
particular meanings [. . .] and build a case for their abandonment [oo.J through the use of 
[oo.] various rhetorical strategies or particular collective action frames to provide an 
interpretation of the situation and frame courses of actions that appeal to existing 
interests. These ways, individuals try to manage meaning and delegitimise the status 
quo" (Maguire and Hardy, 2009, p. 151). They also suggest that as discourse changed, 
"new subject positions emerged from which actors spoke and acted in support of 
problematisations, which then became normalised in new bodies of knowledge", 
(Maguire and Hardy, 2009, p. 156). Analogous process occurs during 
deinstitutionalisation if institutional agents wish to convey their intended sensemaking 
accounts to others. Taking advantage of their credibility, power and influence, these 
sensegivers induce deinstitutionalisation by singling out cues that emphasise negative 
features of existing institutions as well as merits of replacements. The intentional 
juxtaposition of real loss if problematic institutions stay in place and potential gains 
from abandoning those makes this sensemaking account more appealing than 
alternatives. Having said that, it should not be interpreted that sensegiving would 
definitely deliver the intended impacts. Since sensemaking is a social and political 
process, meaning negotiation will be determined by power dynamics and struggles 
140 
among actors. In the deinstitutionalisation process of central planning regime, more 
powerful actors such as state and governments tried to use political power and social 
position to manipulate sensemaking of the mass. Whether it was coercive "hard" 
instruments like laws and regulations or persuasive and "soft" propaganda campaign, the 
purposes were the same: changing shared understanding. If the emergence of new 
narrative "market socialism" represented ideological struggle between not wanting to let 
go of socialism and the inevitable conversion to capitalism, the subsequent changing 
process of social sensemaking to accommodate new market and business concepts, was 
in essence, the product of social negotiation. Overtime, via rules and regulations, 
organisations (SOEs and private businesses alike) learned to accept ideas and practices 
but discarded those proven impractical to Vietnamese organisational environments and 
the wider Vietnamese society. Over the course of 25 years (since 1986), 
deinstitutionalisation of central planning and institutionalisation of "market socialism" 
proceeded with various speeds. Indeed, Vietnamese version of capitalism was not only 
shaped by the way institutional agents constrained the less powerful but also by the 
resistance of these groups to repression. The next chapter examines the whole process in 
detail by dividing into three phases, each studies institutional agent sensegiving and 
corresponding interpretation of receivers and the consequential industry and 
organisational restructuring during that period. Before moving to this, however, it is 
important to point out that institutional transformation is not an isolate process that 
manifests on its own. There are factors, both internal and external to organisation 
environments that could reduce or elevate the speed of deinstitutionalisation. Theorists 
propose that endogenously, organisations possess properties that can accelerate 
deinstitutionalisation, referred as entropies; and they are also endowed with inertia 
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qualities, so-called dissipations (Oliver, 1992). Organisational entropies are tendencies 
of organisational rules and logics to erode and modify on their own accounts, to deal 
with internal inconsistencies whilst the notion of inertia suggests coherent resistances to 
change. Relatively speaking, one of the strongest dissipation factors is preference for 
certainty and stability within organisation, especially for Confucian institutions like that 
of EVN. Shocks and radical changes often bring uncertainty and chaos which are 
mentally and emotionally disturbing. Handling these cues might be a difficult task since 
they do not fit into existing schema hence require modification to mental mode. In case 
of EVN, although employees might agree to innovation, they might not have full 
understanding of new concepts or lack the knowledge of how these procedures work. 
Uncertainty in outcomes and course of actions partially explains resistance, and in tum 
slow down deinstitutionalisation. Another factor likely to cause resistance is distaste of 
instability. This is not surprising at all, especially at the beginning of 
deinstitutionalisation process, since the majority of employees were born and raised 
during wars and spent most of their lives working under socialist regime. There are ways 
to raise instability tolerance and mitigate resistance including providing employees with 
adequate information concerning purposes, directions and detailed action plans as well 
as leaders setting examples as guidance. In terms of external constituents, incomplete 
legal framework and ambiguous reform initiatives might exacerbate anxiety and 
confusion. Certainly incoherent, ever-changing and open to interpretation laws and 
regulations offer little articulated guidelines and might even delay transition. 
Organisations like EVN might find it hard to commit to long term plans if changes occur 
constantly. These are crucial elements that influence deinstitutionalisation outcome and 
speed therefore must be dealt with carefully. 
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On the other hand, noteworthy entropies do exist to smooth the progress of institutional 
transformation. One of the most significant factors contributing to the successful 
deinstitutionalisation of command economy is because social sensemaking changed with 
them. As the economy restructured and legal framework improved, social expectations 
evolved at the same time. During central planning era, state cooperatives were not 
viewed as enterprises in their own rights hence were not hold responsible for any 
wrongdoings or failures. This expectation changed significantly since the day SOEs 
became legal entities and won independence in business management. Encouraged by 
greater freedom of speech (among other principles advocated at Sixth Party Congress by 
Nguyen Van Linh, 1986), the media and indirectly, the people, began to voice their 
opinions and in some case, concerns about the duty and responsibilities of state-owned 
enterprises like EVN. Much more was expected from SOEs now. Alongside social 
responsibilities, SOEs were expected to meet standards of international business with 
modem entrepreneurship and management skills. This consisted of greater customer 
awareness, demand side management and improved overall efficiency. Customer service 
has become an important requirement of business that previously did not exist. In 
addition, as private sector developed, it was common thinking that SOEs must boost 
competitiveness and more importantly make necessary preparations to forego monopoly 
position once competitive market arrives. To a certain extent, increasing participation 
and influence of the media undoubtedly play a part in facilitating and hastening 
deinstitutionalisation. As one of the most pivotal industries, power industry has received 
enormous interest not only from the government but the public and media also. 
Constantly being under the spotlight might bring SOEs recognition and support but also 
additional pressure. In analysing deinstitutionalisation process, next chapter implicitly 
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incorporates these moderating factors in explaining the interplays between institutions 
and sensemaking; that is - how institutional breakdown induce conscious sensemaking 
and how sensemaking, in tum, shape up institutional transition in next phase of 
deinstitutionalisation. The role of sensemaking will be uncovered as sensemaking during 
one particular period is used to explain why and how deinstitutionalisation takes the 
course it does. 
5.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have thoroughly examined institutional settings surrounding the case 
study by tracing evolution of Vietnamese traditions through history. The significance of 
political, social and economic developments was particularly emphasised. Idiosyncratic 
institutions particularly attributed to Vietnamese contexts encompass traits of the most 
ancient agricultural society thousands of years ago, Confucian ways of thinking and 
living, as well as more recent, modem-day ideologies such as Communism and 
Socialism. The origin, timing of entry and contents of institutions received as much 
interest as institutional adjustments did since path dependence offered great insights in 
understanding why at particular point in time, certain institutions seemed more 
welcomed by certain culture. In this case, fundamental similarities between 
agriculturaVConfucian institutions and Communism/Socialism such as norm of 
dependence, collective orientation and respect for hierarchy might hold the key in 
elucidating why Vietnamese people found Communist ideologies appealing, especially 
when compared against capitalism and individualist culture it stood for. 
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Second, with the focus of organisational settings in mind, I have paid close attention to 
implicitly shared traditions, values and norms as well as their institutional implications 
on organisational environments and practices. In referring to these organisational 
institutions, we often picture characters such as thoughts of dualism, harmony- and 
consensus-building, collective- and relationship-orientation, norms of dependence, 
respect for hierarchy, paternalistic/authoritarian leadership, personal communication, 
emotion-sensitivity, subjective thinking, high power distance, uncertainty avoidance and 
principles such as egalitarianism and command-based bureaucracy. 
Third, I highlighted the role of Vietnam wars, apparently a major part of Vietnamese 
history, and their far-reaching impacts on the economy, the people and the traditions. It 
could be said that constant wars robbed Vietnam of its chance to realise the country's 
potential, but it was wars that nourished traditional values of a closely knit community. 
If wars could either destroy or strengthen traditions, in the case of Vietnam, it was the 
latter. Effectively, struggle against capitalism fostered national unity and, led to the 
adoption of socialist regime and ultimately facilitated the merging of Confucian 
institutions with socialist institutions. 
Fourth, the versatility of institutions has also been shown. That is - as the country passed 
from one era to the next, intrinsic traditions evolved with them by aptly absorbing 
essential qualities and cleansing off outdated ideas while keeping core values intact. In 
the wake of this selective process, there remain only the most resilient traditions, which 
lie at the heart and core of Vietnamese society. Such values include respect for 
hierarchy, norm of dependence, collective and relationship orientation. The importance 
of institutions' ability to accommodate change will become clearer in the next chapter 
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when de institutionalisation of central planning is investigated. It will be shown and 
explained why certain features of Communist/Socialist institutions such as 
egalitarianism and command based regime are discarded but others survive. 
Fifth, for the sake of clarification and presentation, crucial events of 
deinstitutionalisation process were examined in chronological order to reveal 
progressive nature of the process as well as causal linkages. This way, a series of 
predated events could be taken as explanatory factors and antecedents for subsequent 
institutional changes. Deinstitutionalisation therefore could be taken as the product of 
events occurred in previous periods. Along the same line, agricultural/Confucians 
institutions were studied prior to Communism/Socialism institutions to reveal evolution 
of institutions over time as well as convey clear sense of continuity. 
Finally, in this research, institutional processes were not believed to be isolated from 
surrounding environments. This view was evidenced in the discussion of moderating 
factors, both external and internal to organisations, which might impact on institutional 
transition. In doing so, analysis of deinstitutionalisation took into account broader social 
changes and suggested that new sensemaking narrative was influenced by altered social 
shared understanding and expectations. Specifically, principles of "market socialism" 
were more easily implemented hence faster deinstitutionalising, because concept of 
social entity changed and because of customers and the media's augmented sphere of 
influence. In other words, deinstitutionalisation of central planning might be initiated by 
one party - the government, but the outcome and pace of deinstitutionalisation are 
determined by social negotiation of all relevant stakeholders, including organisations. In 
fact, organisational rigidities could be one of the most powerful countermeasures to 
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deinstitutionalisation initiatives. And if powerful enough, inertias could halt or even 
reverse deinstitutionalisation process. Realistically, in the case of EVN, uncertainty and 
instability avoidance is considered one of such factors. More comprehensive discussion 
of these moderating factors will be incorporated in the next chapters. 
The following chapter, chapter 6 will study a particular set of conditions behind 
economic reform in 1986, the significance and implications of these switching events, 
the birth of new sensemaking narrative and essentially radical reorganisation and 
restructuring at industry and organisational levels. 
147 
CHAPTER 6 
Market socialism and organisational restructuring 
6.1 Introduction 
In Vietnamese people's mind, the year 1975 marks the end of feudalism, colonisation 
and invasion, the end of thousands of years the common people fought for their own 
identity, for the right to live as citizens, not as slaves on their own homeland. It is always 
remembered as the beginning of freedom, just like economic reform symbolised as the 
beginning of a new era. The spirits and ideals of market socialism spread through the 
country, changed the life of every business unit, every household and gained the support 
of the people. This chapter tells the story of how market socialism liberates one pivotal 
field - the electricity sector and the state-owned electricity company. 
In broad perspective, this chapter carries on (from chapter 5) elaborating the first 
research question about the evolution of deinstitutionalisation of old management 
institutions, in the setting of organisational restructuring in Electricity of Vietnam 
(EVN). More specifically, the main aim of this chapter is to explore the nature of and the 
rationale behind switching events, in this case, economic reform in 1986, as the source 
of subsequent institutional transition. 
Like chapter 5, this chapter was drawn mostly from documentations explaining 
macroeconomic, political and social conditions during and after switching events as well 
as those pertaining to the birth and development of power sector and EVN. As far as the 
level of analysis is concerned, the focal points of this chapter are the intermediate levels 
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of industry and organisation. In doing so, it enriches the strand of argument set out in 
previous analysis by explaining how institutional inconsistencies and inertias, if left 
unresolved, might induce catastrophic circumstances and system breakdown, which 
inevitably compel adjustment and rearrangement of unprecedented scale in some cases. 
Ultimately, this chapter intends to illustrate the transitional episode starting from the 
most dramatic moment, the switching events, all the way through the reorganisation 
process itself. Methodologically, it does so by detailing crucial steps and landmarks of 
institutional transition, via the applied context of Vietnam, and in due course revealing 
the journey of self-renovation of a formerly state-owned and -run unit until it becomes 
the corporation it is today. 
As theorised by the theoretical framework in chapter 3, switching events surrounded by 
contradiction, uncertainty and ambiguity and as disruptive and potentially wide-ranging 
as they are, require immense effort to restore orders. In many cases, this involves 
sensegiving of institutional agents although bottom-up sensemaking is equally 
important. Hence, in an attempt to capture the aftermath of switching events, the 
economic reform in 1986, the chapter moves on to investigate the new sensemaking 
account (sensegiving) of 'market socialism', promoted by institutional agents (the 
Vietnamese Communist Party and government). The emergence of this new ideology 
alone is taken as clear indication of deinstitutionalisation of socialist institutions in the 
'normative pillar' (Scott, 2001) since it signified dramatic changes in logics, values, 
principles, ideals and beliefs. Further implications and impacts of such sensegiving 
account will then be examined via the 'regulative pillar', that is the new rules and 
regulations put in place to reinforce the new belief and economic systems. In detail, the 
149 
origin and development of power sector and EVN since 1986 will be analysed 
consecutively. As for 'cognitive pillar', organisational and individual sensemaking is 
planned for chapter 7. 
6.2 Switching event - economic reform (1986) 
If in the early 1980s the economy enjoyed a brief economic recovery following the 
adoption of new policies aimed at increasing private incentives such as the crucial 
'product contracts', then by 1985 the country was once again in deep water as 
stimulating effects began to wear off. Food output rose only 1.1 percent, causing 1.5 
million tons of grain shortage as the government increased input prices without raising 
rice prices accordingly (Porter, 1993). Inflation skyrocketed from 50-90 percent in 1981 
to 300 percent in 1985(Hy, 2003) due to fiscal deficit, monetary mismanagement and 
excessive demand for consumer goods causing accelerating prices in the free market 
(chapter by Yo, T. T in Komai and Qian, 2009). As a result, the purchasing power of 
workers declined dramatically in real terms despite government attempts at salary 
adjustments. At the root of deficiency problems was the situation state enterprises and 
cooperatives found themselves in: low labour productivity, high production cost, 
shortage of materials, poor quality controls causing most of them to operate only one-
third of full capacity (Marr and White, 1988). In addition, slack management, non-
existent training, and state bureaucratic accounting procedures masking serious 
problems meant state cooperatives were operating at a loss even though they fulfilled 
planned targets (V 0, 1988). All things considered, resource misallocation, 
macroeconomic imbalance, state cooperatives inefficiencies and poor living standards 
all contributed to a miserable year of 1985, which saw the credibility of the Party and 
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government hit the new lowest point. Everyone desperately waited for changes and 
knew that they would come soon. Then in July, 1986 the passing away of in-office 
General Secretary Le Duan effectively dealt final blow to the frail central planning 
system and put an end to command regime. The Sixth Party Congress in December, 
1986 clearly acknowledged the existence and importance of private sector and declared 
that multi-ownership was the way forward for Vietnamese economy. The result was the 
revolutionary economic reform, Doi Moi, which changed the future of Vietnam and its 
people forever. 
In every possible way, economic reform 1986 delivered long-awaited and much-needed 
shock to the whole country. This event opened a new window for the renewal of the 
relationships between the State and state-run enterprises, between private and public 
sector and promised a new, welcoming era for entrepreneurship. The reform 
deinstitutionalised every aspect of central planning by enhancing freedom of choice for 
economic units and competition, opening the economy to foreign trade and investments, 
liberating prices almost completely and substantially reduced subsidies to the SOE 
sector (Vo, 1988). So how did 1986 reform instigate sensemaking as a response to the 
disturbances generated by it? How did Vietnamese society and organisations shift from 
old viewpoints to brand new concepts, new principles and new practices? To answer this 
question, we must recall the nature of switching events, their role and effects during the 
deinstitutionalisation process. At the end of the 'incubation period' i.e. antecedents, 
crucial event(s) under specific conditions create disruption to previous flows of 
sensemaking in the form of contradiction, ambiguity and uncertainty. These, in return, 
require conscious sensemaking to restore lost meanings and framework. 
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So what was the new narrative that 1986 reform tried to convey via 'socialism with 
market orientation'? How could two entirely contradicting concepts such as socialism 
and markets possibly work together? Beresford and Fforde (1997) give a good possible 
definition of the changing notions of Vietnamese socialism. According to them, 
socialism possesses essential and dispensable components and 1986 economic reform 
moved away from the latter while the former remained intact. The paper suggests that 
'classic' socialism consisted of three main principles: public ownership of the means of 
production, central planning and distribution according to labour. A group of operational 
principles could be indicated: central monopoly of foreign trade, state monopoly of the 
domestic circulation of goods, cooperative production in the agricultural and handicraft 
industries, planning of industrial production, state control of finance and credit, state 
determination of virtually all prices (including wages) and planned allocation of labour. 
In this sense, public ownership of the means of production could coexist with market-
based circulation and production of goods as long as definitional (not operational) 
elements are retained. In effect, 'reformed' socialism only replaced traditional 
bureaucratic central planning with the authority to regulate SOE industries since it is still 
the sole owner of public assets. The bureaucracy might lose direct control over the 
quantities of input and output but it can still rule state-run enterprises indirectly by 
formal and informal interventions, administrative price setting, financial control, 
selection of management team as well as control over market entry and exit (Komai, 
2008). New meaning of socialism then implies that in theory, markets mechanism and 
signals are expected to replace bureaucratic commands as the driver of the economy. In 
reality, markets did not fill the gap but other, indirect, more subtle tools of coordination 
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did. Alternatively speaking, the role of the markets increased but so did the role of state. 
'Reformed' socialism might have altered the form of control, not the intensity of it. 
Not only that refonn intensified active sensemaking due to the difference between how 
things have been done in the past and how things should be done from now on, it did so 
because deinstitutionalisation created uncertainty and ambiguity. The fact that 
Vietnamese refonn was not based on any complete and available model (Vuong, 2004) 
or that the Vietnamese government favoured the use of experimental 'trial and error' 
method in building their own model probably explained why uncertainty and ambiguity 
were an inevitable part of the deinstitutionalisation process in this case. Uncertainty 
regarding the content and direction of restructuring of such 'spontaneous' reform 
(Kornai 2008) was paramount, causing problems for both SOEs and foreign companies. 
Ambiguity in implementation guidelines and directives also required sensemaking by 
clarifying cues and their meanings whereas uncertainty could only be resolved by 
attaining relevant information. In situations of vast uncertainty and ambiguity like this, 
social construction of meaning is critical more than ever as without a shared (no matter 
how limited and temporary) understanding of how the new institutions work, the system 
will fall apart. 
6.3 New sensemaking account of institutional agents - 'market 
socialism' 
Although 1986 has been known as the milestone of economic reform, antecedents of 
deinstitutionalisation and the fIrst sign of subsequent sensemaking alteration appeared as 
early as 1979. The late 1970s saw the fIrst serious crisis in both economic and political 
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affairs as well as the first wave of refonn incentives. The Third Plenum of August 1979 
and follow-up Decision 251CP shifted the course of economy by legalising SOE's fence-
breaking activities and encouraging agents to increase economic activities and exploit 
opportunities (Fforde, 2007). The most prominent feature was 'three-plan' system which 
pennitted SOE to carry out auxiliary plans alongside compulsory state targets. However, 
this deinstitutionalised effort was short-lived as the Fifth Congress of Spring, 1982 
confinned recentralisation tendency when Decree 146-HDBT was promulgated to limit 
SOE's 'production and trade based on the unorganised market' and 'centralise sources 
of commodities in the hands of the state' (Cong Bao, 1982 as stated in Fforde, 2007). 
This policy stance was later reinforced by Decree 156-HDBT in 1984, the last 
recentralising decree before 1986 economic refonn. In essence, all three policies centred 
on 'three-plan' system but the latter two clearly showed reinstitutionalisation of 
command economy as they contained detailed administrative controls to change fonnal 
incentive structure. In effect, the two Decrees entailed that SOEs were not to retain any 
profits and they had to obtain pennission from superiors for outside plans. Obviously 
this was a deliberate move aimed at creating adverse impact on 'unplanned' activities 
(Duiker, 1985). In a way, this indicated that deinstitutionalisation failed to reach final 
stage (new institutions), that is, resistant work overpowered deinstitutional impacts 
hence reinstitutionalised to old institutions. Even though counteractive forces exist in 
every deinstitutionalisation cases but occasionally, they are strong enough to actually 
reverse the entire process, which was exactly what happened to decentralisation before 
1986. 
154 
Despite failure to fully decentralise prior to 1986, policy stances and widespread bottom-
up 'fence-breaking' activities during this period were solid indicators of 'reformist' 
narrative and deinstitutionalisation tendency (Fforde, 2007). Over ten years since 1975, 
Party leaders and the state had slowly transformed their sensemaking of socialist 
transformation and its implication for economic and social development. In 1976-77, 
fully trusted and committed to Marxism-Leninism, Party leaders were absolutely 
confident in their ability to build a socialist economy, which was "a much easier task 
compared to defeating the US", and that "the process of [building central-run economy 
and] taking the economy ... from small scale production to large scale socialist 
production shall be largely completed within about twenty years" (Cong Bao, 1982 as 
stated in Fforde, 2007, p. 168). The results, however, were disappointing. Then came the 
Six Resolution in 1979, which was symbolically called bung ra - literally translated 
'breaking open' of private initiatives, completely reversed policies of previous years. In 
Six Resolution, wrongdoings were acknowledged: 
Shortage was severe [. .. ] the role of consumer goods and local industries was 
undermined. [oo.] the State and collective sectors of the economy were not 
adequately enhanced while the private sector was underutilised. 
The main error [. . .] was the mechanical application of collectivisation [. oo] The 
Party leaders' simplistic view on socialism and on the way to achieve socialism 
[.oo] without taking into account the real situation [00'] had created adverse 
consequences (stated in Vo,1987). 
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Party members also publicly admitted the magnitude of problems and for the first time 
hinted at more fundamental weaknesses of bureaucratic administrative system. This 
indicated momentous shift of opinion among leaders, who until that time insisted that 
problems were simply transitional and refused to question deep-rooted assumptions. In 
1982, top government officers such as Pham Van Dong6 acknowledged previous targets 
to be 'too ambitious' (McWilliams, 1983); 'the production was unstable due to material 
shortage' and accepted that 'the government only controlled 60% of retail trade and 
40% of wholesale trade' (Chanda, 1984, p. 30). Although underlying causes were not 
mentioned, it appeared that reality began to sink in. At this point, it had become a 
consensus that previous miscalculated decision makings and mismanagement of 
resources were neither in the economy's nor the people's best interest and in fact, it 
might have been beneficial to acknowledge the role of markets and cut down on 
administrative controls. 
Despite growing concern about deteriorating economic conditions, not until after the 
death of Le Duan, ideological transformation began to gain real momentum and exert 
broad impacts. The replacement of old-school politicians with innovative minds as top 
leaders like Truong Chinh7 and Nguyen Van Linh8 who were famously known as strong 
advocates of renovation and market economy, heralded a more aggressive approach to 
economic reform. Although Nguyen Van Linh was the prime facilitator who put 
economic reform in action, it was Truong Chinh who laid the foundation for 
revolutionary political and economic thinking. Originally a conservative, Truong 
6 Prime Minister (1976 - 1987) 
7 Party General Secretary for a brief period after the death of Le Duan and prior to the appointment of 
Nguyen Van Linh 
8 Party General Secretary (1986 - 1991) 
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Chinh's standpoints changed significantly in the last few years of his life. Speaking of 
Truong Chinh' s role in economic refonn, Dao Xuan Sam, a member of economic 
advisory council in 1986 recalled: 
By 1985, large scale economic investment projects barely showed any impacts. 
Cooperatives were on the verge of collapsing due to raw material shortage. 
Inflation was 300%, 400%, even 700% at one point. Opinions were divided: 
fence-breaking to repair crisis or firmly adhered to central-planned, state-
subsidised mechanism. Then General Secretary Le Duan died. Sixth Party 
Congress was only few days away but reports sent to units were strongly 
opposed due to lack of new thinking and actions. Truong Chinh was then 
temporarily appointed as General Secretary and he made a daring, 
unprecedented move - rewriting plans with the mentality "reform is utterly 
urgent, reform for survival, reform or die". There was no doubt that Truong 
Chinh was the chief author of reform as he was the only one brave enough to 
face reality, to recognise wishes of the people and to use his credibility for good 
cause. (Viet Bao, 2006) 
One of the most crucial institutional changes Truong Chinh brought into play was the 
willingness to embrace truth. Not vague and elusive like previous public 
announcements, Truong Chinh in his political reports delivered at the Sixth Party 
Congress directly criticised early policy failings: 
Previously, the Party's eagerness to develop large-scale heavy industry that 
surpasses the country's real capabilities was one of the errors of leftist 
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infantilism. We [the Party leadership] did not pay adequate attention to 
restoring and correcting the economy, over-emphasising on building heavy 
industry .. . resulting in too many investments with very low efficiency. 
Agreed with this viewpoint, Nguyen Van Linh said: 
We have proposed erroneous strategic policies. In referring to economic 
structure, we prioritised agriculture and heavy industry whilst undervalued 
consumer goods and exports. We have also made indiscriminate investment in 
capital construction. As a result, our investments have been scattered and 
inefficient. (Fifth Plenum of Central Committee) 
In another remark concerning transitional priorities, Truong Chinh emphasised the 
difference between old and new policies: 
We have yet determined clearly and consistently the viewpoints and policies 
regarding socialist transformation [ ... j. So far, we stressed changing ownership 
of the means of production but overlooked amending problems relating to 
management, organisation and distribution. We [ ... ] favoured quantity over 
quality and efficiency ... (Sixth Party Congress, 1986). 
In terms of socialist transformation, we must proceed on a permanent, 
continuous basis, by adopting adequate forms and steps for each locality and the 
entire country [ ... ] and careful not to impatiently eliminate [the non-socialist 
sectors], causing production to fall and the market to decline (Tap Chi Cong 
San, 1986). 
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Once again, Nguyen Van Linh stood by Truong Chinh on highlighting the importance of 
non-socialist sectors: 
As an agricultural country heading towards socialism and battered by decades of 
long war, we did not rightly value all economic sectors r .. .J and failed to 
consider the development of productive forces as our most important task (Sixth 
Party Congress, 1986). 
Truong Chinh believed the key in improving political, economic and social institutions 
laid in the 'hard-line' campaign, which sought to alter economic thinking, address crisis 
of confidence and convert bureaucratic habits (Esterline, 1987), He advocated slogans 
and ideas such as open press, respect and bravely face reality, think and act with an 
objective state of mind, daringly break away from old regime, determined to create a 
new model, new mechanism, new logical thinking for complete transformation of 
political and economic systems (Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee of the 
Vietnamese Communist Party, July, 1986). Although he resigned and then passed away 
soon after (in 1988), his mottos left behind deep impressions and remained the guiding 
principles for economic reform in next decades. In referring to how his beliefs got 
translate into practical reform policies, Tran Duc Nguyen, another member of advisory 
council in 1986 said: 
In the midst of central planning embedded with centralised mechanism, close 
economy and state cooperatives, Truong Chinh endorsed totally opposite 'three 
crucial viewpoints' - developing multi-sector economy (encouraging under-
utilised private resources instead of state run monopoly); modifying economic 
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and investment structure (concentrating on exports. consumer goods alongside 
industrial goods); and finally renovating administration and management 
(replacing bureaucracy with autonomy and open mechanism). (Thong Tan Xa 
Viet Nam. 2007) 
These were the policy agendas presented for economic reform at the end of 1986 
although at this time, Nguyen Van Linh had replaced Truong Chinh as General 
Secretary. Profoundly influenced by his predecessor, Nguyen Van Linh followed the 
same directions and actively promoted a more flexible style of management replied on 
modem organisation skills and management techniques. He also sought to transfer 
accountability for daily governance to a body of appointed officials (St. John, 2006). His 
ideas and initial success at changing political habits and institutional rules was then 
inherited by his successor, Do Muoi9 and remained as one of the key principle of 
subsequent policies. During his speech at the Sixth Party Congress (1986), Nguyen Van 
Linh called for a complete and radical socio-economic renovation in order to replace a 
subsidy-based bureaucratic centralism with planning mechanism consistent with the 
principles of democratic centralism. As for the causes, he proclaimed: 
'The national economy has collapsed because of falsified profits and real losses. 
The prices of equipment and materials were calculated at too low level for a long 
time. forcing the state to make up for large amount of losses. [ ... J While central 
planning should remain. the plan had to be elaborated from the bottom up and 
{. .. J under the guidance and regulation of the state to assure balance' (June, 
1988, Plenum of the Central Committee). 
9 Prime Minister (1988 - 1991) and General Secretary (1991 - 1997) 
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Indeed, economic refonn delivered what the economy needed the most: handing SOE 
sector their autonomy, promoting private entrepreneurship and opening for foreign trade 
and investment. In doing so, institutional agents intended to institutionalise a new 
paradigm, one that did not deny the role of the state (and SOEs) as drivers of the 
economy but simply emphasised the inability of command system in doing so. The 
refonn, hence, was supposed to develop the positive potential of all components of the 
economy in production and services' but also to 'continue the socialist transfonnation 
and strengthen the management of the market (Sixth Party Congress, 1986). This goal, 
apparently. was a total contrast to the Five Year Plan 1981 - 1985 ( and in the 1980s as a 
whole), that is, to concentrate on a vigorous development of agriculture, to see it as top 
priority, to tum it into large-scale socialist production and to employ heavy industry to 
boost agriculture (Fifth Party Congress, 1980). In implication, new refonn policies 
meant SOEs remained the priority (for now at least) and focus of government 
development plans and policies. Playing the leading role in the process of 
industrialisation and commercialisation of national economy, SOEs entitled to 
preferential treatments in tenns of infrastructure foundations, financial access and 
institutional linkages although direct subsidies were no longer available. Since there was 
still a strong desire to retain control, in crucial industries such as electricity and petrol, 
market entry was extremely limited even though private sector participation was 
encouraged as stated in (Sixth Party Congress, 1986, p. 30): 'the state accepts long term 
existence and positive effects of the family, individual and private economies active in 
production and services; it guarantees the rights to property, to inherit and to legal 
incomes for people active in these sectors; it accepts their legal incorporation/identity 
and equality before the law in their production and business activities'. Competition was 
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expected to be introduced in the future via a slow process and not before SOEs had 
sufficient time to restructure and enhance efficiency. The government cautioned that 
"transitional phase onto market socialism was a complicated process which required 
deliberate and long term preparations thereby would be implemented by experimental 
approach" (Sixth Party Congress, 1986, p. 58). 
Latent in the language used by leaders and contents of reform policies was the changed 
meaning of concept of socialism. The goal was 'to develop a multi-sector economy and 
apply the market mechanism to build socialism successfully' but most importantly, 
'economic renovation and building a multi-sector economy operating within a market 
mechanism must be accompanied by the strengthening of the role of state management 
along socialist lines' (Sixth Party Congress, 1986, p. 60). It was evident that the 
acknowledgement of the role of markets was not meant to violate socialist principles. 
Rather, it was the transitional phase to socialism that changed. Instead of command 
system, now it was market mechanisms and tools that would actualise the process of 
socialist transformation. Here, to justify new interpretation of socialism, market-led 
phase should be seen as an integral part of socialism, not adversary (Kolko, 1997). New 
meanings were also introduced to other elements. As a direct attack on corruptions and 
bureaucratic centralism, it was pronounced that 'no members have the privilege of 
considering themselves an exception and of speaking and acting at variance 
with ... orders of higher echelons' (Sixth Party Congress, 1986, p. 87). In terms of 
economic matters, over the next few years, the government introduced new concepts for 
operationalisation of the new system. Amongst others, the most important concepts 
included 'industrialisation' , 'modernisation' , 'commercialisation' and 'socialist 
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accounting practices'. In essence, commercialisation referred to the intention that 
resources should be acquired and disposed of through markets rather than through 
administrative means (Fforde, 2007). For many large SOEs, foreign investment and joint 
ventures are valuable opportunities to acquire capital, modem technologies and business 
know-how (Wolff, 1999). If implemented, the idea implied such a radical transformation 
away from long-accepted, institutionalised direct allocation of resources to the new 
'socialist business practices' starting with the liberalisation of prices and businesses. 
One crucial element of socialist business was the idea of 'socialist accounting practices' 
which was 'voluntary exchange based upon calculation by both parties of the economic 
costs and benefits involved' (Sixth Party Congress, 1986, p. 90). In other words, 
enterprises should independently engage in all economic and financial activities, raising 
capital from profits and efficiently using funds allocated to them in the formal state 
budget. In response, they could make their own decisions about setting prices, salaries 
and employment, and were allowed to use their income for importing raw materials 
(Esterline, 1987). 
Against expectations, the immediate aftermath of reform was rather unimpressive for the 
next three years. Most of much-needed reforming policies had not been fully 
implemented as leaders failed to agree on the pace of restructuring although 
commitment to reform remained strong (Cima, 1989a). Ideological conservatives made 
up of bureaucrats and members of military establishment continued to be one of the 
fiercest resistant factors to changes (Cima, 1989b). The main reason for this delay was 
prompted by fears that fast liberalisation would result in anarchy and destabilise the 
Party's control. In essence, true changes only arrived in 1989 when the Party 
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reemphasised the need to toughen up state sector with more aggressive restructuring 
policies. In sum, the period between 1986 and 1993 was concerned mainly with practical 
implementations of decentralisation and institutionalising new concepts and rules for 
market-oriented institutions including reforming SOEs planning and shifting to socialist 
cost- accounting (1987), new SOE charter (1988), charter of joint venture and economic 
cooperation (1989), revised accounting regime (1989), wage and bonus payments 
according to work done (September, 1990), inspection, bookkeeping and auditing 
practices (November, 1990) and pilot equitisation programmes of some of small SOEs 
(1992). 
Without doubt, the new sensemaking narrative of 'socialist market' had paved the way 
for the most extensive and intensive transformation of political thinking, economic 
structure and social understanding in modem Vietnamese history. But it is agreed that 
policy initiatives do not always deliver their intended consequences. One of the reasons 
is that shared meanings are negotiated between sensegivers and sensetakers, who are 
capable of fonning their own sensemaking thereby able to exert powerful resistant 
forces. As such, it should only be wise to analyse how organisations as a whole interpret 
sensegiving narratives from institutional agents. 
6.4 Restructuring at industry level 
Recognising the importance of state businesses and the urgent need to remodel, state-
owned enterprise reform was initiated as part of economic renovation since 1986. 
Despite having been on the renovation list at roughly the same time, state owned 
enterprise reform did not actually launch until the mid-1990s. The initial reform of 
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Vietnam's power sector focused, first, on reorganisation, and second, on consolidation. 
Under the old centrally planned system, Vietnam's power sector consisted of three 
regional State-owned Power Companies (PC1, PC2, and PC3), which are in fact 
extensions of the former Ministry of Energy, responding mainly to the administrative 
needs rather than business requirements. Although regime of 'owning-controlling' 
ministries was relevant in the old planned economic system, it had become a bottleneck 
to the new market mechanism. For instance, the norm of shared responsibilities among 
ministries in relation to the management of state's assets meant that Ministry of Finance 
would have had difficulties in managing the utilisation and expansion of state capital. 
Moreover, none of the ministries would be held solely accountable for state assets thus 
led to resources wasting and inefficiencies (Ng et al. 2001). In an attempt to reduce 
direct interventions in the daily operations of power companies; to build up a corporate 
culture within the sector to replace the old bureaucratic atmosphere; and to develop large 
and internationally competitive large business units, system of 'owning - controlling' 
ministries were abolished. In particular, in 1994, power sector was restructured with the 
corporatisation of EVN and the establishment of Ministry of Industry as owner-investor 
institution. Corporatisation basically is the transformation of SOEs into limited liability 
enterprises (Van Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). According to Pham and Nguyen (2001), 
corporatisation is the form of restructuring to change management structure of SOE 
while allowing the state to retain its 100 percent ownership. Under corporatisation, the 
state appoints one state institution to act on its behalf as owner of state assets as opposed 
to the previous owning-controlling institutions. These new owner-investor institutions 
then exercise rights to participate in the enterprise management by appointing Boards of 
director, attending shareholders meetings. Under this form, basic management structure 
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of SOEs has not changed since the state still has authority in deciding enterprises' plans 
and disbursement of profits. Corporatisation, however, ensures closer supervision and 
tighter responsibilities and makes it possible for SOEs to raise capitals as legal entities 
(Wang and Wong, 1998). 
Key actors in electricity sector are the government and Ministry of Industry (MOl). 
Other specialist ministries including Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Trade and 
Ministry of Labour are responsible for monitoring compliance to taxation, financial 
matters, salary policy, employment policy and export-import issues. Being the owner of 
capitals and assets in state-owned power businesses, the government has the highest 
authority and power in issuing resolutions, regulations and regimes regarding electricity 
activities. Other matters include approving developmental plans for power electricity 
industry proposed by MOl, making fmal decision on electricity retail tariffs and price 
policies. Ministry of Industry functions as the State agency in the following aspects: i) 
Drafting development master plans within a 10-15 year periods submitted to the Prime 
Minister for approval; ii) Setting and modifying standards, economic-technical norms 
regarding electricity activity and utility; iii) Developing electricity retail tariffs and 
doing research and proposing regimes and policies on electricity price submitted to the 
Prime Minister for approval; iv) Developing tariff framework for power generation, bulk 
power supply, and fees for transmission and distribution and surcharges for using 
ancillary services; v) Managing activities concerning regulating electricity activity and 
utility; vi) Issuing regulations and instructions to manage rule of operation for the 
competitive power market; vii) Inspecting implementation paces of maser plans, policies 
and laws at power businesses; viii) Settling complains and claims concerning electricity 
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activity and utility. MOl is not allowed to directly intervene by administrative orders in 
procedures of managing and running business and production activities in EVN's 
member organisations and independent power producers. 
Under the Prime Minister's decision, smce the beginning of 1999, construction 
companies have been separated from EVN, Power Designing and Investigation 
Companies and the Energy Centres have been renamed as Power Engineering 
Consulting Companies (PECC). Since 2000, to enhance market diversification and to 
release scarce capitals to other investment projects, generation had been open to private 
actors and EVN started purchase contracts with non-member producers. Private sector 
participation is limited to several small hydroelectric and coal-fired thermal plants. 
There are also two other players in Vietnam Electricity Market that are not wholly 
owned by EVN - IPPs (Independent Power Producers) and BOTs (Build Operate 
Transfers) power generators. Main difference between IPPs and BOTs is the structure of 
their contracts for electricity supply. IPPs sell power to EVN at guaranteed prices (via 
power purchase agreements) and are owned by Vinacomin, Petro-Vietnam and some 
small Hydro Operators. BOTs are bounded to EVN by a tolling arrangement. A tolling 
station is kept available for use at specified efficiencies by its owner and one that is used 
to convert fuel to electrical energy for a fee (a toll) when requested by its paymaster 
(EVN). In 2003, statistic estimated private player contribution up to 15% of all power 
generation. 
Since 1996, the government focused on laying the foundation for a complete power 
market and strengthening legal institutions. After years of preparations, Electricity Law 
was passed on November 2004 and came into effect on July 2005. The Law aims to 
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stimulate the diversification of investment in the sector, promote economical use of 
electricity, enhance electricity infrastructure and develop a competitive electricity 
market. The government hoped to improve EVN efficiency in investment, production 
and sales of electricity, boost EVN's attractiveness as a FDI destination, ease 
government burden while ensuring sustainable development of electricity sector and 
enhancing user rights via greater customer choice. Along with gradually encouraging 
private sector participation, this law was a crucial step in the restructuring process. 
Under this law, vertically integrated and monopolistic structure (before 2004) of 
electricity market was disintegrated with the separation of generation, transmission and 
distribution activities. According to the Law, the State maintains its monopoly over 
electricity transmission, regulation of the national electricity system, and the 
construction and operation of large power plants, which are significant for socio-
economic or national defence and security reasons. In all other segments of the industry, 
electricity markets will be established and developed in stages. The rights and 
obligations of the electricity entities, in particular the choice of contractual partner and 
trading method, will be in line with the stages of market development as follows (Figure 
6.1): 
(1) Competitive electricity generation market - at this stage, electricity 
generators will have the right to sell electricity under a defmite-term contract or to offer 
to sell electricity on a spot basis. Electricity wholesalers and major end users (Le. entities 
that consume a relatively high quantity of electricity) will have the right to buy 
electricity from electricity generators under a definite-term contract or by spot trading. 
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(2) Competitive electricity wholesale market - electricity wholesalers will be 
able to sell electricity to retailers at any price, provided it is within the tariff range set for 
wholesale transactions. 
(3) Competitive electricity retail market - electricity retailers will have the right 
to determine the price at which to sell electricity to end users, provided the price is 
within the approved tariffs. End users will have the right to choose from which 
electricity retailer to purchase electricity. 
Figure 6.1 Roadmap for power market (200S - 2025) 
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Until 2005, MOl was responsible for all regulative and administrative activities. As the 
sector grew, this became increasingly difficult as MOl was unable to supervise every 
rule and regulation, causing delays in reform process. With the aim to speed up 
restructuring, a new authority was created under Electricity Law in 2005, Electricity 
Regulatory Authority of Vietnam (ERA V). ERA V is the agency assisting MOl in the 
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implementation of policies and in regulating electricity activities. ERA V, as an agency 
under Ministry of Industry, can make decisions on issues assigned by MOl and the 
Prime Minister. In relation with power businesses, ERA V functions as an administrative 
agency which manages electricity activity and utility. ERA V has the right to intervene 
into some stages of production and sales and utility of electricity, ensuring transparency 
and publicity without discrimination among electricity entities. At present, ERA V is a 
part of Ministry of Industry, but in the future it will soon become an independent 
agency. The aim is to create an objective environment for decision makings on issues 
related to generation and sales of electricity, and also to protect consumer interests. 
ERA V authorities include: i) preparing rules and guidance on the operation of 
competitive electricity markets; ii) suggesting measures to adjust and maintain the 
balance between supply and demand; iii) Issuing, amending and revoking electricity 
licences; iv) issuing guidance on the conditions and procedures for electricity outages 
and on the reduction of consumption and for interconnection to the national electricity 
system; v) preparing electricity retail tariff; vi) providing tariffs for electricity generation 
and wholesale and the fees for transmission and distributions; vii) observing the 
implementation of plans and projects of investment in the development of electricity 
sources, electricity transmission and distribution grids for compliance with the master 
plan; viii) determining the ratio in capacity and electricity power between electricity 
trading through defInite contracts and electricity traded on a spot basis in each market; 
ix) observing the implementation of the approved tariff and settling complaints and 
disputes in the electricity market (Master Plan V, 2005). 
The industry structure since 2005 was illustrated in Appendix C. 
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In general, the separation between operational, regulatory and ownership functions in the 
sector is still loose. ERA V's regulatory powers are limited as it is not an independent 
body yet. Moreover, the regulatory environment currently provides little encouragement 
to private investors while EVN remains a public monopoly. Although the government 
has decided to gradually abolish the vertically integrated model, the transformation 
remains incredibly slow. This, unfortunately, has some negative effects on restructuring 
process at EVN. 
6.S Restructuring at organisational level (EVN) 
6.5.1 Preliminary reorganisation (1986 - 1994) 
Before being given individual legal status in 1994, Electricity Cooperative was under 
direct control of state departments and governed by one-tit-all rules applied to state 
cooperatives and businesses. Hence, analysis of SOE reform in this section was 
considered directly relevant to the case study. Starting from November, 1987, as an 
integral part to the ongoing extensive economic reform, SOE sector underwent massive 
restructuring when Decision 217IHD BT regarding planning and business accounting of 
SOEs was issued. The content of this Decision focused on ten aspects of management of 
SOEs (chapter by Nguyen and Tran in Ng, Freeman and Huynh, 1996): 
1. Planning: SOEs hereafter had the autonomy in formulating and 
implementing long, medium and short term operating plans based on the 
socio-economic guidelines of the Party and developmental plans of 
relevant sectors. 
2. Material supplies: system of providing material supplies replaced by 
system of production factors and product procurements through 
economic contracts at negotiated prices. 
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3. Marketing of products: Products from mandatory plan had to be sold to 
designated buyers. Products outside mandatory plan should be sold to 
state-owned enterprises before trying to sell to other trading firms or 
consumers. 
4. Financial-accounting regime: SOEs and employees were entrusted with 
government assets and working capital and were responsible for 
efficiently utilising those assets. Cost items should be clearly computed 
to reflect their true costs. Profits were to be calculated as equal total 
revenue minus total cost in order to increase profits by reducing costs 
and avoiding fines. 
S. Prices: Enterprises could propose selling prices and wait for approval 
from pricing agencies. 
6. Monetary, credit and payment issues from now on would be dealt 
directly with Central Bank. 
7. All SOEs activities must be operated through economic contracts. 
8. Labour, salaries, wages and social issues: SOEs were allowed to make 
own decision on the type of and candidates for employment, the ways of 
paying out salaries, wages and bonuses but had to guarantee social 
insurance and minimum income. 
9. Export-Import activities and economic cooperation with foreign partners 
were encouraged. 
10. Collective ownership of employees of enterprises: government entrusted 
assets and capitals to enterprises as a collective entity. 
Together with Decision 251CP in 1981, Decision 217IHDBT was the first two legal 
documents highlighting the shift to socialist cost-accounting regime, reforming 
economic management and confirming the autonomy of SOEs. To accompany new 
operations of SOEs, new SOE charter was enacted in 1988, specifying SOE as legal 
entities and independent accounting units where employees were allowed to exercise 
management rights in implementing government guidelines. In essence, the new SOE 
charter addressed the matters of leadership and management within SOEs (headed by 
managers) as well as clarified the relationship between SOEs, the government and their 
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superior levels (who from now only gave guidance, not control nor interference in daily 
operations). 
But did the economy jump into recovery mode right after reform? Could 
deinstitutionalisation of central planning be that quick and easy? The answer is no. After 
reform was initiated in December, 1986, the promise of renewal and dramatic change 
was not delivered, not until another crisis in 1989 that finally saw reform gaining 
substantial momentum. Explanation for initial slow implementations of changes mainly 
pointed to the demarcation of opinions regarding the speed of reform. Although by now, 
no one opposed the ideas of renovation, conservative Party members, who feared that 
too fast liberalisation and changes would threaten Party's power and destabilise the 
already weak economy, resisted in any way they could to impede progress of 
implementations (Cima, 1989a). As a result, little was done despite the fact that 
restructuring was urgently needed. By 1989, when Soviet Union collapsed and aid was 
suddenly cut, the economy was thrown into the third crisis (first in 1978-1979 and 
second in 1985) as output slumped and inflation reached triple-digit (McCargo, 2004), 
(Cima, 1989b). Once again, the government had no other option but to speed up the 
institutionalisation and implementation of already widely supported reform policies. In 
many ways, the new wave of policies was a much-needed shock-therapy to the system as 
price liberalisation (except a few cases) and subsidy cut were introduced in one swift 
move. SOEs from now had to be responsible for their losses while compliance to new 
practices was emphasised. As countermeasures to hyperinflation, interest rates were 
raised to positive level in real terms whilst government lost power to 'negotiate' with 
SOEs for compulsory plan (due to loss of aid resources) which meant SOEs no longer 
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had to prioritise targeted plan over supplementary. SOEs were allowed to formulate their 
own production plans and resources (coal and fuel) were simply allocation of inputs at 
state-determined prices without output obligation (Fforde, 2007). In truth, 1989's crisis 
was a blessing in disguise as SOEs at last had their real breakthrough as autonomous 
enterprises and an opportunity to alter the relationship with the state. The period of 1989 
- 1993 continued to witness more aggressive changes to the economic structure and 
SOE sector. Over few years, numerous policies were continuously made to enhance 
legal frameworks of SOEs including additional regulations on operations, 
financiaVaccounting principles; joint ventures (March 1989) and economic cooperation 
in production, distribution and services (April, 1989); charter specified functions, 
authorities and responsibilities of chief accountants (March, 1989); regulations on 
distribution of wages and bonuses according to work effort (September, 1990); laws on 
auditing and bookkeeping practices (November, 1990); and also Decision on the role of 
regulatory apparatus redefmed responsibilities, authorities and tasks of ministries in 
exercising state control to limit government interventions in day-to-day operations of 
SOEs; regulations on equitisation lO (1992) and bankruptcy law (December, 1993). 
As a whole, contents and pattern of policy reform in this period (1986 - 1993) should be 
assessed as pragmatic, experimental, cautious and hesitant. Restructuring policies and 
implementations remained piecemeal, half-measured and weakly committed, particularly 
those relating to the position and scope of activity of state sector in the multi-sector 
economy. Even though the Party and state insisted on the inevitability of reform yet their 
actions did not seem to have equal weights given that they were able to tolerate 
10 Vietnamese version of privati sat ion 
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inconsistencies and ambiguities inherent in policy measures of this period. As motivated 
by pragmatic rather than ideological rationales, the reform lacked clear and coherent 
visions and directions. The hesitation of leaders towards fast liberalisation explained the 
sluggish pace of transition at the beginning. The pace, however, picked up in the latter 
part of this period when conservative ideologies lost out to reformist pressures. As a 
result, transformation began to enjoy real momentum, yet relatively modest compared to 
the acceleration in subsequent phase. At this point, the question regarding the role of 
SOEs in market socialist economy remained unsolved as they had neither legal status 
nor operated like a truly autonomous entity. In spite of decentralising policies to abolish 
direct control of state apparatus, SOEs still belonged to state department. Substantial 
changes should be acknowledged though as the State managed to institutionalise new 
sensemaking narrative, that is, 'market socialism' whereby new concepts such as 
socialist cost-accounting, work-based salary, planning and operating autonomy, 
equitisation, property rights, bankruptcy, joint venture were largely institutionalised. 
Albeit still primitive, market institutions began to take shape. 
6.5.2 Accelerated restructuring (1994 - present) 
The year 1994 saw an important change to Electricity State Cooperative (Xi nghiep quoe 
doanh). Together with other large state-run cooperatives such as Petroleum, Electricity 
Cooperative was restructured as state-owned enterprise (Doanh Nghiep Nha Nuoe), 
namely Electricity of Vietnam. When EVN was established, Viet Nam was emerging 
from a long period of closed economy. The role of the private sector in the economy was 
limited, and management strategies solely centred on fulfilling fixed production targets 
and complying with an excess of rules and regulations. The exposure of EVN staffs to 
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modem engineering technologies was minimal, as was its familiarity with economic, 
financial, and management philosophies. Since economic refonn was initiated in 
December, 1986, electricity industry had undergone fundamental changes with the aim 
to separate public ownership and business operation and management. This 
transformation, despite having started at the same time as economic reform in 1986, only 
achieved substantial momentum in the 1990s, especially since the establishment of EVN 
in 1994. In other cases, the industry and the company are considered as two different 
levels of analysis. In this case, however, as EVN being the monopoly and monopsony at 
the same time, changes to the industry structure, in fact, are changes applied directly to 
EVN's ownership and organisation. 
Until 1994, the power system in Viet Nam was divided into three regional power 
companies (PC): Power Company No.1 (PCI), operating in the north; Power Company 
No.2 (PC2), operating in the south; and Power Company No.3 (PC3). These vertically 
integrated companies functioned independently in their respective territories, with 
different technical capabilities in power system planning, design, construction, and 
operation. However, since the companies operated in centrally planned system driven by 
production targets, not profits, the need to develop financial, planning and management 
skills was less pronounced. Furthermore, obsolete in-house technical capabilities did not 
possess electronic, computing, and communications technologies. 
In May 1994, a 500-kilovolt (kV) transmission line was built to bring power from the 
Hoa Binh hydropower station to Ho Chi Minh City. This new line established, for the 
first time, an interconnected transmission grid, stretching the length of the country. It 
was also the impetus for major industry reorganisation later in 1994. Since gaining legal 
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status as State Enterprise, EVN has directly and indirectly controlled the majority of 
generation, transmission, distribution, bulk power and retail power supply. There was a 
clear distinction between commercialisation and corporatisation. Commercialisation 
related to the improvements of areas such as financial and accounting management, 
organisational structure and operational procedure, management information, and 
organisational procedure. Corporatisation, on the other hand, referred to the conversion 
of EVN and the PCs into full-fledged corporations. Under goverrunent direction, EVN 
goals include sufficing both domestic and industrial usage required for industrialisation, 
improving customer service and efficiency to maximise capital and asset utility. It has 
been operating in the form of a "conglomerate" or national monopoly in generation, 
transmission, and distribution of electricity. EVN basically operates every kinds of 
activity ranging from buying fuel for the power stations, balancing power generation and 
demand, planning development and investment, down to collecting revenues from end 
customers. Under EVN, generation and transmission operations were restructured into 
functionally separate, dependent accounting (cost) centres, while distribution was 
reorganised into five regionally based independent accounting (profit) centres. In the 
reorganised power sector, EVN is business-oriented taking profits as the primary 
motivation for its operations. Over the years, EVN has improved quality of service 
significantly by paying close attention to customer services, developing infrastructures, 
boosting employee productivity and most importantly, intensive ongoing restructuring. 
Ever since, EVN's electricity sales increased at an average annual rate of 15% 
approximately. EVN has achieved substantial outcomes so far in facing the challenge of 
meeting the rapid increase in demand while at the same time expanding coverage across 
the country. In 2006, 98 percent of districts and communes had access to electricity, 
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household electrification reached 93 percent, up from 73 percent in 2000 (Annual report, 
2006). Quality of service has also improved significantly. Transmission and distribution 
losses fell steadily from 21.4 percent in 1995 to 11.8 percent in 2005 (Annual report, 
2005). 
As part of restructuring plan and with the aim to provide a structured and safe 
investment environment for investors, a board of director and Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) were introduced, both of which were appointed by MOL This separation of 
ownership and control was a crucial part of restructuring. Under the old, state controlled 
regime, responsibilities and duties were not clearly spelled out, creating great 
opportunities for pursuing personal interests. The problem was amplified by lack of 
correspondence between organisational perfonnance and manager remuneration (due to 
egalitarian wage system). Moreover, nonn of unanimous and sharing decision making 
among government departments implied that no single authority was directly responsible 
for EVN's perfonnance leaving further opportunity for self-benefiting behaviours. The 
new governance system with the supervision of Board of Director and binding 
responsibilities for CEO was expected to bring about changes in management thinking 
and practices. This Anglo-American governance was a completely new concept to EVN 
and to Vietnamese companies in general since under socialist regime, authorities 
belonged to Power Ministry and the State. Tall hierarchical design meant plans had to 
past through a numerous of layers before reaching final decisions, causing time-wasting 
red tape and enonnous difficulties on daily operations. 
EVN organisation structure since 1995 consists of Board of Management, General 
Director, functioned Departments, dependent and independent cost-account member 
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companies (Organisation chart - Appendix D). EVN is organised into strategic business 
units - distribution and retail are independent accounting units (i.e. profit centres) and 
transmission and generation are dependent accounting units (i.e. cost centres). The 
500kV and 230kV transmission systems are owned and operated by EVN. There are ten 
distribution companies (known as Power Companies in Vietnam) responsible for 
distributing asset management (up to 110 kV), purchasing power from EVN at the 
internal price and in tum, selling to their customers (agriculture, industry, commerce and 
domestic groups) at tariffs approved by the Prime Minister. EVN Distribution 
Companies are responsible for regional distribution of electricity and corresponding 
customer services including providing information on available services and handling of 
complaints. 
Ownership diversification was another crucial part of organisational restructuring. In 
Vietnamese context, this process is referred to as equitisation, which basically is partial 
privatisation. Despite having initiated in 1992 and reinforced in 1997, progress has been 
rather inadequate and only gained substantial impetus in 2002. This was due to the fact 
that the government willingly liberalised only small, unimportant SOEs in the past. 
Since 2002, large SOEs like EVN were put under pressure to elevate equitisation as 
intensive restructuring was urgently required to enhance efficiency further. Having said 
that, the process remained extremely limited and only applied to a small number of 
minor subsidiaries. Once again, this was due to the government's persistence in 
maintaining a firm grasp on EVN, for various reasons including national security and 
stable economy development. With plans for competitive power market well underway, 
this state, however, was expected to change dramatically in the next few years. How the 
179 
situation turn out is remained to be seen though as the government has yet finalised on 
either equitisation schedule or which units to be equitised. In addition, EVN exerted 
great efforts in innovating into a diversified and customer-oriented business. In terms of 
development and business strategies, EVN facilitated on an extensive customer base and 
good reputation by diversifying into promising fields such as telecommunication and 
insurance since 2005. To raise capitals and attract investments, EVN also published 
instructions on license acquirement concerning foreign investors and rules of dividend 
sharing. Step by step, EVN was heading towards becoming financially dependent and 
efficient, profit maximising and committed to service excellence. 
Since 2006, EVN has become Electricity of Vietnam Corporation. EVN now operated as 
a corporate group as defined in the 2005 Law on Enterprises which requires, among 
others, that (a) contracts, transactions and other relations between the parent and the 
subsidiary be performed independently as if between two fully independent legal 
entities; and (b) separate and consolidated accounting be prepared. The purpose was to 
allow accounting units to be autonomous and independent of each other while 
minimising cross-financing and increasing financial transparency. As it currently stands, 
EVN holds 100 percent equity in a number of companies, including several power 
plants, distribution companies, transmission company and EVN Telecom. EVN also 
holds at least 50 percent of equity in the other subsidiaries. This move could be viewed 
as another step of corporatisation process and supposedly should enhance EVN's 
financial capacity and efficiency by offering greater authority in capital management. 
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6.6 EVN's institutionallini<ages 
This model represents dynamic and systematic relationships that affect EVN's business 
during this transitional phase hence it is only a primitive and approximate description, 
which is subject to further modifications to reflect economic, political, social and legal 
transformations. Figure 6.2 displays the general model. 
At the heart of the model are the connections (indicated by arrows) among government 
of Vietnam, Vietnamese society and EVN. Some of these links are one-sided influence 
(represented by one-ended arrow) whilst the others are bi-directional effects (double 
arrow). This model is self-reinforcing process and only disintegrates when the 
connections are broken or altered. 
The success of EVN and more general, power industry has been supported and 
nourished by the policies of government of Vietnam who acts as regulatory authority, 
facilitator of industrial relations and guardian of social stability altogether. In terms of 
development of power industry, via partial privatisation (equitisation) and deregulation 
to lessen control over EVN, government aims to stimulate entrepreneurial capacity of 
one of the most critical growth engine of the economy. Many aspects of business which 
previously belonged to government control such as worker salaries and personnel 
recruitment are now managerial discretion. After reform, less restrictive regulatory 
environment unleashes enormous power that EVN has in potential. One of the most 
astonishing evidence of the capacity of EVN to grow in such a short period of time is the 
success of recent diversified activities into telecommunication field and later 
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manufacture, bank and insurance fields. Intra-finn improvements are not less 
impressive in any way. After equitisation, joint stock companies have gradually 
strengthened their organisation, personnel arrangement, reinforced and enhanced 
production and business capacity, executed an effective, market-driven management 
mechanism. In the context of Vietnam, regulations and laws, however, are subject to 
manipulation of key agents like EVN. Via powerful ties with government agencies, 
EVN might be able to stipulate favourable policies or timescale of further 
deregulation to their advantage. This issue has important implications which must be 
appropriately dealt with if government of Vietnam attends to introduce real 
competition to power market. Stable and trusting industrial relations are also under 
government prudence. By creating fair and secure conditions for negotiations and 
contract implementations, business partners can find the same ground to practice 
strategies whilst integrate employee rights and demands. 
Another building block of government coherent system is social stability sustained 
by unemployment and housing benefits, health and education systems and other 
living amenities. In fact, this function is right on top of political agenda for a socialist 
authority like the Vietnamese. Development though crucial, must never be pursued at 
the expense of social stability. Such public programmes act as cushions when crises 
strike or when social and economic changes must be implements. Since personal and 
social costs are mostly borne by government and uncertainty is minimised, resistance 
to change is much lower, creating a flexible, open attitude among citizens (and EVN 
employees). 
All these roles of government cannot be fulfilled if government is not legitimated by 
society. In the model, the link between government of Vietnam and society is 
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legitimated on four different sources: political legitimacy stems from political system 
of one Party which advocates information and responsibility sharing; economic 
legitimacy comes from the role of wealth redistribution and social protection and 
equalisation; cultural legitimacy is resided in strong ties of identity and social 
homogeneity; and finally social legitimacy originates from social stability that giving 
room for business development. The convergence of four elements of legitimacy 
grants government with strong support of citizens, which makes transitional phase of 
the nation much more manageable. 
If government is seen as a welfare source to both Vietnamese society and EVN, there 
also exists a link between the latter. National identity and cultural embeddedness of 
Confucian society are the ultimate sources of the Vietnamese resilience, which in 
turn fuels economic and social developments. Meanwhile, individuals within that 
society possess a united social homogeneity and strongly embraced sense of social 
responsibility. 
In this sense, whilst Confucian society holds the spiritual, philosophical foundation 
for personal and relational values, which guide and sustain EVN's culture, EVN 
acting as social entity, takes the responsibility to preserve national identity as well as 
to nurture social development. This is one of the reasons why EVN top management 
can never replace collectivism with extreme individualism. 
Having examined the external influences, the discussion now turns to intra-industry 
component of the model. It is proposed that due to escalating pressure to meet 
demand and difficulties of augmenting infrastructure in sync with the speed of 
development, it might be advantageous for EVN to form a kind of network to 
stimulate business and innovation, at least in these first few stages of market 
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fonnation. The network components include subsidiaries, competitors, 
complementors and EVN's own university. 
First of all, the introduction of market in power industry implies that EVN will meet 
greater competition from new rivals, both domestic and foreign-owned. Previously, 
although EVN is not the only player but with IPPs and BOTs participate only in 
electricity production, EVN holds the dominating position. Though, under market 
system once it is fully completed, competition arises from both production and 
distribution divisions thus is supposed to pressurise EVN to improve efficiency. 
However, it should be borne in mind that in Vietnam power industry, supply can 
hardly keep up with demand as the economy is growing at an incredible speed while 
infrastructure (power station etc) takes longer time. Given these supply deficiencies 
which cannot be resolved in a short period of time, it might be in the interests of all 
parties involved if EVN continues to maintain inter-organisational network with 
IPPs, BOTs and also establish new links with newcomers. Since majority of 
prospective investors are Asian (Japan, China, Taiwan, Singapore), who also cherish 
Confucian culture, a relational-based networking is likely to be well-functioned. Not 
only that networking assists finns to cope with institutional imperfections caused by 
uncertainty of emerging market environment, network functional needs such as 
financial, input, technical and management expertise and psychological benefits such 
as trust, security and conflict resolution are important. Governed by reciprocal and 
trusting cooperation, inter-organisational network offers firms risk-bearing, cost-
efficiency and flexibility. Under the pressure of competition (electricity has been 
purchased from other countries in order to fill shortage of supply), enterprises instead 
of specialising in all stages of production can benefit from reciprocal subcontract and 
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exchange of needs with each other. In this sense, networking is as much economic 
activity-oriented as a political partnership. 
Alongside inter-organisational networking, EVN has been developing an intra-finn 
networking, which consists of its own university, 25 subsidiaries and complementors. 
After equitisation, EVN has hybrid ownership with 5 are total state-owned and 20 of 
the rest are joint stock companies. Five of main subsidiaries are now private owned. 
Having realised the crucial role of labour quality in innovation, EVN fonned its own 
university - Electric Engineering University, which dedicates to human resource 
training and development. The training activities focused on a few short training 
courses, e.g. strategic planning, production preparation training for new generation 
and network projects, equitisation and securities, telecommunication, infonnation 
technology, nuclear power, etc. Not only focusing on specialist training, Electric 
Engineering University also improves corporate management and administration, 
which becomes more essential than ever since EVN developed into a complicated 
corporation with large number of subsidiaries and multi-lined activities. Other main 
actors in the network are EVN's complementors. They are equipment manufacturers 
and infrastructure constructors. The complementation of these units offers EVN huge 
augmentation since the infrastructure upgrading, carried out by EVN own 
infrastructure and manufacturing divisions, falls short of capacity. 
The model of institutional constituents of EVN will be inadequate without 
considering the impacts of global economy, the media and customers. Prior to WTO, 
government of Vietnam acknowledged the need to meet international standards if 
Vietnam competitiveness is to be boosted. Now that Vietnam has successfully joined 
WTO, the wave of globalisation presents opportunities yet challenges at the same 
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time. As enormous foreign direct investments and financial aids from world-wide 
organisations pouring into Vietnam economy, the process of industrialisation is 
pushing forwards harder than ever. Manufacturing capacity and labour productivity 
are among the most pressurised-to-change areas. Consequently, at the least, EVN and 
domestic firms have to level to international standards in terms of market entities and 
more importantly, as growth engine, constituents of power market have to secure 
power supply for industrial and domestic usages. This continues to be the most 
challenging task EVN encounters. 
The last but not least major players in the network surrounding EVN are the media 
and customers. With unprecedented freedom of speech, the public has gained 
significant power in recent decades. Government and enterprises have been paying 
more attention to customer demands and media responses. Being a social entity, 
EVN has taken social responsibilities seriously in the past but focused mainly on 
employees. Customer rights and demands have been neglected. Since customer body 
has grown stronger and the media closely scrutinises every move, new measures are 
required to enhance customer services. The fact that the public succeeded several 
times in lobbying government to postpone electricity price increase and that the 
media criticisms over EVN's poor performance exerted incredible pressure for 
innovation, evidences the power of customers and media in Vietnamese context. 
These powerful institutions cannot be underestimated in any way and the success of 
EVN partly depends on how well these links are handled. 
The above model is proposed, considering the short- to medium-term situations and 
impacts therefore is subject to further modification once institutional contexts mature 
and stabilise. How the model turns out to be in the long term depends on the relative 
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strengths of influences such as globalisation, the ability to preserve cultural 
distinctiveness, government intentions and individual characteristics of EVN. 
However, it is not unfounded to say that emerged from Confucian society, grown 
after a long history of war, nourished in socialist market and confronted with 
globalisation with own style, the model of institutional linkages for EVN is unique. 
The distinctiveness is shaped by the interaction between social, political, economic 
and cultural actors in Vietnam. It is unwise and ungrounded to predict future model 
with precision but the main stream might always be the same: a market system 
whose core is the people and whose main facilitator is the government. The close 
connections between government, society and the economy might have caused 
delays and confusions from time to time but surprising as it might sound, it is this 
coherence and philosophy that uphold stability and national development. 
6.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I investigated the causes and significance of triggering event, 
economic reform 1986, in terms of economic policy modifications as well as its 
implications for organisational form, structure and practices. Together with other 
supporting conditions (the death of General Secretary Le Duan and dramatically 
deteriorating economic perfonnances) contributed to its final fall, this revolutionary 
reform was largely the result of a long and difficult struggle, trying to weigh up 
benefits of abandoning clearly flawed central planning with costs of shaking up 
beliefs fundamental to the survival of Socialist society and the Communist Party. The 
fact that pro-reform thinking arose as early as the 1970s and prevailed in 1986 spoke 
volume of how strong and persistent deinstitutionalisation incentive was. Delayed 
actual deinstitutionalisation owed up to powerful resistance along the way; however, 
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in the end, the bureaucratic system had become so disintegrated that its failures could 
no longer be defended and its existence had proven too costly. In terms of 
consequences, triggering events appeared to have caused contradiction, uncertainty 
and ambiguity inherent in a chaotic period, like suggested in theoretical framework. 
At first glance, the reform was initiated by the Party and the government, however, a 
closer look at fence-breaking behaviours throughout the 1970s and 1 980s said 
otherwise. Understanding of this bottom-up pressure revealed the complicated nature 
of deinstitutionalisation process, whereby bottom-up participation of organisations 
was as influential as institutional agents', not only as resistant but also as facilitators. 
In contrast to what one might think, the receiving end might not always be the ones 
who resist and top authority might not always be the ones who initiate, as was shown 
in this case study. Evidently, the government could embrace both roles during the 
course of deinstitutionalisation and so could organisations. Their respective role in 
one particular episode of the process was determined by surrounding conditions as 
well as by motivations of each group. Hence, in this chapter, not only presenting the 
dynamics of one crucial milestone of deinstitutionalisation process, the triggering 
event; I also highlighted the possibility of substitution existed between high level 
authority and organisations, especially as initiators of deinstitutionalisation. 
Third, I established that the first response to disruptions caused by switching event 
was the construction of a new sensemaking account capable of restoring lost orders 
in mental framework. The fact that institutional agents, in this case the government, 
were actively promoting one particular account, 'market socialism', confirmed the 
role of sensegiving in deinstitutionalisation. Obviously, this was only half of the 
equation whereby organisational sensemaking made up the other half. In this 
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analysis, I emphasised various instruments institutional agents used to construct and 
disseminate new sensemaking. These included the creation of new vocabulary which 
represented new values, principles and priorities and the use of influential authority 
figures as means of persuasion, whose credibility had huge impact on the success of 
sensegiving. The focal point of sensegiving, moreover, fell on stressing problems of 
existing systems while promoting advantages of the alternative. The juxtaposition of 
the two systems undoubtedly purported to encourage comparison, of out which the 
new system was likely to emerge as winner. 
Fourth, I presented a detailed description of reorganisation and restructuring at 
industry and organisational level, resulting from this new system of 'market 
socialism', in the context of EVN. In doing so, it became apparent how various 
elements of new belief system were translated into organisational management 
values, nonns, principles and practices. Considerations of how modifications in 
macroeconomic policies impacted on sector structure and organisational fonn were 
also included. Specifically, the birth of state owned EVN as legal and business-
oriented entity, whose autonomy was their own, and not as a submissive 
governmental unit; and the transformation of power market into an integrated and 
self-functioning mechanism were prominent evidence of the scope of 
deinstitutionalisation. Analysis in this section, however, mainly provided a broad 
picture of institutional transition at industry and organisational level, with no 
connection has yet been made between these changes and sensemaking underlying 
such transformation. This is in fact the focus of the next chapter 7. 
Analysis have been carried out on institutional agent sensemaking led to and caused 
by switching event (economic reform in 1986), implicitly emphasised the role of 
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sensegiving during deinstitutionalisation process. In combination, this chapter and 
the next chapter uncover one side of the coin i.e. how sensemaking impacts on 
institutional processes. Chapter 8 will consider the other side i.e. how institutions 
exert influence on sensemaking via editing and priming mechanisms. In fact, in this 
chapter, the triggering effect of institutions on sensemaking was described in the 
discussion of triggering event. It was proposed that by generating contradiction, 
uncertainty and ambiguity, economic reforms instigated sensemaking to restore 
disrupted social orders of previous command-based regime. The next chapter 
presents the second instalment of three-part analysis, which elaborates the nature of 
switching events and their impacts on sector and organisational restructuring. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Organisational sensemaking and institutional 
transformation 
7.1 Introduction 
People and their surrounding environments are inseparable; one leaves lasting 
impacts on the other. If institutions' existence makes people feel compelled to do 
certain things then people blessed with the ability to think can react obediently or 
creatively with their own intention and thoughts. People also have a bearing on 
institutions. It is because institutions are created and dictated by the perceptions of 
the very people they exert influence on. If the perceptions of these individuals 
change, institutions change. This chapter will take a look at the nature of this 
relationship between institutions and organisational sensemaking, which is the 
collective opinion of the people who share similar backgrounds, values and 
traditions. The main subject of analysis is where collective sensemaking takes place: 
the organisation and the institution of interest is management. 
From an overall perspective, this chapter is the last of the three-part analysis 
answering the first research question as to "how the deinstitutionalisation process 
evolves". In particular, it uncovers the receiving side of the relation by elaborating 
sensemaking. both individually and organisationally, as responses to 
deinstitutionalisation incentives initiated by institutional agents. 
For one thing, the focus falls on the lowest level of analysis, by emphasising 
individual reactions to switching events. Hence, this chapter reveals insights about 
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the transitional process from another viewpoint, the microanalysis, the individuals, 
the personal side of a multifaceted process. Alternatively speaking, this chapter is 
concerned with the 'cognitive pillar' of the deinstitutionalisation process (Scott, 
2001) and the role of sensemaking therein. That is, how sensemaking determines not 
only the outcome but also the speed of transformation while shaping new institutions 
concurrently. Nevertheless, analysis is carried out bearing in mind that sensemaking 
is neither independent nor free from external control and constraints. Indeed, 
sensemaking is considered taking into account the institutional and cultural 
influences which prime and edit the very sensemaking that helps shape them. This is 
the reciprocal relationship shared between institutions and agents, though not the 
only interaction at play. This chapter acknowledges that deinstitutionalisation 
discourse or the interplay between institutions and sensemaking is affected by 
internal and external forces which push and pull the process in different directions. 
Consideration of such factors, therefore, is a part of analysis. 
The second element of this chapter is discussion of alternative institutions, which is 
the product and final destination of the deinstitutionalisation process. Obviously, old 
institutions will not simply disappear without the presence of substitutions. Whether 
these new institutions completely eliminate the old or whether there will be a hybrid 
form between the two, order must be restored. In seeking an answer, this chapter 
aims to provide descriptions of new institutions in place, together with explanation of 
the replacement or the variety of outcome. 
The sensemaking evidence of deinstitutionalisation was divided into sections. The 
first was sensemaking of old institutions. Understanding of attitudes and emotions of 
the organisation (EVN) towards inflexibilities and shortcomings of old principles and 
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practices not only provides insights on early bottom-up deinstitutionalisation 
incentives but also clarifies why and how the need for adjustment came to be realised 
and accepted. Although indications of subsequent deinstitutionalisation might not yet 
be sufficiently strong from this evidence, it certainly identified the origin and 
fundamental rationale. Following up was evidence of substantial changes in 
organisational environments and how individuals and EVN as an entity made sense 
of it all. For the sake of clarification and comparison, deinstitutionalisation of 
Confucian institutions and central planning institutions were studied separately so 
that the scope of transfonnation of each element became clear. As previously stated, 
reinstitutionalisation of the new belief system and formalisation of new practices 
were crucial parts of the whole deinstitutionalisation process: they were studied next. 
The analysis also sought to provide details of and explanations for the current state of 
transition, obviously by examining sensemaking of employees and institutional 
agents at this time, as well as other factors. 
7.2 Sensemaking and institutional makeover 
7.2.1 Making sense of old institutions - the roots of bottom-up fence-
breaking 
Strictly speaking, before gaining legal status as state-owned, not state-run, 
enterprises in 1994, state organisations functioned as state departments under the 
direct control of state officials. After economic reform released some of this pressure 
and business units started to gain autonomy, managers' sensemaking changed too. 
Now playing a double role as institutional agents (sensegiving towards employees) as 
well as sensetakers (sensetaking from the Party and state). manager sensemaking 
held crucial insights to the deinstitutionalisation process. In particular, the process of 
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learning to be entrepreneurs and leader, the way they incorporated sensetaking and 
sensemaking of their own as well as the way they alternated between the two roles 
deserved close attention. 
First, let us look at how managers made sense of pre-refonn situations and then how 
this sensemaking got modified by refonn initiatives. When asked about their feelings 
towards life right after the war and their opinion of central planning in the I 970s, 
cooperative leaders and workers were of the same mind. A typical answer was: 
Life after the war and conditions in SOEs were very difficult. But at that time, 
people still lived with the wartime attitude and sympathised wholeheartedly 
with the Party and the state. We were eager to work hard, for the country and 
for our own sakes and mentally prepared for obstacles lying head. After the 
centrally-planned mechanism was put in place, we saw problems beginning 
to arise but all thought it was because of the war. I used to tell workers we 
had to embrace the hardship now for tomorrow would be better. I myself 
believed it as this was what the Party promised (Vice President of Business). 
This hopeful mindset, however, did not last long. As misallocation of resources and 
bottlenecked production worsened economic conditions and shortage occurred in 
almost all goods, concerns and doubts began to circle. Fence-breaking behaviours 
and black markets thrived, in spite of the Party's efforts to repress 'wrong' attitudes 
and eliminate all deviant activities. Speaking of the shortage and motives for fence-
breaking in the face of difficulties, one of the managers gave the following response 
and stressed that the majority of people shared the same feelings: 
It was not like we wanted to break the laws and betray the Party. But we 
could not afford to be loyal and law-abiding anymore. Workers and our own 
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families were suffering as state wages had lost most of their value. Also. 
delivery of raw material was so unreliable making meeting targets so much 
harder. In the end. we decided to set up small workshops to produce non-list 
products. which were then exchanged for food and other goods or sold in the 
black markets. This was done 'under the table' of course because we could 
go to prison if found out. Superiors had to be kept in the loop because they 
were more likely to overlook it if this was for everyone's benefits. Fence-
breaking was illegal but it helped raise living standards and ensure targets 
were fulfilled because we could use surplus products to cover in case of 
material shortage (Vice President of Business). 
Unsurprisingly, employees were as much supportive of fence-breaking as managers 
were; as one employee from International Cooperation Department put it: 
When fence-breaking started. everyone felt a sense of relief We [employees] 
were more enthusiastic about 'outside' activities than we were about 'inside' 
- legal work commitments - as it was fence-breaking that changed our lives 
for the better, not the bureaucratic regime. We were particularly grateful that 
leaders were willing to put their jobs (and lives) on the line for all of us. We 
all had "chan ngoai dai hun chan trong" - [roughly translated: the 'outside' 
leg is longer than the 'inside J leg]. You could say that fence-breaking was 
purely self-motivated. 
In terms of what impacts inconsistencies inherent in pre-determined targets 
production had on work institutions and ethics, the comment below (Head of 
Emulation and Propaganda Department) was not uncommon: 
196 
Predetermined production targets, fixed work portion and egalitarian wages 
truly created an unhealthy work attitude. No concern was paid to the quality 
of goods produced or productivity as there was simply no motivation to do so. 
It became a sluggish, passive environment. We had sayings like this "giao gi 
/am nay, chi dliu diznh day, xong r6i ng6i day {roughly translated: only do 
your work portion, no more,' only do as ordered to; once finished, sit 
around] II • This was because we were not held responsible for waste and 
losses, like the saying "t6n that khong 10; 16 liIi khong chiu {roughly 
translated: waste is not your worry, losses are not your responsibility]. Yes, 
that was just how it worked. 
Apparently, these quotes provided overwhelming proof of bottom-up 
deinstitutionalisation. Though official reform arrived later, early incentives and 
newly formed entrepreneurial thinking and practices to some extent signalled the 
upcoming storm. Despite clear evidence of the system not working as well as the 
party had hoped, the leaders made no radical changes until the crisis of 1978-1979. 
At that point, inflation had spiralled out of control; famine threatened the collapse of 
the whole system and social unrest demoralised Party members and eroded the 
people's trust in leadership. Only then did the Party decide to make amends for the 
impractical fixed targets allocation, production and distribution systems by legalising 
SOEs' auxiliary activities in the form of the Sixth Resolution and 2S/CP in 1979. 
Manager thoughts concerning 25/CP are well-represented by the following: 
Without 25/CP, many people could have gone to prison. Fortunately, itfreed 
up circulation of goods and accepted previous fence-breaking. We {SOEs] 
could officially register 'outside' plans now but had to give priority to state-
197 
supplied targets. Spiritually, it was welcomed as a breath of fresh air 
although we were not under the illusion that problems would be resolved as 
easy as that. We were just glad that such a policy came (Director of National 
Load Dispatching Centre). 
From the above quotes, it seemed that by the late 1970s and early 1980s, cooperative 
leaders and workers no longer mistook problems as war-related. Instead, they 
accurately pinpointed the roots of problems, that is, fundamental flaws in the 
Communist state economy. Although not openly discussed, confidence in the 
leadership was greatly damaged. In the mist of hardship and shortage, fence-breaking 
came as the only solution and was motivated by nothing but the survival instinct. It 
had a momentous impact on well-established institutional thinking and behaviour, 
nonetheless. For one thing, it meant that the new, self-directed, economic-oriented 
ways of doing things had challenged the old, passive, order-based ways; and the 
struggle would be largely influenced by state policies and incentives. Without 
warning and premeditation, economic thinking and entrepreneurship penetrated 
seemingly solid socialist institutions which supposedly had eradicated such 
sensemaking. 
One interesting point to note was that regardless of roles and levels of authority, 
similar feelings and opinions were conveyed across the board: frustration and 
distress. Impacts of policy incompetence in the 1970s and 1980s on the 
psychological and physical wellbeing of the people were as severe, if not more so, as 
their impacts on economic structure and perfonnance. The only difference was the 
ability of the fanner to produce responsive actions. Indeed, as confidence in the 
leadership was damaged forcing people to take matters into their own hands, a 
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submerged, yet persistent wave of resistance was formed and these people patiently 
fought their way to the final goal: autonomy. In the minds of every person, there was 
a sense of optimism, novelty and excitement to economic reform in 1986, as 
expressed by one employee (Corporate Planning Department): 
The situation in 1985 was desperate yet no one knew how to turn the situation 
around. The political reports distributed at the beginning of 1986 were very 
conservative and discouraging. We could not imagine how our lives would 
have been if General Secretaries Truong Chinh and Nguyen Van Linh had 
not be appointed. Their reports were hugely reformist. We had lost all 
confidence towards the previous leadership but the reform brought hope. 
From fence-breaking, we already knew markets worked better than central 
planning and that we were capable of self-managing. The reform only 
formalised what we had been doing for a while so we could work hard 
without fear. We had been waiting for this day for a long time. We were all 
utterly glad, both managers and employees. 
After decentralisation was initiated, there had been some degree of restructuring but 
this was regarded as piecemeal and unsystematic. In a way, this reflected the delayed 
implementation at the end of the 1980s and vigorous policy renewal at the beginning 
of the 1990s. Despite initial positive feelings and supportive opinions towards 
reform, all interviewees emphasised that big changes did not arrive in SOEs until 
they were established as State Corporations in 1994. This stemmed from the fact that 
prior to this important milestone, the power sector consisted of three regional units, 
who operated independently under the control of local state authorities. The period 
was viewed by managers and employees of SOEs as simply a 'preparation phase' 
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for major reorganisation in 1994 and the majority of them did not attribute significant 
feelings or events to this particular time. One explanation for this lack of interest 
and/or poor recall might be because SOE reform was an ongoing process. Most of 
the changes initiated in this period were enhanced or replaced afterwards hence 
comprehension of full impacts and evaluation of outcomes might only become 
possible after significant time has passed. In the next phase, whereby 
deinstitutionalisation picked up pace, differences between the central planning 
regime and the new management system would be clearer. 
7.2.2 Deinstitutionalisation of socialist (central planning) institutions 
Previous discussions in chapter 5 showed that there were two main types of 
institutions embedded at EVN: agricultural/Confucian institutions (consensus-
building, relation- and collective-orientation, norm of dependence, respect for 
hierarchy, personal/face-to-face communication and authoritarian/paternalistic 
leadership) and central planning institutions (bureaucratic leadership, command-
based, top down communication, lack of financial, planning and customer-focused 
mentality, motivation-deprived management and norm of passive working). The 
appropriate question to ask now is: How much have these institutions changed? 
Which ones (if not all) were eliminated and replaced? And what are new institutions 
like? 
Out of the two main institutions, the central planning component certainly underwent 
more intensive and comprehensive transformation since it was mostly their features 
that received challenges and eventually lost legitimacy. Given positive feelings and 
supportive attitudes towards reform (analysed in previous sections), replacement of 
this element of old institutions was welcomed with open arms and progressed rather 
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quickly. In nonnal circumstances, well-established and legitimate assumptions about 
realities make surrounding environments stable and predictable for actors to make 
sense of their lives and purpose. Inconsistency and uncertainty caused by disruptions 
of institutional contexts require actors to develop new interpretations and sets of 
solutions based on these interpretations. The success of institutional change 
management in organisations, first and foremost, depends on managerial ability to 
make sense, interpret and predict economic and political situations at hand. Radical 
changes such as those induced by economic and SOE refonns cause psychological 
shocks which, unless managed properly, might disintegrate the whole system. Top 
management sensemaking, therefore, is not only required for appropriate strategies 
but also for successful implementation. The transition from a command-based 
bureaucratic regime to the complete opposite, self-planning and self-managing 
mechanism, required the development of entrepreneurship skills more than anything. 
Here, managers must acquire the ability to envision development strategies and the 
ability to translate them into practices. Fortunately, there was evidence of such 
market-oriented ways of thinking among the top management team, particularly 
when it came to EVN's role and objectives after 1994: 
After restructuring, together with greater autonomy, EVN has bigger 
responsibilities to fulfil. As a state-owned enterprise entrusted with state 
assets. the priorities are to ensure sufficient power supply for the 
industrialisation and modernisation of the economy as well as for mass 
usage. With a 'leading' role in the industry. we must renovate every aspect 
thoroughly and extensively. In order to do that. we have deployed an 
equitisation programme since 2002. diversified our business. invested a great 
deal in training. technologies. infrastructure and modernised management 
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practices. We highly value sustainable growth and competitiveness in the 
process of integrating ourselves with the world economy (Vice President of 
Business). 
Giving examples of significant achievements so far, it was said: 
Infrastructure investments are one of the most important tasks. Over the 
years, EVN has invested hundreds of billions of VNDII in improving the 
power source and the power grid network. From 2006 to 2008, we have 
introduced 7 new power source projects with 1. 626MW capacity. By 2012, 
we'll have 29 new power plants with a total capacity of 10.495MW This is 
the largest investment project carried out so far (Chief Officer of 
Transmission Company J. 
For sustainable growth, manpower development is pivotal. EVN has opened 
our own university and college to strengthen our human resources. The 
number of specialists and highly skilled workers increased quickly thereafter. 
We also send employees on overseas training programmes. Now we have 
acquired the necessary skills and knowledge in many areas including 
managerial, technical, project management, network consultancy and design 
(Vice President of Business). 
Apparently, EVN's managers made a correct connection - an essential first stage of 
successful strategic response - linking opportunities and challenges arisen from 
institutional changes with EVN's core strengths and weaknesses. They were able to 
envisage future strategies and appropriate actions pivotal to the organisation given 
II VND: Vietnamese Dong - currency of Vietnam 
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external environments. In other words, EVN attained business-oriented thinking and 
knowledge, which is exactly the mentality required for a successful restructuring. 
Compared to the previous restricted role of managers acting mainly as executers of 
centrally-made commands, in this aspect alone, there were momentous changes. Not 
only did managers receive real management duties and responsibilities, higher 
demands were placed on their managerial and strategic abilities, credibility and scope 
of influence. For managers in today's environment, legitimacy was vital. This led to 
the significant role of charismatic and capable leader(s) during institutional 
transition. In the past, the socialist regime did nothing but damage to EVN leaders' 
image. Employees tended to see managers not as competent leaders but basically 
government servants. This view changed completely after 1994 nonetheless: 
I have to say, we were lucky to have them as our managers during that 
difficult time. By any standards, they were good leaders. Not only were they 
able-minded in terms of business dealing. they worked for the company's 
interests wholeheartedly. They were the first reason why changes were 
implemented as swiftly at the beginning; because we trusted them (Head of 
International Cooperation Department). 
When questioned if more recent leadership also met the same standards and 
popularity, the majority of employees showed hesitation and simply shook their 
heads. This was not surprising at all since even the slightest ill-speaking of superiors 
was considered as unforgivable impertinence in the Confucian tradition. As a result, 
employees tended to offer explanations for any shortcomings of leadership rather 
than direct criticism or disagreement: 
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Managers today are more politics-involved than the first team (in 1994). 
They have to consider their interests as well as the company's. But in my 
opinion, once duties and responsibilities were clearly spelled out, 
managers found that their interests were served by serving the company's 
interests. In terms of ability, I think they are quite competent 'to a certain 
extent' [a way of avoiding frankly speaking the truth in Vietnamese 
context - meaning managers could have done better]. I have not heard 
complaints about the top management team because we could not blame 
EVN's difficulties solely on managerial ineffectiveness. Their hands are 
tied in many circumstances. But given the urgency to raise the game 
before the power market is completed in the near future, things should be 
improved soon (Deputy Head of Corporate Planning Department). 
Echoing employees on the scope of real managerial power handed over by the 
government, managers expressed disappointment: 
Managing a large and state-owned enterprise like EVN is not easy. We 
[managers} still have the government and the ministries to answer to. 
Because the power industry is one of the key sectors which the government 
refuses to privatise. we do not have full discretion in many areas. We could 
formulate development plans but they must be approved by the Ministry of 
industry. We are not allowed to make decisions on retail prices either. We 
want to pay more to employees as better incentives but cannot. How can we 
attract skilled labour with salaries half that offored by private companies? 
There are a lot of problems that need to be solved (Director of National Load 
Dispatching Centre). 
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The above comments surely gave the impression that although employees believed 
that inadequacies still existed, the blame did not fall on the top management team, so 
to speak. Managers and employees seemed to be in agreement when it came to the 
possible source of the problem i.e. the current state and situation of the power 
industry and its impact on EVN management practices. They, however, could also 
comprehend the implications of joining the competitive market in the future on the 
need for further restructuring. 
Following shortly behind the emergence of entrepreneurial thinking and skills and 
the noted important role of leaders, one of the most discussed topics of change was 
the radical restructuring which occurred at EVN caused by the abolition of the 
command-based mechanism. This covered a wide range of issues including the 
division of labour into departments with defined purposes and functions, an increase 
in work initiative and independence, interactive communication and development of 
business philosophies. First and foremost, there was the opening of functional 
departments, which might be the most obvious and comprehensive change of all. The 
Chief Officer of the Transmission Company explained the meaning and importance 
of newly introduced and specialised departments: 
You know, under central planning, we had no Accounting and Finance 
department, nor International Cooperation, Export-Import, Emulation and 
Propagation or Appraisal departments. These are new additions since 1994. 
Their existence alone speaks volumes. We are now a state enterprise, not a 
collective; therefore we must conduct ourselves as suggested by the name. On 
the one hand, we paid close attention to financial management by improving 
bookkeeping and auditing and we also recognised the benefits of business 
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dealings with foreign companies. One of the most crucial tasks was to raise 
capital and enhance the company profile therefore the export-import 
department was very important. But of course, we should not overlook 
employee-related matters. Human resource management was a new concept, 
we were still learning but have made good effort so far. In contrast to 
previous egalitarian wages, we now use performance targets and bonuses to 
boost motivation. These are the functions of the Emulation and Propagation 
and Appraisal departments. The role of these departments was fully 
understood and the reorganisation in general was very well-received because 
they served not only the company's interests but also the employees '. 
At first look, it seemed that EVN had gained substantial business know-how and had 
recognised the importance of key business areas. It signified massive transformation 
of attitude and skills because such business orientation could not exist under the 
planned economy. Concepts such as auditing, bookkeeping, company profile, human 
resource management, performance-based salary or bonus would have sounded alien 
and irrelevant. The difference between the old and the new mindsets was striking but 
not unbelievable. It was partly because these skills originated well back before 
reform started therefore the switch did not happen overnight. The gradual transition 
and unpressured opportunities to experiment at that time definitely contributed 
positively to the learning process. Moreover, changes got accepted quickly, owning 
to the fact that they brought benefits to the majority of employees. Abiding by these 
new philosophies, company goals and objectives were adjusted correspondingly. In 
the past, fulfilling fixed output targets was the prime and only purpose regardless of 
profits, quality or customer demand. There would have been no need for financial 
management, international cooperation or concerns about capital raising or measures 
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to boost productivity. In today's environment, EVN was required to appreciate the 
importance of demand-side management and customer satisfaction. In the end, 
success criteria for state-owned enterprises like EVN was not confined to preserving 
and developing state assets, in order to uphold the 'leading' role of the key growth 
engine, their ultimate goal must be profits. If under a centrally-run regime, quantity 
was the only concern, nowadays, attention is also paid to the quality of the product 
i.e. stability of voltage12 and stability of frequency13. With the final aim of profit 
maximisation, EVN's top management team emphasised the need for more extensive 
restructuring especially equitisation and diversification, highly skilled human 
resources and better customer services: 
This [1994 's reorganisation] is an opportunity as well as a challenge to 
EVN. We truly understand that only a high quality and diversified package 
followed by good customer service can build trust from the customers. We 
have speeded up the construction of infrastructure, concentrated on system 
and technology enhancement and invested a large amount of resources in 
collecting customer feedback in order to provide them [customers] with our 
best services and competitive prices. 
Profit is everything these days. The general rule is that if we .finish just about 
the targets, we get double bonus; if we do better than that, the bonus is 
tripled but if we make losses, there are no bonuses. If it was large losses. the 
salary was cut down to even lower than the minimum wage. In the electricity 
sector. the product has to be produced exactly at the same moment as it is 
used. This means that stability and safety are the most important criteria of 
12 Fluctuates between + 5% and - 10% of normal value for 220 V 
13 Fluctuates between ± 5 % of normal value for 50 Hz 
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customer service. Moreover, the main product - electricity - has a long l ~ r e e
cycle; the basic characters o/this product do not change/or a long time (220 
V, 50 Hz). So the only way to be profitable and to be differentiated from your 
competitors in the future is by providing a valuable service to customers 
(Vice President 0/ Business). 
All in all, EVN ensured to offer a wide variety of choice to customers and to take 
care of customer needs for supply to reflect true demand. This was another 
significant step in preparing for future competition as the company has recognised 
customer awareness and satisfaction as core values and rightfully focused on 
building the company's image. 
These were not the only changes by any means. The newly founded functional 
departments resultantly facilitated the decentralisation of administration whereby 
each level was given its proper responsibility and rights. If only superior-worker 
relations existed across the board in the past, levels of authority were now divided 
into managerial, department heads, group leaders and employees respectively. A 
lucid sphere of influence and power distribution helped increase productivity and 
create a norm of multi-level communication and interaction. In turn, the 
decentralised organisation fashioned other radical changes including those made to 
the nature of work, delegation and communication. Speaking of the impacts on the 
nature of work, one employee from the Business department said: 
Under the previous regime, even though activities like planning and 
organising daily operations were carried out back then, they were 'hidden' 
because they were shared among several units; personal duties were not 
clearly spelled out at all. Assessment targets were done per team, not per 
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individual. When the company was reorganised into departments, we 
experienced such a big change as each department now specialised in one or 
a few functions only. As a result, we were given clear duties and 
responsibilities. One could not make an excuse like 'it was a collective 
failure, not mine' or rely on others to do your share of work anymore. The 
transformation was incredible because it seemed that everyone immediately 
snapped out of sleeping mode to 'shoulder' new tasks and responsibilities. 
We all understood that no state-subsidies meant that we must work hard for 
it, like the saying 18m An l ~ ~ chiu' [roughly translated: gains or losses, you 
bear the consequences of your own doings]. 
When compared to earlier work ethics described by the saying "giao gi lam n&y, chi 
dtiu dimh ddy, xong r6i ng6i ddy" [roughly translated: only do your work portion, no 
more; only do as ordered to; once finished, sit around] and "t6n thJt khong 10; 161a; 
khOng cMu [roughly translated: waste is not your worry, losses are not your 
responsibility], the new way of working could not be more different. Proudly called 
'responsible spirit', a proactive, work-focused, accountability-bearing tradition was 
institutionalised. It would be erroneous to think that all employees simply 
appreciated more responsibilities and/or regarded them as benefits although the 
majority did. Matching the newly endowed responsibilities was a substantial increase 
in power and independence. From managers to employees, all emphasised and 
celebrated greater freedom of work, thanks to decentralised administration. One 
manager complained about complete lack of power in all areas of business under the 
old regime: 
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Can you imagine that we had absolutely no power in the past? We could not 
even make the smallest decisions like buying more equipment, installing new 
transformer stations or hiring staff. At that time, technology was obsolete, 
infrastructure was deficient but we were not authorised to allocate funds. 
Everything must go through state departments and they, who 'sat above' 
[meaning distant planners unable to comprehend real situations} got to 
decide. After restructuring, restriction was relaxed. We could now mobilise 
funds and make our own investment decisions, improve reading meters or 
build power stations if we wanted to. In other words, funds went to the right 
places, at the right time (Director of National Load Dispatching Centre). 
In tenns of another aspect of independence, employees expressed similar liberalising 
experience in relation to individual work: 
Until that time (1994), we worked like machines. We did not really think 
about and never questioned what we were doing. We just followed orders and 
the rest was not our concern because working harder did not lead to higher 
earnings. We would rather spend time on 'outside' activities. You know, it 
was very common then. But things completely changed after restructuring. 
Tasks were allocated and assessed indiVidually as well as a team effort. In 
most cases, we only came to superiors if there was a problem we could not 
solve or decide on, whereas before we had to report every single thing we did 
and wait for further instruction. It was extremely time-consuming and 
demotivated. Who would want to work like a machine? Most of us felt 
enthusiastic and empowered as we were trusted to work on our own. It was 
like you became a link of a chain, small but important nonetheless. Of course, 
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there were people who disliked responsibilities but only a few (Head of 
Material and Import-Export Department). 
Matching employees' opinions on the impacts of these changes on productivity 
augmentation, managers highlighted the effectiveness of labour usage and 
communication: 
It [restructuring] changed how we [leaders] managed. Instead of constantly 
giving orders and closely monitoring every aspect, we now assign end targets 
and tasks to departments and let them find the best way to achieve them. Task 
specialisation makes better use of labour resources because they [specialists] 
are good at what they do. Communication is more effective as well. We 
[managers] only deal directly with heads of departments and do not waste 
time on making everyday miscellaneous decisions. Previously, whenever 
there were problems, no matter how small, lower-level workers had to report 
it to us [managers]. We then made decisions but sometimes it was 
unnecessary or already too late. For example, an unexpected but normal 
power cut or system breakdown should not have to wait for a predictable 
solution (Vice President of Business). 
In terms of demand-side management, one of the most significant changes was the 
availability and development of customer services. In 1994, customer service 
received well-deserved attention when the Department of Emulation and 
Promulgation was formed. Apart from emulating programmes and competitions to 
boost internal productivity and cooperation, another crucial function of the 
department was to increase public understanding of the company by publicising (or 
rather 'promulgating') development plans and updating the company's activities on a 
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regular basis (non-existent previously). Originally, as suggested by its name, the 
main purpose was to raise customer awareness vis-a-vis difficulties facing the 
company or to seek empathies for its inadequacies (unstable power supply or 
uninfonned power cuts were relatively common in the old days). Indeed, the specific 
needs of the customers were largely ignored. As time passed, the department's scope 
of activities had extended to cover actual customer services. Since 2000, the 
department got involved in managing a call centre, which was set up to provide fast 
and accurate service infonnation, collect customer feedback and deal with 
complaints. In doing so, the purpose had switched from merely making infonnation 
available to being seriously committed to the enhancement of service quality. 
Wishing to offer a well-rounded operation, customer services were designed to cover 
before-sale and after-sale servicing ranging from meter installation and repair, home-
collecting payment service and network to group-of-users meter installation and 
consultation. According to employees, quality of service has improved significantly 
over the years due to many good quality measures: 
The stability of the electricity supply is assessed by the so-called 'number 
nine standard', which is the ratio as a percentage between the time of energy 
supplied in a given period and the total time of this period (normally in one 
year). In developed countries like the u.s or the U.K, this standard is 99.99% 
or the time of cutting power is 0.0000001%, meaning that in one year, the 
time of cutting power is about 3.15 seconds. Over here, thefigure was 82.5% 
in 2001 but increased to 90.05% in 2003. You see, our power cutting and 
repairing time were still high but definitely improving (Technical Department 
staff). 
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At the end of 2003, we sent 2,000 questionnaires to customers who used the 
package meter installation service. Most customers thought the cost of 
installing a new meter was reasonable but only 46% of customers were 
satisfied with the service. The reasons given were complicated procedures 
and unprofessional/unfriendly servicers. There are many things that need to 
be done if we are to become competitive in the next few years before the 
power market is introduced (Emulation and Propaganda Department 
member of staff). 
At first view, EVN appeared to handle the transition from a command-directed to a 
self-operating mechanism rather well. Radical changes were put in place in almost 
every aspect of business ranging from organisational structure, financial and human 
resource management to the adaptation to the 'quality, not quantity' mentality. 
However, if we take a closer look under the surface, EVN still faced serious 
problems of overstaffing, a half-hearted, dependent work approach and incomplete 
business culture. It seemed that transformation did occur but further restructuring 
was done only in moderation and with hesitation. Could extensive and hard-line 
transition be all talk, and no actions? The last comment above in fact sheds some 
light on the state of current customer services and more broadly speaking, business 
practices at EVN. Although they had come a long way since the centrally-planned 
era, inadequacies existed in many areas nevertheless. For one thing, EVN lacked a 
comprehensive system to evaluate service quality and tools used to collect 
information were piecemeal and unsystematic. Attention was paid to a wide range of 
issues relating to quality of service but these activities were carried out by several 
departments simultaneously. There was no marketing division in EVN's structure at 
the moment. 
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Currently we do not need a marketing department because as the monopoly, 
customers have to come to us. We do not need to worry about the market or 
competition, at least for now. But because of that, reports [about customer 
services] from different departments sometimes conflict with each other 
making it difficult to interpret. In the future, we definitely need a group 
specialising in marketing activities (Deputy Head of Business Department). 
The 'monopoly attitude', like the one expressed above, were frequently encountered. 
In fact, 'because we are a monopoly' was the most frequent explanation to existing 
inefficiencies at EVN. On a broader scale, true business sense has not been fully 
institutionalised yet. It was correct that most employees recognised the need for, and 
valued the building of, a quality-oriented tradition, to be more efficient and 
competitive, however, the consensus stressed the non-urgency aspect of the problem. 
That is, providing that the opening of the competitive market has not yet arrived and 
government preferential treatments remained intact, restructuring and improvements 
could afford to be done slowly. The emphasis was placed on 'sufficiently good' 
rather than 'the best you could' do. Translating into the work context, it meant that 
the aim was to meet the requirements, not essentially to generate value i.e. seeking 
cost reduction or higher returns. In this sense, the norm of passively following 
commands was replaced by conscious, independent yet half-hearted practices. There 
was some degree of initiative-taking and motivation but it fell somewhat short of 
expectations. Surely, like enterprises elsewhere, EVN's goal was to build a 
'corporate culture' where managers and employees were supposed to be profit-
maximisers and motivated by work independence, empowerment or financial means 
at least. Could institutions that emerged at EVN be described by any of these 
criteria? Not quite it seems. At EVN, not only did profits tend to be interpreted with 
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different meanings, but work-related benefits like independence, empowerment or 
even financial perks were hardly effective in generating incentives. This situation, 
however, did not apply to the low-level workforce alone. According to the leaders, 
the real objective of EVN (and SOEs in general) was not profits, at least not in the 
sense that government would intend. 
For SOEs like us, the most important thing is to make slightly higher profits 
every year and avoid losses at all costs. It sounds confosing to you because 
you think enterprises should aim to earn as high profits as they can. But here. 
at SOEs. if we announce high profits and bonuses, people start to question it. 
They would say we did not do enough to deserve that. So it is safer to just 
declare a little bit of profit every year so that higher figure would be easier to 
achieve next year (Head of Business Department). 
Giving examples of this kind of half-effort and elusive behaviour, and one possible 
explanation, one employee (from the Business department) said: 
On the contrary to the designed objective, the goal of having higher 
performance every single year has led to adverse consequences. In our mind, 
we must find a way to make this happen no matter what. Hence sometimes. 
instead of working extra hard, lower results were deliberately reported so 
we'l/ have an easy time next year. Underrepresentation is a common problem 
for any SOE. We call it 'achievement-ism', which literally means that things 
might be done ineffectively but still kept that ways for the sake of 
performance. This has become an alarming concern. 
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7.2.3 Deinstitutionalisation of Confucian institutions 
Unlike Western individualism, Confucian institutions highly value interpersonal 
relations, consensus-embeddedness, nonn of dependence and respect for hierarchy. 
The study of Quang and Vuong (2002) gave a general description of the Vietnamese 
management style before and after economic refonn. In the past, the Confucian style 
of management was portrayed as paternalistic and authoritative leadership, 
hierarchical organisational structure, high-power distance, top-down communication 
pattern and collective responsibility. After restructuring in 1994, there were some 
positive changes but only to a certain extent. Leadership at EVN was still 
paternalistic although it also became more participative. Here, like a family, the 
family's head was responsible for making every decision even though opinion 
contribution was encouraged. In the business context, although heads of departments 
have been more involved in the decision making process via fonnal meetings or 
infonnal discussions, in reality, power remained highly concentrated at the top level 
only. 
In principle, we [heads of department] are authorised to assign and organise 
things in our departments. But this only applied to 'normal' circumstances 
where nothing was out of the ordinary. If any changes are to be implemented, 
no matter how small, we must run it past the bosses before assigning tasks. In 
essence, we are only the messengers (Head of Material and Import-Export 
Department). 
You know, not much has changed in terms of leadership and management if I 
am to be utterly honest. This is a very sensitive subject in the Vietnamese 
context. We [employees] avoid open conflicts as best we can. For example, in 
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meetings, you should carefully observe bosses' views and reactions before 
making suggestions because you are going to get in trouble if you make them 
lose face. No one of lower position should criticise his or her boss (Deputy 
Head of International Cooperation Department). 
In theory, we have meetings as well as an annual employees' congress via 
which the higher level give out plans and instructions and collect our 
[employees] feedback. But these were only 10rmal' measures for 'outsiders' 
to see. In reality, we must carry out whatever decisions the bosses decide 
(Corporate Planning staff). 
At first thought, one might think that managers at SOEs like EVN would be able to 
enjoy great freedom and power; however, managers had to face a similar dilemma. 
They too did not have full sovereignty in seemingly simple organisational issues like 
payment, resulting in grave consequences occasionally: 
In the past five years, we lost 4,000 highly skilled employees because 
EVN cannot decide our own salary policy (Vice President of Business). 
The above quotes undoubtedly give the impression of an ongoing presence of top-
down, paternalistic leadership, restricted channels of communication, the utmost 
respect for hierarchy and consensus-building ways of working at EVN. In this aspect, 
not much in Confucian institutions changed after restructuring. This finding was not 
surprising, however, because a history of prolonged war and collective socialism had 
made following orders familiar to everyone. In the end, these management practices 
were not the prime target of deinstitutionalisation incentives as Communist/socialist 
traditions were. Relatively speaking, it looked like such practices had yet caused no 
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immediate catastrophic consequences or functional problems, apart from the 
demoralising impact on employees' motivation. Alongside limited real delegation 
and work freedom, low salary was reported as one of the reasons why incentives and 
motivations could not have been higher at EVN despite more attention being drawn 
to individual opportunities for promotion. A performance-based incentive system 
was used, according to which excellent performance would earn workers a chance to 
study abroad and promotion was very likely once they returned. Responses were 
positive but these attempts aimed to raise enthusiasm morally, not financially. Under 
the old regime, worker salary was provided and managed by a government agency. 
Accordingly, employees received a standard salary package and benefits-in-kind 
including peaks, health insurance, education for children and paid holidays. Once 
restructuring was put in motion, workers' salaries were no longer drawn from 
government budgets but from EVN's profits, which were not sufficient to guarantee 
similar generosity. For this reason, a small salary and benefit cut was temporarily 
implemented at the beginning. Employees expressed considerable concerns and some 
were dissatisfied although they appeared to understand underlying causes. It can be 
said that, until now, disappointment remained manageable but the tension was 
mounting. 
Admittedly, we somehow feel demotivated. We could sympathise with low 
salary in the past but in today's standard, salary at SOEs is about half of that 
provided by a private company. You can understand why people do not work 
as hard as they can now (Material and Import-Export Department staff). 
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7.2.4 Institutionalisation of new core values and fonnalisation of practices 
On the quest to create 'corporate thinking and behaviours', the top management team 
proposed to institutionalise 'EVN traditions' represented by new core values such as 
quality-orientation and customer care, devotion and responsibility, cooperation and 
sharing, creativity and efficiency. To legitimate the new values, new rules and 
regulations were implemented. In such a cultural-embedded environment like that at 
EVN, where respect for hierarchy and rules is common, it was expected, with good 
reason, that regulative measures would have strong influence. Although not all 
employees would be comfortable with new rules, the majority of them would comply 
nonetheless, owing to both coercive forces and expedience motivation. To 
employees, the threat of isolation caused by deviant behaviours was greater than the 
costs of compliance. New standards of management practices included 'corruption 
and bureaucracy eradication', 'fair and incentive-encouraging payment and training 
system', 'open and fair perfonnance appraisal', 'responsible, non-avoiding, non-
passing-the-blame ethics' and 'community value'. In referring to the most important 
aspects, customer service and work practices were emphasised. According to official 
documents, employees must give prominence to individual responsibility, fulfil their 
tasks to the best of their abilities, treat company's assets like their own, eagerly 
contribute ideas to discussion but willingly obey orders from the higher level once a 
decision is made. On the other hand, managers must facilitate and appreciate 
suggestions from the lower level in an unbiased, objective manner. Towards 
customers, employees must be friendly and honest; the 'customers come first' slogan 
should be engraved. 
219 
In the attempt to create 'corporate and service traditions' at EVN, a quality assurance 
programme was introduced, namely ISO 9000, the Quality System Management 
Standard. ISO 9000 is a series of requirement standards dictating the operation of 
principal processes in accordance with ISO standards. The processes describe how 
activities connected to one other in order to obtain desired results from input of 
resources. ISO 9000 covers subjects such as system build-up, handling of documents 
and data and system improvement. More specifically, system build-up is divided into 
three levels: the first, most general level depicts processes and part processes; the 
second level features routine descriptions explaining process break-down i.e. what is 
done and by which part of the organisation; the final level covers detailed 
instructions on how tasks should be done. System improvement is designed via a 
process group (every process has a process owner and a process group responsible 
for continuous improvement and distribution ofinfonnation about new methods); via 
internal audits (once every two years) and via staff (every employee has the 
opportunity to report weaknesses detected in the system). The processes encompass 
many areas such as market, operation, planning, finance, purchasing, development, 
personnel, safety, information and communication. As part of ISO 9000, conduct 
code handbooks specifying duties and responsibilities were provided; as well as 
formal written instructions regarding member roles, task sharing and inter-
departmental cooperation procedures. In the past, written job descriptions, detailed 
areas of responsibility and contract terms did not exist. In theory, standardisation of 
practices should bring about significant changes: 
ISO 9000 does improve productivity but only when it comes to on-the-job 
training of new employees. Instead of having to closely supervise and teach 
new employees every single thing, they can refer to ISO 9000 for almost 
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every task, saving us a lot of time. However, for senior employees, there was 
not much change since ISO was written based on what we were doing 
anyway. This was just to formalise' things, to satisfy the government. ISO 
still needs lots of improvement since the descriptions are rather general. 
Moreover, it is not easy to pinpoint assessment criteria for each and everyone 
because of the shared decision making tradition (Head of Corporate 
Planning Department). 
ISO quality assurance was an interesting example of the weak impact formalisation 
had on management and organisation institutions. The incompetence of principal 
rules in inducing compliance was well-described by the expression 'new bottle, old 
wine' - [meaning only change the appearance, not the content]. Put differently, rules 
and regulations existed (on paper) and should have been able to reinforce certain 
standards in theory, but in practices, their authority was rather inconsequential i.e. 
'all talk, no action'. This was the consensus on the subject of reconstitution 
outcomes at EVN. Although there were substantial and speedy changes at the start, 
the progress has decelerated dramatically, hence the persistent problems and 
inefficiencies discussed above. All in all, EVN has become an enterprise endowed 
with business philosophies and principles; however, the type of management practice 
inherent in the organisation was still packed with inconsistencies like poor 
assessment criteria (caused by norm of team decision making), low motivation and 
the avoiding attitude (due to unsatisfactory salary and insufficient work 
empowerment) and most importantly, 'monopoly thinking'. Objectively speaking, 
half of these problems were caused by the tentative approach of the government 
towards the competitive market and the other half were straightforward by-products 
of such uncertainty and ambiguity. SOEs like EVN often came under fierce criticism 
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for their lack of incentives and there should not be any excuse for such ineptitude, 
yet the government's indecision accidentally gave them a very good excuse. 
7.2.5 Current states and incentives for further restructuring 
It was not unexpected to find such dramatic restructuring at EVN, given huge 
changes in institutional contexts and reorientation of the economic apparatus. In 
organisational settings, a new governance system, newly founded functional 
departments, new goals and objectives accompanied by new rules clearly reflected 
new priorities. Confucian institutions of close interpersonal connections, respect for 
authority, harmony and teamwork orientation and norm of dependency somewhat 
prevented the complete deinstitutionalisation of several aspects of old institutions, 
especially Confucian elements. Most Communist/socialist components proved to be 
less inertial and quicker to succumb to challenges since their failures were clearly 
recognised. In addition, Communist ideologies were relatively young compared to 
Confucianism which had been the heart and soul of Vietnamese people for thousands 
of years. It came as no surprise that most Confucian ways of thinking and behaviours 
have hardly altered and possibly never will. At the time, it appeared that both the 
government and top management team understood the roots of resistance, partly due 
to the differences between traditional Confucian values with new beliefs and partly 
because institutional agents have not provided sufficient motivation to change. This 
was the unresolved paradox inherent in the new ideology between the 'market' 
element and 'socialism' counterpart. So far, there was some degree of managerial 
tolerance but it should not be taken as ignorance nonetheless. More than ever, EVN 
leaders recognised that it was now urgent to truly raise the morale of the employees, 
increase competitiveness as well as promote EVN's potential. Top management 
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realised that despite reasonable success in renovation so far, further extensive 
restructuring was inevitable given the current lack of satisfactory progress in many 
areas. In referring to equitisation, one manager stated that the nature of the power 
market (as a key growth engine of the economy and defence of national security) was 
partly responsible for the existing status as a largely state-owned (in transmission and 
distribution) and unattractive monopoly: 
Equitisation has shown some positive outcomes. Joint stock companies 
have gradually strengthened their organisation and personnel 
arrangements, reinforced and enhanced production and business 
capacity, and executed a dynamic. effective. market-driven management 
mechanism. Thanks to those changes. the company ran profitable with 
higher-than-target dividend sharing ratios. Also, they have attracted a lot 
of domestic and foreign investments hence their market value has 
increased multi-fold compared to the original face value. Having said 
that, due to the nature of the power sector. the equitisation process 
remained rather slow. Difficulties and obstacles arising from the 
undefined power tariff mechanism between EVN and joint stock 
companies. unidentified public benefit fund and policy have yet been 
solved (Director of National Load Dispatching Centre). 
Financial capacity was always listed as one of the most difficult yet crucial aspects to 
improve. The highlight was placed on a dramatic rise in demand in a short period of 
time, rendering EVN unable to cope (given current structure and legal status): 
In the past. EVN managed to provide relatively sufficient power supply for 
industrial and household usage. However. rapidly increasing demand. 
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especially these past few years, is becoming more difficult to keep up with as 
infrastructure construction lagged behind. Building of power plants requires 
large funds and takes a long time to complete. After we diversified into 
telecommunications, banking and other businesses, the situation improved 
significantly. Also we have sources like ODA, issuing bonds, shares and other 
commercial papers, loans from domestic and foreign banks but the progress 
is still slow as the total amount required is just too large. We can only 
manage half of the total investment ($33 billion) at present. Moreover, 
operating according to the mother-subsidiaries model, cross-investment is a 
huge problem since subsidiaries are not financially independent (Deputy 
Head of Material and Import-Export Department). 
Another huge impediment was the lack of transparency of the legal constitution and 
an overlapping, complicated authority line. Rigid restrictions and lack of power and 
responsibilities did not create direct incentives for managers and employees, hence 
no motivation for value creation. Here, the same tradition of shared decision making 
at the Ministry of Industry and ERA V, its subordinate, caused delays to 
organisational operation and weak reinforcement of individual responsibility. Time-
consuming red tape of the bureaucracy was supposed to be removed along with the 
central planning apparatus yet the preference to work as teams to avoid open 
conflicts prevented it happening. Ultimately, Confucian consensus-centred tradition 
was responsible. 
The underdeveloped legal framework is a huge obstacle. These include an 
ambiguous operation mechanism of management apparatus (MOl and 
ERA V) and weakly defined legal status and authority. Inefficiencies arise 
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from an unnecessarily complicated management mechanism between the 
'mother' company - subsidiaries; between MOl - EVN. We have two 
deputy directors of MOl as members of the Board of Directors. but still. 
they are not authorised to make a decision, everything must go through 
the Minister for approval. It is not clear who has the highest authority in 
the company either because the Board of Directors works as a team. The 
Chairman has only one vote while the deciding vote requires seven 
(Emulation and Propaganda Department member of staff). 
The third major concern was SOE classification (or the lack of it). There were 
basically two types of SOE: those in business for profits and those in business for 
public benefit. Currently these two forms were treated in the same way, leaving both 
to enjoy similar subsidies and sharing the same assessment criteria. This created 
opportunities for exploitation of undeserved government protection in some cases but 
mostly SOEs like EVN had to undertake social duties as well as commercial ones. As 
the Chief Officer of the Transmission Company admitted: 
Uneconomical projects like rural electrification programmes are a 
compulsory obligation, sometimes a huge burden. We have to cross-subsidise 
these unprofitable investments eating away our profits considerably. 
These quotes might give the impression that managers were trying to make excuses 
for their shortcomings. They might or might not. Nonetheless, there remained an 
undeniable truth; these were the real hindrances of the power market and EVN. The 
only solution to all these problems was competition, in all three areas: generation, 
transmission and distribution simultaneously. At present, the first step has been 
approved - a competitive generation market in 2015. In referring to this, the Director 
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of the National Load Dispatching Centre stressed that EVN had been fully prepared 
and confident of their ability to cope, in this area at least. 
In terms of power generation, which is planned to become a competitive 
market in 2015, EVN is no longer a monopoly. Over the years, many 
power generation companies have been equitised. At the moment, EVN 
holds only 47% of market share and the figure will be 40% after the Phu 
My Thermal Power Plant gets equitised in 2012. By 2015, it is anticipated 
as 37%. In other words, EVN has been operating as a non-monopoly for a 
while. 
On the subject of further plans for restructuring, top leaders expressed complete 
support, however cautioned against premature competition and its consequences. 
We acknowledge existing inefficiencies but opening up to competition 
means companies would all compete to offer the lowest price. This might 
lead to system overload because current transmission and distribution 
systems are not able to handle that kind of demand. We are not against 
further restructuring but it must not be done hastily. Even right now, EVN 
as the 'parent' company still has a hard time seeking adequate investment 
funds; if EVN is completely privatised. how could subsidiaries do it? 
Impossible (Vice President of Business). 
To sum up, the second phase (1994-present) of deinstitutionalisation of central 
planning showed stronger government commitment to economic reform. As a result, 
SOEs like EVN intensified reorganisation and restructuring to be a better fit for a 
'leading' role in their individual industry. For the first half of the second phase, 
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substantial positive outcomes were achieved at EVN resulting in the emergence of 
institutionalised business-led thinking and customer-oriented practices. Nevertheless, 
the pace of deinstitutionalisation has slowed down in the latter half of the second 
phase halting the equitisation process and further restructuring. Explanations 
included inconsistencies in the management mechanism, at both sector and 
organisational levels, lack of incentives to create value due to low real authority and 
loose responsibilities, but mostly because of a 'monopoly attitude' among 
employees. In turn, this paradox could be explained by perhaps one of the most 
confusing and contradicting elements of the reform i.e. the role and position ofSOEs 
and the direct implications for the private sector. On the one hand, private businesses 
were legalised and promoted but had to face a wall of unfavourable treatments 
compared to SOEs in every aspect of business. On the other hand, SOEs were 
supposed to stand on their own feet but continued to receive subsidies and had 
government protection over debts and connections for lobbying in case any 
challenges to their interests came up. In addition, the fact that many large SOEs like 
EVN continued to be charged with a mixture of social and commercial 
responsibilities gave them a perfect excuse from any shortcomings. Although a large 
part of social obligations was curtailed after 1986 (e.g. employee entitlement to free 
housing, education, health services), 'state enterprises were to carry out business 
aimed at achieving socio-economic objectives assigned by the state'. The 
Government's decision to keep important SOEs under public ownership entailed the 
commitment to keep these social and political objectives in check (McCargo, 2004). 
This represented a significant ideological struggle that would not be easily resolved. 
To add further complication, the Party and the government seemed to prefer 
gradualism over shock-therapy. Reforms in Vietnam tended to be implemented step-
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by-step and through trial and error. As a result, the whole refonn process was 
coloured with uncertainty and ambiguous attentions since the government neither 
laid out a clear strategy nor direction for the future. 
7.3 Alternative institutions: hybrid Confucian - market socialist 
institutions 
Institutional theorists all agree that deinstitutionalisation cannot be taken out of the 
broader context of institutional change implying that the deterioration of old 
institutions takes place simultaneously with the creation of new ones. 
Institutionalised beliefs and practices cannot disappear without the replacement of 
alternatives otherwise organisational entity and orders will be lost. Having said that, 
new institution creation needs not cause all elements of old institutions to vanish. 
Some traditions proved flexible enough to evolve with new goals and practices, like 
those of Confucian institutions. Unlike Communist/socialist institutions, Confucian 
beliefs and values continued to playa large part in EVN's traditions. In other words, 
a hybrid fonn of logics and procedures between Confucian and business-led 
philosophy was created; even though some aspects of the modem business model 
have not quite arrived. Still, it is the aim. Characteristics of new institutions are 
summarised in Table 6 below: 
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Table 6 
New institutions (hybrid between Confucian and business-oriented) 
; 
I - ~ ~
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Confucian 
Business-oriented 
L ____ _ 
Collective-orientation 
Harmony and consensus-building 
Certainty preference 
Holistic, experience-based logical thinking 
Relation-based, emotion-susceptible behaviours 
Personal, face-to -face communication 
Authoritarian - Paternalistic leadership 
Norms of dependence 
Respect for hierarchy 
Performance-based payment 
Clear duties and responsibilities 
End target management mechanism 
Low level of delegation and top-down communication 
Collective orientation 
Not transparent, regulated personnel policy 
Availability of management and entrepreneurship skills 
Availability of financial, marketing, operational conducts 
Profit- and customer-orientation 
Most of these features were discussed previously therefore will not be repeated here. 
One thing that should be kept in mind, though, is that in the future, when managers 
and employees at EVN have greater motivation for value creation and intensive 
reorganisation, the balance and interconnection between these two institutions 
(Confucian and business-led) might alter. The impact of globalisation might go 
deeper than purely inducing economic consequences and change managerial work-
related values in future Vietnamese generations. Attitudes of young Vietnamese have 
crucial implication for the resilience of relations as young managers will move into 
positions of authority in the near future. Value differentials are under pressure from 
several factors (political, industrial, etc.) with the most important being social 
objectives. As companies increasingly fonn alliances around the world, globalisation 
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related forces might stimulate global homogenisation of values. It is reasonable to 
argue that the new Vietnamese generation, which is under the direct influence of 
industrialisation, score lower in collectivism and higher for individualism (typical 
Western value). This trend may show a demographic discrepancy due to influences 
such as gender, education, geographic regions, position level, company size and 
industry. Increasing workforce diversity caused by the arrival of the young 
generation and altered social expectations on work and responsibility might bring 
surprising changes. The new generation, born and raised in the post-war period, is 
different from war generation in many aspects. Compared to older employees, youth 
generation is more self-motivated and dynamic, enjoy independence and their own 
initiatives. Naturally, they dislike authoritarian leadership. This might well be the 
rationale for the leadership to change. However, it should not be inferred that 
individualism will replace Confucian values but might only replace collectivism, to a 
certain extent because collectivism and Confucian values might not intertwine. There 
need not be cultural convergence or divergence but rather cross-vergence of values 
from various sources. Hence some of the values might decrease in importance but 
not necessarily all of them. According to this view, Confucian values such as respect 
for hierarchy and preference for personal communication are learned within the 
family therefore will be passed on to the next generation, whereas Collectivism, 
outweighed by Individualism, might affect loyalty and norm of dependence. As a 
consequence, some aspects of management might be modulated accordingly. 
Paternalistic, personalised leadership might still be approved but human resources 
management might experience some changes such as the adoption of performance-
based pay and reward systems. In general, the strength of relations within the firm 
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might not be wiped out but to a great extent the agency problem is a potential 
problem, especially given the large size ofEVN. 
One interesting yet important point to reflect on is that EVN's top management 
might not want to substitute collectivism with individualism per se. Individualism is 
only encouraged up to the point where employees are permitted to facilitate personal 
chances for promotion whilst harmonious team-working is still the principle. In fact, 
alongside the performance-based system, trade unions are promoted to create more 
community-based activities, within and outside work hours, to maintain a sense of 
collaboration. Moreover, face-to-face personal communication is still preferred, 
which contributes to preserving a Confucian culture within EVN. 
7.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I presented a different side of the deinstitutionalisation process, the 
sensemaking. If chapters 5 and 6 emphasised history, traditions and institutional 
impacts on organisation practice, i.e. the macro states, this chapter focused more on 
microfoundations, the individuals. For one thing, the deinstitutionalisation process 
was viewed beyond mere changes in regulations, rules and standards; it became alive 
with emotions, thoughts and attitudes of the very people whose lives had been 
touched during the process. This sensemaking approach, whether from an individual 
or organisational perspective, represented their collective answer to the call from the 
top level, the government and its reform programme. It was sensemaking that 
provided great insights into how deinstitutionalisation incentives came about, how 
they were disseminated to a broader audience and developed through time. It was 
also sensemaking that offered promising explanations for variations in transitional 
outcomes and speeds since organisational inertias and responses might be as 
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powerful as to delay or even impede the process. In a nutshell, evidence of 
sensemaking in this chapter complemented and completed macro analyses in 
previous chapters to provide insights about deinstitutionalisation as an institutional 
change process, a sensemaking process and as interactive ground for both. 
In addition, having analysed antecedents and critical events that led to 
deinstitutionalisation in previous chapters, I came to identify sensemaking of 
employees towards the 'old' Socialist institutions as the first evidence of bottom up 
deinstitutionalisation. Fence-breaking activities prior to switching events and 
workers' distress towards the rigid bureaucratic system, though might not being 
manifested openly, were so omnipresent that they became the understated yet 
persistent force of change throughout. It was true that first time challenges to the old 
institutional system might not be successful, as shown in this case due to strong 
resistant efforts; their impacts were by no means short lived. Provided that the 
underlying rationales for fence-breaking in the first place stayed unresolved, the once 
failed challenges could tum into strong support for deinstitutionalisation when it 
eventually arrived. 
Thirdly, the evidence was presented to enlighten the link between the transitional 
process of sensemaking and various states of deinstitutionalisation. I showed that 
different responses of sensemaking were responsible for different destinies of 
different components of old institutions. The total vanishing of central planning 
institutions was caused by dissatisfaction with the crippled mechanism and 
unanimousness of opinion meant that the changeover was fast. Ever since, modern 
management know-how including functional departments, customer and business 
orientation and responsibility-embracing ethics has replaced centralisation and 
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egalitarianism as the new philosophy. In contrast, some parts of Confucian 
institutions such as nonns of dependence and delegation proved to be tricky. Among 
possible explanations was the meaning of Confucian beliefs in the life and society of 
Vietnamese people. Centred on relations and hannony, consensus-laden and 
collective-oriented ways of living and working are most likely to be preserved. The 
selective feature of deinstitutionalisation aligned the argument that old and new 
institutions need not be mutually exclusive but complementary instead. Of course, 
the outcome entirely depends on the comparability of the two. 
Going further, the analysis evaluated the tendency for and impediments against 
further changes after having studied current states and surrounding conditions. As 
anticipated, institutions, especially mature and well-established ones, might be 
incredibly resistant. Their abilities to constrain, prime and edit sensemaking and 
behaviour were demonstrated not only by exerting pressure to comply but also by 
providing the comfort in doing so. Quite possibly, sense of stability might outweigh 
necessity for change. The delicate balance between these two detennines the ups and 
downs, slow or quick speed of further deinstitutionalisation. 
To complete research question one and the first half of the analysis i.e. the 
deinstitutionalisation process, this chapter offered descriptions of alternative 
institutions, which were the final destination. Bearing in mind that 
deinstitutionalisation in this case was ongoing, these new institutions were 
constructed given current conditions. The hybrid form between business-oriented and 
Confucian logics worked in this case giving it distinctive features; however, this 
would not be universal for every case. 
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In many ways, EVN as a restructuring state-owned enterprise is a close resemblance 
of the economic transformation at national level. Moving away from central 
planning, the competitive market and internationally recognised corporations have 
become the new, well-received concepts. Even though difficulties lie ahead, as 
always, the government has the support of its people and Vietnamese society and 
companies alike will continue to move forward as one united body. The process is 
likely to be slow though as consensus-ridden sensemaking is still the norm. It is 
unwise to seek a full picture of institutional settings around EVN at this moment 
because the Vietnamese economy is still in transition; political, economic, legal and 
institutional environments have yet to mature and stabilise. Institutions, which 
continue to co-evolve with the economy and society, will demand ongoing 
transformations from EVN. In tum, efforts are required at both the top management 
and employee levels. Although this study does not attempt to predict future 
institutions, it is not unfounded to say that based on evidence to date, Vietnam and 
EVN are likely to be able to preserve national identity and Confucian cultural 
quintessence despite mounting pressure to conform to globalisation and the market 
economy. 
The next chapter will finish the analysis by answering the second research question 
elaborating the dynamics of the sensemaking process and the link between 
sensemaking and deinstitutionalisation outcome and pace. 
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CHAPTERS 
Sensemaking process and deinstitutionalisation outcomes 
8.1 Introduction 
Unexpectedly, the sensemaking process triggered by crises bears an uncanny 
resemblance to the 'Five stages ofloss and grief (Kubler-Ross, 1969). However, it is 
not a person you love that is lost nor your physical wellbeing threatened by tenninal 
illness; it is that intangible parts of you which cannot be touched yet held dear are put 
in jeopardy - your identity, your purpose, your way of life. Some say that kind of 
loss is nothing compared to matters of life or death but it is life-changing all the 
same. The voids left behind when deep-rooted assumptions are questioned and 
discarded are just as devastating. Deinstitutionalisation of well-established, taken for 
granted institutions could potentially have those effects on organisations and 
individuals. Sensemaking makes its entrance right here and rescues your sanity by 
providing alternative views and solutions. Apparently, the question is asked: is it 
gratifying enough to work out how a person makes sense of a certain situation? The 
answer is that sometimes, the journey taken to reach the destination is just as 
insightful, if not more so. In this chapter, it is emphasised that organisational 
sensemaking during the deinstitutionalisation is a process - the process of identity 
reconstruction - to recover lost assumptions and to restore order which has crumbled. 
It is a healing process. Like any situations involving loss, individuals and the 
organisation as a whole go through various stages of sensemaking, from 'denial' to 
'acceptance' to 'finding solutions' in order to cope with deinstitutionalisation. Until 
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things start to make sense again, everything is brought to a standstill. This chapter 
illustrates how EVN goes through this process. 
Although chapter 7 and this chapter together celebrated the significance of 
sensemaking, their foci were different. If chapter 7 portrayed individual and 
organisational sensemaking accounts and elucidated the role of this sensemaking 
transformation in determining the fate of institutional makeover, this chapter sheds 
light on the steps of sensemaking. Alternatively speaking, chapter 7 was mainly 
concerned with the static contents of sensemaking accounts and not on the journey to 
get there or the intricate web of emotions, cognitive learning, political interests and 
social interactions, where lies the very essence of sensemaking. This was exactly the 
focus of chapter 8 and answers to research question 2: 'what impact does 
organisational sensemaking have on the pace and outcome of deinstitutionalisation?' 
In this chapter, organisational characteristics and sensemaking dynamics were 
analysed and built into the explanation of different forms of collective sensemaking 
and responses, which were then connected to certain deinstitutionalisation outcomes 
and speeds of transformation. The perspective employed here stressed the 
multifaceted nature of sensemaking believed to be influenced not just by cognitive 
capacity but also emotional, social and political features of the organisational 
environment. The relative importance of these factors varied but there was no doubt 
that all of them tried to make their mark on collective sensemaking. 
Sensemaking was said to determine the trajectory of deinstitutionalisation but the 
action was definitely not one-sided. With the ability to constrain behaviours within a 
pre-constructed, well-approved mental framework, institutions were just as 
competent in steering sensemaking in the direction they desired. This mutual 
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interaction between institutions and sensemaking was underlined throughout the 
chapter, with analysis highlighting conditions hampering efforts to make sense of 
deinstitutionalisation and how impediments and entropies intermingled to create end-
products of deinstitutionalisation. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. The first part discusses the 
organisational sensemaking process in several aspects, ranging from initial emotional 
response to crises and subsequent impacts of emotions, to the role of sensegiving and 
how trust towards leaders change the credibility of sensegiving, to institutional 
rigidity as impediments to deinstitutionalisation and finally how shared meaning is 
socially negotiated. Variation in these factors held the key to variation in collective 
sensemaking. The second part then linked different collective sensemaking and 
collective response to particular outcomes and paces of deinstitutionalisation with 
examples to illustrate each scenario. 
8.2 Organisational sensemaking as influenced by cognitive, political, 
emotional and social dynamics 
8.2.1 Institutional facilitation versus institutional resistance 
Institutional entrepreneurship (Eisenstadt, 1980; DiMaggio, 1988) or sensegiving in 
its crudest form refer to the attempts to manipulate sensemaking and behaviours of 
others. It requires skilfully manoeuvring which cues to present, which assumptions 
and meanings to endorse and which courses of action to consent to. By doing these, 
institutional agents seek to create new cognitive frameworks, cultural traditions and 
normative standards. In terms of organisational sensemaking dynamics, institutional 
entrepreneurship represents the cognitive capability as well as the political element 
237 
of institutional process since it signifies political interests, power structure and 
relations. Standing in the way of agents, institutional resistance denotes the work 
involved in preventing changes, which caused rigidities during the 
deinstitutionalisation process. If agents are messengers of changes, institutions 
symbolise stability and certainty. 
Like most change processes, deinstitutionalisation of central planning was initiated 
by institutional agents. One of the most effective and favoured strategies used by 
sensegivers to encourage changes (Gioia and Thomas, 1996; Bartunek, Krim, 
Necochea, and Humphries, 1999), as employed by Vietnamese Communist Party 
leaders in the 1980s, was highlighting merits of the new scheme while discrediting 
(operational aspects of) the old central planning system (refer to section 6.3 in 
chapter 6 for more information on the new sensemaking account of the 'socialist 
markef). The intentional selection of these particular cues and the juxtaposition of 
them were played cleverly and to great effect. Capitalising on the already-presented 
dissatisfaction with impractical centralised allocation and productions, the Party 
leaders were probably able to make potential gains of reform more attractive. The 
opposite - the 'market' - was apparently viewed as the logical choice. In this way, 
persuasive tactics worked very well, where things would otherwise have been more 
difficult. 
Apart from the government, another group of agents which played a major role in the 
implementation of deinstitutionalisation of central planning were the managers. In 
cases of deinstitutionalisation (like this thesis) where analysis studied institutions at 
more than one level - national, organisational and individual - in which managers 
held both roles as sensetakers (from government) and sensegivers (to employees), 
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managers were much more than just a 'bridge' which connected the two ends. When 
certain policies jeopardised their benefits, due to their special position, managers 
could be institutional agents who were responsible to transfonn government policies 
into practices and at the same time they could be forces of powerful institutional 
resistance, detennined to reverse policy decisions to protect their own interests. The 
conflict of motives made managerial sensemaking a great deal more interesting for 
agency vs. resistance; whichever the dominant role turned out to be, the other would 
always be there in the shadow. Insights from this other dual agenda revealed the 
complexity of managerial sensemaking, at least, and at best the interconnectedness 
between agency and resistance. Top leaders at EVN appeared to be in such internal 
conflict. On the one hand, they vocally agreed with further restructuring and the 
competitive power market; on the other hand, repeated attempts were made to delay 
the process. Arguing against (successfully) the Ministry of Industry's 2009 proposal 
to separate power transmission (following generation) from EVN control, EVN's 
chainnan said: 
The construction of a competitive market is necessary,' however, if the project 
goes ahead, EVN would only manage a third of the market and the amount of 
capital available to us would decrease significantly with such legal status. 
Without those funds, EVN would not be able to maintain national power 
security and the social responsibilities [rural electrification} entrusted to us, 
which we have accomplished for so many years. This project goes against the 
previous policy to corporatise EVN and make EVN a key economic engine. 
As for the urgency of the matter: 
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Big changes are needed but right now might not be the best time. We must be 
cautious in restructuring since hasty moves jeopardise not only this sector 
and this company with thousands of employees but national security as well. 
We need more time to deliberate. 
Of course, given EVN's position and the large number of stakeholders involved, 
calling for caution was not irrational. But this reason was used to postpone sharing 
control for years. The views of top managers at EVN would not have been such a 
cliche if they had been able to convince that delaying was indeed essential as time 
would allow EVN to be better-prepared for such competition when the right time 
came. Their excuses would be more genuine if a timeline was confinned for such 
transfer, which had yet to happen. The absence of such strong commitment hinted at 
other motives. Looking back at evidence of slow reorganisation in recent years at 
EVN (section 7.2 of chapter 7), it was not hard to recognise the unmistakable 
impression the managerial unwillingness to release 'monopoly prerogative' left on 
the 'monopoly attitude' of the employees. Whether this monopolist thinking was 
truly the most sensible needed not make a huge difference to employees as much as 
the fact that this was the view approved by managers. Other views certainly existed 
but the most 'legitimate' one was the one which ought to be valued highly: 
sensegiving - sensemaking endorsed by power. 
Managers and employees were by no means the only source of resistance. 
Institutions and their ability to constrain and edit sensemaking within pre-existed 
framework were an extremely powerful resistance force. For while institutions made 
substance available for sensemaking less varied, they made certain things 
inconceivable. This held true either for types of cues, meanings, assumptions or 
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courses of actions. To demonstrate this point, let us consider how Confucian 
institutions acted out their defence against the invasion of modem organisational 
practices. As soon as the socialist market became the new philosophy, autonomy and 
active management (as opposed to passive order taking during central planning) 
became the new thoughts. But just like management traditions elsewhere. the 
Vietnamese management style matured via the process of selection. Having been 
internalised early on in life for all Vietnamese people and having remained at the 
core of society, Confucian ways of thinking played a key part in deciding which 
practices to adopt and how they should be modified to fit Confucian traditions as 
well as new goals. This was the reason why individualism was deemed unsuitable 
while concepts such as work independence, work empowerment and individual 
responsibility were more welcome although in the Vietnamese context, they were 
interpreted differently from those of their Western counterparts. In adaptation to 
Confucian traditions, these concepts became concepts 'in moderation'. Take the 
examples of work empowerment and independence. Theoretically speaking, after 
reform managers at EVN were supposed to delegate a certain amount of authority 
and freedom to employees according to their roles. In reality, delegation remained 
very limited due to the high power distance of Confucian traditions, managers 
remained like heads of a family who found it hard to relinquish control: 
We [department heads} only have 'artificial' power. Before making any 
important decisions even those within our 'official' authority, we must 
consult them first [managers}. It is understood that we should act our roles 
within the little space they allow us to (Head of International Cooperation 
Department). 
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Some changes are more easily accepted than others. The centralised and 
rationed resource allocation system was impractical. so it got replaced. You 
can say that the lack of delegation tradition needs to be replaced too but it's 
easier said than done. Central planning was here for a short time while 
collective way of living is in our blood, we have learned it. lived it our whole 
life. Things like that take a long time to be accepted and even longer to see 
real change (Deputy Head of Business Department). 
In tenns of independence, written procedures allowed employees to complete tasks 
without having to rely on supervision and monitoring but team working would 
always be stressed. The collective-embedded culture would not allow individualism 
to thrive. What independence and empowerment in the harmony-oriented context 
actually meant was 'to take initiatives and responsibility for your actions but 
decisions remained under group deliberation'. The contradiction between concepts of 
group decision making and independence made this combination unlikely and utterly 
impractical. They existed alongside but worked against each other nevertheless. This 
was the perfect example to show how powerful institutional resistance can be. In this 
case, Confucian logics made individualism and insubordination unthinkable, in doing 
so, it caused a bottleneck in the introduction of many modern organisational 
practices. If sensemaking was able to determine the trajectory of 
deinstitutionalisation, institutions were as much capable of carrying out their own 
defence against changes by limiting sensemaking to certain cues and meanings. If 
agents and institutions were two sides of the same coin, so were sensegiving and 
resistance. 
242 
8.2.2 Emotions in organisational sensemaking: accelerator or inhibitor? 
Crises that questioned well-respected, shared assumptions could easily throw 
everyone into chaos, especially ones with unprepared for, devastating prospects and a 
huge sphere of influence. Strong, negative feelings are often spoken of as the most 
prominent psychological impacts of disasters. Yet, in order to feel these kinds of 
emotion, a person must somehow realise that it is indeed happening. If so, this person 
is no longer in the 'denial' stage, which is the first response stage to crisis-ridden 
situations (Kiibler-Ross, 1969). 'Denial' happens because people have a tendency to 
instinctively defend what they feel comfortable with and resist the unknown. 
Evidently, this was the dominant sentiment when people started to recognise signs of 
a failure of the central planning regime, even before proper crises appeared and 
triggered the 1986 reform in Vietnam. This was the period between 1975 and 1986, 
as one of the employees from the Material and Import-Export Department put it: 
When the state system began to go wrong, we were all very worried and 
confused. At that time, the war had just ended and the people trusted the 
system that brought us freedom, we truly believed that Communism would 
bring prosperity. So we convinced ourselves that this was supposed to happen 
at the beginning, there was nothing wrong and that if we could endure it, 
things would eventually get better. I guess we were self-deceived then. 
Another employee from the Emulation and Propaganda Department mentioned the 
Party's opinion at the time was partly responsible for keeping people in such faith: 
In the midst of this. during their public speeches, the Party leaders persisted 
in saying that difficulties were temporary even though food and material 
shortage became so severe that we were in fear of starvation. Some people 
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became very angry and anxious enough to act upon it. This was when fence-
breaking began because we were desperate to keep our families alive. The 
government was aware of these activities yet they refosed to acknowledge 
them as the right way of doing things. Perhaps lack of better alternatives (in 
their opinion) added to it so the system carried on. 
The fact that fence-breaking took place anyway without government consent was 
good evidence of the people's ability to overcome 'denial' and contemplate solutions 
even before leaders did. Of course, not everybody broke 'fences' because people had 
their own agenda, dealt with crises differently and recovered at their own speed. 
Some got stuck in the 'denial' stage and some willingly came to or were pushed into 
'acceptance' rather quickly. In this case, the leaders seemed to take longer but it 
could easily be the other way round. All the same, regardless of healing speed, it was 
undeniable that strong negative feelings inflicted by crises hindered sensemaking and 
delayed deinstitutionalisation at the very least. Ironically, the greater strong negative 
feelings of contempt, pessimism, distrust and disappointment towards lack of actions 
in this period, the more likely they were to provoke strong positive emotions of joy, 
trust, satisfaction and optimism when changes came about at last. The polarisation of 
these psychological reactions, however, existed only when the awaited changes were 
desired, like in the case of the 1986 reform: 
The situation turned around completely. From being angry, depressed, 
anxious, we could not be happier that the government decided to go ahead 
with the reform plan. The government finally was on the same lines as the 
people and regained the people IS trust. We eagerly devoted ourselves to the 
reform (Corporate Planning Department staff). 
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This evidence was interesting since it showed how powerful emotions were in 
affecting thinking and behaviours. Rationality hopelessly failed when people were 
overwhelmed by negative situations. They made sense by not trying to make sense at 
all. In terms of sphere of influence, emotions were able to affect group relations and 
organisational sensemaking too because people experienced emotions as a group as 
well as individuals. Special bonds developed among people in the same situation 
were then built into trust, compassion and support over time. This emotional alliance 
facilitated opinion sharing, making people more susceptible to sensemaking of the 
people of the same group. In fact, the nature of relations between managers and 
employees before and immediately after reform offered great insights: 
Back then, we were one big family, all of the same mind, same interests and 
same goal. We did not think of managers as someone high above but someone 
we could trust whole-heartedly, someone who underwent the same hardship 
as us. We followed their directions and guidance because we believed they 
were in the company's interest and our interests (International Cooperation 
Department staff). 
This citation was so captivating not only because it confirmed the influence of 
emotional alliance in collective sensemaking but also because of potential effects if 
group dynamics changed. Instead of emotional bonding, it might well be emotional 
distance. As restructuring proceeded in the power sector and EVN, major changes 
were introduced including the formalisation of roles, duties, responsibilities and 
clearer power distribution. The relationship between managers and employees 
adjusted accordingly: 
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Don't get me wrong, we still believe in our leaders' ability but they now have 
their own interests to protect. Moreover, it is clear now they are our 
superiors and we must follow their orders, whether it is for our or the 
company's benefits or not (Corporate Planning Department stafJ). 
It was interesting to see the delicate change in vocabulary. Managers were now 
referred to as 'one of them' not 'one of us'. Hidden underneath this careful yet firm 
expression was the conscious distinction of role, duty, power and relation. The subtle 
change in the notion of trust was noteworthy too. The emotional ties shared between 
managers and employees at the beginning of reform seemed to be severed. 
Leadership credibility became more about 'ability' and no longer possessed 
'sincerity'. What implication did it have for organisational sensemaking when 
sensegiving did not have the kind of authority it did in the past? About this, one 
employee from the Technical Department said: 
Managers' ideas are still considered the most important but we learnt to 
think for ourselves and on our own. We came to understand that a manager's 
view is not the only view and might not be the most appropriate view. 
Of course, the fact that employees came to develop their own sensemaking should 
not be attributed to changes in emotional ties alone. Increased work independence 
and greater responsibilities were partly accountable. However, it was the possibility 
of alternative views apart from those of managers that made a difference. It meant 
that in situations where sensegiving differed from employees' sensemaking, 
meanings and orders had to be negotiated whereas previously, sensegiving could 
have been the only account that existed or mattered. In other words, if emotional 
alliance and trust between managers and employees were presented, sensegiving was 
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considered more credible hence more influential. On the whole, whether accelerator 
or inhibitor, emotions certainly had their own share of influence and their own ways 
of exerting pressure. Their impacts were considerably greater at the beginning of 
disasters since emotions were still raw, where immense feeling ofloss shut down any 
attempt to make sense. As the initial phase passed, emotions continued to play a 
crucial role in organisational sensemaking, only less explicitly. These emotional 
alliances (or lack of them) might not be as significant as 'denial' in delaying or even 
halting deinstitutionalisation but they impinged on the integrity of sensegiving and 
changed the nature of social negotiation of meaning and orders. 
8.2.3 Social process of organisational sensemaking 
The last element of organisational sensemaking embraces the notion of sensemaking 
as a process of social construction (Berger and Luckmann, 1967) in which 
organisational members derive shared meanings and schemas via interactions with 
others in order to create orders of the workplace. Social order is therefore negotiated 
(Strauss, 1963); values and norms are negotiated (Fine, 1984). Looking both ways, 
while institutional structures denote the boundaries of negotiations, no structure is 
possible without negotiations. Institutional changes prompt active sensemaking and 
require orders to be renegotiated, a process which often involves a large number of 
stakeholders with different positions, motives, backgrounds and frames of reference 
(Maitlis, 2005). The negotiation process is involved in all kinds of interactions, 
whether it is intra-group or intergroup, horizontally among people of the same 
position or vertically between individuals of different levels. Understanding these 
social processes holds the key to the categorisation of organisational sensemaking, 
because the nature and scope of negotiations determined by power relations 
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essentially decide who is eligible to participate and which matters are open to 
discussion. The outcome of these negotiations, i.e. success or failure to attain 
consensual agreements, establishes the characteristics of the corresponding 
organisational sensemaking account. 
Evidence from the case study confirmed and demonstrated three types of 
organisational sensemaking discussed in the theoretical model in chapter 3: 
interactive single account, restricted single account and interactive multiple account. 
The accounts were analysed based on two elements: the extent and outcome of social 
interaction. The first indicated the presence of multi-stakeholder participation and the 
second category identified collective sensemaking in terms of the effectiveness of 
negotiation processes. Among the three cases, 'interactive single account' could be 
considered as the most desirable since it represented cases where receivers of 
institutional initiatives were able and willing or allowed to engage in the 
reconstruction of new orders; and it resulted in consensus of opinions. The second 
best outcome was 'restricted single account' because there was only one account 
presented, the most crucial factor enabling changes to proceed. The difference 
between the first and second best scenarios lay in the lack of sensemaking inputs 
from other stakeholders. As participation was 'restricted' to institutional agents, this 
kind of account only reflected sensemaking of a small group of individuals, not 
necessarily the majority. This outcome was not the product of successful negotiation, 
ifit could be called negotiation at all given only one party was involved. 'Interactive' 
sensemaking was richer in content and more comprehensive in approach than 
'restricted' sensemaking because it showed the possibility of sensegiving being 
enriched and improved by other perspectives, envisioned by different groups of 
people from different positions within the organisation. The least favourable was 
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'interactive multiple account'. Although this scenano started out as potentially 
advantageous given the 'interactions' among parties, the outcome was not. Lack of 
consensus or a dominant account brought change to a halt. 
The process of social negotiation led to 'interactive single account' being aptly 
characterised as highly dynamic, constructively rich in information, emotionally 
harmonious and effective overall. Each of these features pointed to different 
organisational aspects that played a part in shaping the final outcome i.e. scope for 
interaction, effectiveness of communication and emotional relations among 
organisational members. In this scenario, institutional agents conducted their 
sensegiving activities as usual in the form of government policies, regulations, the 
organisation's formal meetings, official rules and directives. At the same time, 
receivers of change were able and willing to engage in the process by expressing 
their opinions and actively contributing resolutions. The exchange process of 
sensemaking between institutional agents and receivers might have been intensive 
and complicated but ultimately it was successful because agreement was 
accomplished. For this to occur, not only must communication flow freely 
horizontally and vertically, credibility of sensegiving is essential. It was no surprise 
that trust among organisational members facilitated animated and fruitful social 
negotiations. A good example of 'interactive single account' was the development 
and finalisation of ISO 9000:2000, described by employees as 'a collective 
achievement' because it was 'written by employees, guided by managers and 
assessed by both parties'. In fact, employees felt 'drawn in and committed' because 
they were allowed to 'test different ideas and approaches and make recommendations 
to the managers on whichever worked best'. Here, we could see that managers 
fulfilled their roles as leaders by setting out goals and guidelines and making 
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imperative decisions but they trusted employees enough to let them in on the process. 
It made all the difference: the final version of ISO 'worked so well' as managers 
shaped employees' understandings but enabled them to construct their own 
sensemaking accounts and voice them openly. The whole process was organised, 
reciprocal and effective. 
Despite having the same outcome, 'restricted single account' could not be more 
different to 'interactive single account'. Actually, it was everything that 'interactive' 
organisational sensemaking was not: highly controlled sensegiving, limited 
engagement opportunity for other stakeholders except institutional agents and 
emotional distance (often found in the high power distance context). In its own way, 
'restricted single account' was effective in the sense that there was a dominant way 
of thinking which allowed organisations to function. This, however, was obtained by 
confining organisational sensemaking to the visions of only a small group of players. 
At first glance, the 'restricted single account' scenario did not appear problematic as 
it posed no threat to the change process; however, 'restricted' account was likely to 
be incomplete given the absence of other stakeholders' sensemaking. Compared to 
'interactive single account', 'restricted single account' did not reflect the intricacy of 
reality and underestimated potential risks of such a narrow outlook. Single account 
stemmed from unilateral imposition rather than constructive negotiation therefore did 
not possess the mutuality and comprehensiveness quality of its 'interactive' 
counterpart. This type of organisational sensernaking was predominantly institutional 
agent sensegiving and social negotiation was largely non-existent. In a post-
bureaucratic and paternalistic environment like EVN, this scenario was common in 
which top leaders considered it unnecessary to consult or include other stakeholders' 
perspectives because 'it gave no better result and was too time-consuming' or 
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because 'employees only complained about how they did not want changes'. For 
whatever reason, sensemaking is strictly unilateral. 
As unfavourable as 'restricted' stakeholder sensemaking was, 'interactive' social 
processes only came with benefits if consensus was reached. The third type of 
organisational sensemaking, 'interactive multiple account', was in fact the least 
desirable because in the absence of a unanimously endorsed account, the change 
process slowed down dramatically, if it ever began at all. The social process inherent 
in this category could be described as multilateral but ineffective negotiation. Here, 
stakeholders actively engaged in negotiation with institutional agents but neither 
party was able to make their sensegiving the winning option. Failed negotiation was 
induced by overly rich or fragmented sensegiving and possibly exacerbated by lack 
of trust among participants. This kind of organisational sensemaking was rarely seen 
at EVN since the 'restricted single account' was by far the most common. This 
finding was not unexpected because 'interactive' suggested some kind of freedom of 
speech and action, which was unfortunately not implicitly available to other 
stakeholders apart from the top leaders. Interestingly, 'interactive multiple account' 
was found in the negotiation process to involve another set of players i.e. between 
the government and EVN. Being the single player for years, EVN had gathered 
substantial power and control, not only in terms of electricity-related activities but 
also in policy lobbying. EVN and other major economic corporations (petrol, coal) 
have been known for their (successful) attempts to delay changes. Let us consider the 
issue of developmental direction for EVN and the power market, for example. Both 
the government and EVN acknowledged the need for a new structure with the hope 
that competition would correct existing impediments, albeit for different reasons. If it 
was inefficient monopolistic behaviours at EVN that urged the government to seek 
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out better alternatives, financial difficulties due to demand for a large number of 
investment projects forced EVN into this position. Both sides, however, could not 
agree on the timeline. In preparation for a competitive market, the Ministry of 
Industry thought the time had come to disunite generation and distribution functions 
from EVN and open entry to private investors. EVN disagreed on the grounds of 
insufficient capitals and network overload if numerous players were to compete 
given current situations. Citing that more time was needed to enhance infrastructure 
and network capacity, EVN proposed a trial separation of one power plant for the 
time being and to reschedule competitive generation and distribution until after 2015. 
Failure to reach consensus in this matter was the prime obstruction of the power 
market restructuring. The future was yet to be decided. 
8.3 Organisational sensemaking and deinstitutionaIisation outcomes 
Having established the impacts of emotions, cognition, power and social aspects of 
organisational sensemaking during the deinstitutionalisation process, the final step 
was to make the connection between organisational sensemaking and 
deinstitutionalisation outcomes. It was understood that the ways organisations 
responded to permanent and major changes were contingent on how new reality was 
viewed in regard to which meanings were appointed to new concepts, the kind of 
altered individual and group mentality necessitated for new roles and duties, the line 
of logics and routine adaptations required by new goals and new organisational 
identity. The construction of new orders, however, was not always fruitful and it was 
this relative success of social negotiation that shaped organisational response and its 
companion, deinstitutionalisation outcome. In general, multi-stakeholder 
sensemaking did better than its unilateral counterpart if consensus was attained. 
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Accompanying each type of organisational sensemaking, there was a certain 
deinstitutionalisation outcome and certain speed at which changes would occur. 
Organisational sensemaking at its best produced a single account, with sensemaking 
contributions from institutional agents as well as receivers. Given the wide and 
effective channel of communication, it was no surprise that the result was one of 
'Developed' disposition. This meant that the original account advocated by 
institutional agents was augmented by different viewpoints from people of various 
backgrounds and positions. It was superior compared to the 'Planned' scenario 
created by the single account but 'restricted' the sensemaking not only in the richness 
of content of sensemaking account but also in terms of speed of change. 'Developed' 
deinstitutionalisation was deemed to generate a faster transformation process than the 
'Planned' one because the inclusion of other stakeholders in the initial 
conceptualisation stage significantly reduced potential resistance during later 
implementation. In the third case, deinstitutionalisation was 'Delayed' due to 
contestation among equally credible accounts of sensemaking. Although 
communication was open, consensus was not possible, hence the slow speed of 
transformation. 
In this case study, the period from 1975 to the present witnessed three very 
distinctive settings. There was evidence showing deinstitutionalisation of central 
planning underwent slow, high and then medium paces of transformation depending 
on the particular sensemaking of that individual phase. Table 7 below summarises 
the characteristics of each phase of the process. 
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Table 7 Stages of deinstitutionalisation of central planning in Vietnam 
Pre-reform Post-reform Post-reform 
Phase 1 Phase 2 
4 ~ ~
Organisational Interactive multiple Interactive single Restricted single 
sensemaking account account account 
Outcome Delayed scenario Developed scenario Planned scenario 
Pace Slow High Medium 
Description Multi-stakeholder Multi-stakeholder Sensemaking 
participation in participation in dominated by 
sensemaking sensemaking institutional agents 
No consensus Consensus achieved Consensus achieved 
Changes are minimal Large-scale changes Substantial changes 
occur without occur with possibility 
impediments of impediments 
The most notable aspect of the pre-refonn phase (1975-1986) was the co-existence of 
official centralised resource allocation and a distribution regime alongside an 
unauthorised 'black market' and fence-breaking activities. These two economic 
systems represented the two separate sensemaking accounts at that time. Although 
the unofficial way of thinking and doing things was not pennitted then, the fact that 
they persisted regardless emphasised the inability of institutional agents to make their 
system of choice more credible and binding. Besides, receivers of changes actively 
pursued their visions and substantiated their sensemaking to a degree. Even if fence-
breaking was not legitimate by definition because it was not legalised by laws, it was 
no less credible, if not more so than the official system for it was given mass support 
and proved more efficient in practice. In this sense, the people were in fact the first 
agents who promoted the use of markets. Gradually the 'market' view attracted 
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greater attention as a number of government officers became advocates of 'market' 
principles themselves. Having received the backing of some authority figures meant 
fence-breaking was accepted yet consensus was far from achievable. Resistance from 
the opposite side remained too strong. The Party leaders persevered with the view 
that difficulties would resolve themselves, which unfortunately was not true. This 
was the reason why the pre-reform phase was best described as a standstill since 
neither sensemaking account showed signs of winning. Clearly the centralised 
distribution system was too flawed to be further implemented but doubts about 
market measures prevented deinstitutionalisation advancing at this stage. Overall, 
changes were insubstantial (refer to chapter 5 for more details on government and 
organisational sensemaking as well as the level of changes during this period). 
The next stage was a marked contrast to pre-reform stage. The first half of the post-
reform phase witnessed large-scale changes which occurred at incredible speed. This 
was because the main principle of reform, 'market socialism', and the motivations 
behind previously banned fence-breaking activities were analogous. In essence, the 
government just legitimised and legalised the ideas and actions already omnipresent. 
In doing so, it made sensemaking of this phase 'interactive single account' since both 
institutional agents and receivers of changes contributed to the discourse of one 
single view of reality. This version of reality was 'developed' from that of 
institutional agents by encompassing a wider range of stakeholder perspectives, 
impacts and consequences. In this case, market socialism was conceptualised by the 
government but its underlying logics had been nurtured and proved to be well-suited 
in an organisational setting by the people. Here, in cases of 'interactive single 
account', sensemaking opportunity was more evenly distributed than the other two 
scenarios. The distinction between institutional agents and receivers therefore 
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became less profound; both the government and the people became facilitators of 
changes at some point and not necessary simultaneously. The unanimity exhibited in 
'developed' organisational response consequently capacitated the acceleration of the 
adjustment process. If inability to resolve disagreements originated 'delayed' 
deinstitutionalisation, consensus on the other hand fostered smooth transformation 
during 'developed' deinstitutionalisation. At EVN, when asked to describe the 
situation immediately after reform, one employee from the Material and Import-
Export Department stressed the ease of system transfer: 
Changes came about very fast. Partly because the situations called for it, 
partly because we all knew what needed to be done and fully supported these 
reforms. The core ideas of new system {market economy and modern 
management] were similar to what we had been doing [under the table] 
anyway. Of course, there were small problems here and there in the 
adaptation process but that was expected. The most important thing is there 
was no dispute. The atmosphere was urgent, but focused. 
The fast-moving restructuring was not sustained during the following period, 
unfortunately. One might say it was not unusual for the initial stimulation to wear off 
once major changes had done their work. What made this case study interesting and 
insightful was that there was scope for further dramatic makeover; it just has not 
been given the chance. The second phase of post-reform could potentially have been 
another large-scale and intensive transformation if equitisation and competitive 
power market had ensued quicker. The explanation was simple: 'restricted single 
account' of sensemaking. The unique attribute that set this scenario apart from the 
others lay in the nature of how a single account was achieved. By implication, 
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'restricted' sensemaking denoted one-way flow of sensegiving of which consensus 
was derived from coercion and imposition rather than persuasion or negotiation. 
Latent in this so-called conformity was the possibility of disagreement and resistance 
since other stakeholders were deliberately or accidentally left out of the sensemaking 
process. Their perspectives were overlooked. 'Restricted single account' was 
probably biased, which control was overestimated. This was exactly the cause of the 
medium pace of transformation, which expressed substantial changes but not as fast 
as those experienced under 'interactive single account'. The reason might simply be 
cognitive partialness where 'restricted single account' needed to be enhanced by 
incorporating other stakeholders' viewpoints during the implementation process; or it 
could be one of a psychological nature. Unlike 'interactive' social sensemaking 
which carried the sense of reciprocity and fulfilment, 'restricted' sensemaking 
suggested a less positive emotional profile, which might become the source of 
opposition. The benefits of emotional alliance inherent in 'interactive' processes, 
which might enhance sensegiving credibility hence reduce the chance of resistance, 
were not available in 'restricted' sensemaking. 
In the context of deinstitutionalisation of central planning and organisational 
restructuring at EVN, unlike the first phase of post-reform when a dramatic 
makeover was witnessed, seeing markets replaced by centralised bureaucratic 
mechanisms and order-taking state units turned into autonomous, modem-day SOEs 
overnight, changes in the second phase of post-reform took place relatively 
gradually. Piecemeal adjustments were made to the operations of authority 
institutions (Ministry of Industry or ERA V) and EVN structure (sparse equitisation 
projects and reorganisation of internal units); nothing reached the scale experienced 
in the first half. In this stage of deinstitutionalisation, the government exercised the 
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authority of institutional agents and disseminated sensegiving in the fonn of policies 
and regulations. Unlike the first half of post-refonn where receivers of change 
engaged in sensemaking via their fence-breaking efforts, the same did not apply to 
the second half, either because improved economic situations did not provoke 
desperate actions or more proficient law enforcement prevented widespread fence-
breaking. In any case, this was the typical 'restricted single account' since 
sensemaking was predominantly one-sided. Since organisations were largely 
excluded from the policy fonnulation stage, a bottleneck in policy implementation 
occurred. This was the case with equitisation at EVN, which only managed to 
transfer into private ownership 30 out of 55 units targeted by the government 
(Executive report, 2009). In explaining the situation, the Director of the National 
Load Dispatching Centre said: 
The government did not take into account all potential problems arising from 
the equitisation of such a large corporation as EVN. The target is not 
feasible. Issues like social responsibility. granting permission of land usage. 
stakeholder selection or brand value evaluation are all time-consuming and 
complicated procedures. Take the example of social responsibility. Currently 
EVN has the obligation to ensure country-wide rural electrification. Any unit 
to be equitised still has to carry this out; and for investors. this is not a 
selling point. Besides. the government's ongoing control over electricity 
prices makes investment in the power sector an unattractive option. 
Since economic refonn was ongoing, there was no doubt that the 
deinstitutionalisation process would reveal more in due course; fortunately, 
retrospective analysis sufficed to demonstrate the interplay between sensemaking and 
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institutional processes. Looking further ahead, the 201 Os should be the decade of 
marked improvements in the sector and better restructuring efforts on the side of 
EVN due to mounting pressure from rapidly increasing electricity demand over the 
years. The suspension of the opening of the competitive market to any further extent 
appears too risky to ignore; nevertheless reality is likely to disappoint. Given the 
norm of a lengthy, unanimousness-governed deliberation process and the divergence 
of opinions regarding the proper roadmap at the current time, deinstitutionalisation of 
previous institutions pronely impinge on another slow-pace episode. We will see 
what the future holds because no one is yet ready to gamble. 
8.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the analysis followed the individual steps of the sensemaking process 
during deinstitutionalisation of old institutions and elaborated the significance of 
influential factors. Sensemaking was viewed as a process and studied as such 
because the conceptualisation acknowledged the multifaceted quality of sensemaking 
and enabled the understanding of the complicated web of interactions. If analysis had 
only been concerned with the substance of the sensemaking account, which was 
important nevertheless, the chance to trace the origins of variations and anomalies 
would have been lost. This was due to the fact that analysis of sensemaking as a 
process took into consideration all the factors, remotely or directly, impacted upon 
the social process of collective sensemaking and also revealed the role of each factor 
as well as the nature of their interactions. It was the relative importance of these 
factors that shed light on why individuals or organisations made sense of situations in 
certain ways. These were cognitive, emotional, political and social dynamics of 
organisational sensemaking. Without explanations of discrepancy in response, we 
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would have been unable to comprehend why change initiatives sometimes did not 
generate the desired outcomes. The underlying reason was that different individuals 
or organisations with idiosyncratic composition of cognitive capacity, emotional 
intelligence, political interests and social relations had diverse ways of making sense 
of and dealing with unexpected situations. This was the disadvantage but also the 
beauty of diversity. 
As a process, organisational sensemaking provoked by crises went through various 
stages of transfonnation; each stage was predominantly governed by certain factors. 
The analysis confinned that during the initial episode, emotional incentives tended to 
override the others as shocks blocked the use of cognition. In defence against 
overwhelming prospects of dire situations, conscious sensemaking became irrelevant 
and emotionally distressed people made the situation bearable by 'denying' their 
existence. This finding showed that emotions and especially negative feelings caused 
by unfavourable incidences were so powerful that their influence during the 
sensemaking process could not be underestimated. Moreover, the aftennath of 
'denial' stage was demonstrated to be affected by less profound yet equivalently 
important emotional connection. The presence of emotional alliance appeared to 
significantly boost the credibility of sensegiving and the chance for consensual 
collective sensemaking. 
Thirdly, evidence showed that at a later stage of the sensemaking process, other 
factors seemed to be in greater balance with emotions. Active sensemaking was 
activated when people overcame their emotional bottleneck. Institutional agents 
whose actions were shaped by political goals and whose sensegiving was the product 
of their cognitive capacity were always the first and most active advocates of 
260 
changes. Like light and shadow, institutional facilitation was often accompanied by 
resistance, which took many forms including distaste towards uncertainty, distrust 
towards institutional agents or merely as disagreement in opinions. Overall, cognitive 
and political aspects of sensemaking during the deinstitutionalisation process could 
be summed up as the confrontation between sensegiving and resistance, where 
institutional agents and receivers of change both tried to influence the course of 
actions to best suit their interests. The outcome, however, hung in the balance 
between the authority of a small number of individuals and the power of the mass. 
Fourthly, as the last piece of the organisational sensemaking puzzle, the chapter 
analysed the process of social negotiation of orders, which symbolised the common 
playground of all factors. Indeed, social processes conveyed the interconnectedness 
of all of these factors in shaping the outcome of collective sensemaking in the 
organisational setting or other institutional levels. Negotiation processes were the 
arena for cognitive capability to showcase the leading role of sensegiving, for the 
influence of power and political interest to be demonstrated by negotiation tactics, 
for emotional reactions to express themselves in terms of individual psyches and 
group dynamics. Social process of organisational sensemaking was said to be the one 
place everything comes together because features of negotiations (contents, 
participation rights and procedures) were implicitly determined by power relations, 
communication and leadership styles of individual organisational settings. This was 
the reason why the specific characteristics of different negotiation processes were 
shown to play a crucial role in shaping organisational sensemaking outcomes. 
Opportunities for and effectiveness of sensegiving from other stakeholders apart 
from institutional agents proved to be particularly important. 
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Lastly, it has been demonstrated that sensemaking process under the influence of 
emotional, political, social and cognitive dynamics resulted in three types of 
organisational sensemaking, which in turn explained three different paces and 
outcomes of deinstitutionalisation. Characterised by two key dimensions - the nature 
of social construction (interactive or restricted) and the form of sensemaking 
(singular or plural) - examples of three cases of organisational sensemaking 
enlightened why the deinstitutionalisation process ran considerably more smoothly 
and yielded better results if the sensemaking account was universally agreed upon 
than cases where sensemaking reflected only a limited portion of stakeholders or 
where multiple accounts co-existed. Moreover, the analysis chronologically 
presented the entire process of deinstitutionalisation of old institutions from the mid-
1970s to the present time as three different phases, each accompanied with 
idiosyncratic collective sensemaking which orientated the fate and rate of changes. 
Having depicted deinstitutionalisation like this, the analysis offered an alternative 
view of deinstitutionalisation - as a series of individual episodes. In doing so, it was 
shown that the deinstitutionalisation process did not essentially progress with 
uniform pace throughout its course. Just as sensemaking altered to accommodate 
new cues, deinstitutionalisation went through a cycle of ups and downs, depending 
on organisational sensemaking of member episodes. 
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CHAPTER 9 
Discussion and Conclusions 
9.1 Introduction 
This study seeks to understand the deinstitutionalisation process and organisational 
sensemaking thereof. It has done so by conducting an in-depth qualitative, case 
study-based empirical study of the processual nature of deinstitutionalisation and the 
significance of organisational sensemaking during the deinstitutionalisation process. 
In this chapter, I will briefly summarise the main findings, which have been 
discussed in the conclusions of each chapter. I will also revise the theoretical model 
proposed in chapter 3 in light of empirical findings as well as discussing wider 
implications, and contributions of the study and directions for further research. 
9.2 Summary of main findings 
Several significant findings emerged from this thesis and they have important 
implications for the theoretical development of institutional changes, sensemaking 
and especially deinstitutionalisation. 
9.2.1 Deinstitutionalisation as a process 
In referring to the first research question of 'how the deinstitutionalisation process 
evolves', it was concluded that the underlying causes of deinstitutionalisation of 
existing institutions were indeed institutional inconsistencies and rigidities, which 
failed to adapt to changes in surrounding environments. Having been underestimated 
as to the magnitude of troubles they potentially created, the inertias inherent in these 
seemingly stable institutions if overlooked had exhibited the capability to instigate 
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events with catastrophic consequences. The emphasis of this 'incubation period' fell 
on the missed opportunities to make timely adjustments to problematic systems. If 
adjustments were well-timed, they would have incurred incremental or even major 
changes, which were less psychologically damaging to the people involved and 
would not have resulted in disastrous breakdown of the whole system. Old 
institutions would have been able to retain most of their signature features. In this 
sense, the findings confirmed and reinforced the importance of institutional 
bottlenecks as antecedents of deinstitutionalisation as proposed in the theoretical 
model of chapter 3. 
Secondly, the findings demonstrated the advantages of presenting 
deinstitutionalisation as a process because it did not occur overnight, without sign 
nor finished in a short period of time. With a troubled past, dramatic opening and 
life-altering consequences, deinstitutionalisation was certainly not a short episode of 
change but rather a long-haul journey with particular origins, progression and 
destinations. The evidence displayed the anticipated sequence of events that 
deinstitutionalisation was theorised (in chapter 3) to go through: old institutions -
antecedents - switching events - institutional transformation - alternative 
institutions. This is indeed how deinstitutionalisation evolves in practice. 
9.2.2 Sensemaking process during deinstitutionalisation 
In terms of research question 2, concerning the role of organisational sensemaking 
during the deinstitutionalisation process, the study provided satisfactory evidence to 
verify the ideas advocated in the theoretical model set out in chapter 3. More 
specifically, it was gathered that emotional response, 'denial' to be precise, was 
largely the most prominent reaction to catastrophic shocks during the first episode of 
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deinstitutionalisation. At this point, other factors (cognitive, political and social) of 
organisational sensemaking were outshone and only able to exert influence in 
subsequent episodes once the initial emotions have subsided. All four aspects were 
found to be significant in shaping organisational sensemaking and strategic response 
to deinstitutionalisation incentives and in essence deinstitutionalisation outcomes 
themselves. Evidentially, the outcome depends on cultural, social-psychological and 
organisational characteristics such as the credibility of institutional agents, the nature 
of emotion relations, flow of communication and scope for stakeholder participation. 
Accordingly, the more credible sensegiving appears to be, the more connected 
institutional agents and stakeholders are emotionally, the more effective 
communication is, the more liberating sensemaking opportunities are, the less likely 
institutional resistance will become an issue. Basically, these conditions when 
present increase the likelihood of single interactive account which gives the best 
possible outcome for deinstitutionalisation and complete transformation manifests in 
the shortest period of time. 
9.3 Theoretical impUcations 
In this study, I have attempted to employ perspectives from institutional and 
sensemaking theories in the quest to enhance our understanding of the 
deinstitutionalisation process. The research was largely motivated by the lack of 
empirical and theoretical work done on deinstitutionalisation as well as studies 
combining the two important bodies of literature in organisational setting. In the 
following section, I will discuss the issues raised for institutional theory and 
deinstitutionalisation. 
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9.3.1 Implications for institutional theory 
The findings of this study shed some light on the similarities and differences of 
institutional effects in two totally different contexts: one with mature, stabilised 
institutions - the Western environment; one with an emerging, transitional 
background - Vietnam. Given that most research on institutions and institutional 
processes were inspired by and indeed carried out in mature, well-known contexts, 
the most appropriate question to ask now is how applicable these analytic 
frameworks and conceptualisations are to another setting. The subsequent discussion 
will not repeat the lack of theoretical foundation for deinstitutionalisation but 
concentrates on other aspects of institutional theory. 
In accordance with analysis chapters, institutional inconsistencies and bottlenecks 
initiated deinstitutionalisation of central planning on a national scale and at EVN on 
organisational and individual levels. Some modifications had been made to the 
policies and regulations as well as management practices, rules, norms and values to 
comprehend new logics. Moreover, these changes exerted influences by legitimation 
of new logics, standardisation of new practices and formalisation of new values, 
which were very much analogous to the three channels: regulative, cognitive and 
normative suggested in the institutionalisation framework by Scott (2001). In this 
aspect, institutional theory is proficient in its analytic capacity and indeed its 
descriptive and predictive contents remain appropriate in the context of evolving 
institutions. 
On the other hand, it can be argued that institutional pressures to adapt did not have 
such binding power in the context of Vietnam as they usually did in that of their 
Western counterparts, at least in this transitional phase of Vietnam's economy. This 
was evidenced in the partial transition to markets (market socialism) and strong 
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resistance to the abolition of monopoly status from many SOEs and weak law 
enforcement due to ineffective monitoring measures. While these potentially 
powerful regulative factors came up short of expectations, interestingly, cognitive 
and nonnative aspects had greater success in facilitating institutional changes. In the 
context of Vietnam, and EVN in particular, institutional controls were strongest not 
in their coercive capacity but their persuasive, inspiring nature. Individuals became 
enthusiastic carriers of institutional alterations not by force but by choice. They 
complied with restructuring, not so much for the obligations to the rules but rather 
for the necessity of changes. This indicated that in some cultural and institutional 
contexts, regulative influences might not have the same manipUlative power as 
cognitive and nonnative ones and vice versa. 
9.3.2 Implications for the deinstitutionalisation model 
The findings nevertheless offer some new insights, which are internalised in the 
revised version of theoretical model of deinstitutionalisation. In previous models 
(Oliver, 1992 for instance), it was understood that the deinstitutionalisation process 
was influenced by internal and external factors, which acted as entropies and 
dissipations to institutional transfonnation and in doing so directly acknowledged the 
ability of institutional resistance to slow down the process. The evidence presented in 
this thesis went a step further and suggested that resistance, in fact, might be as 
powerful as being able to stop the process in its tracks and reverse the situation to 
pre-deinstitutionalisation status. This was the case with reinstitutionalisation, as 
shown in the analysis of the pre-refonn episode (chapter 5) where decentralisation of 
the state economy could not go ahead due to opposition from a number of Party 
leaders. This situation, however, can only be found in the 'incubation period', Phase 
I in Figure 9.1 below, because once catastrophic events take place, it would be much 
267 
N 
C'I 
00 
------------ Phase 1 
Old 
institutions 
First wave of 
challenges caused 
by Institutional 
Inconsistencies 
and rigidities 
Successful resistance 
prompted 
reinstitutionalisation 
Figure 9.1 
Deinstitutionalisation process 
Unsuccessful 
resistance Second wave of 
challenges triggered 
by catastrophic 
event(s) prompting 
radical 
transformation 
Phase 2 
Institutional 
tra nsformation 
via sensemaking 
Alternative 
Institutions 
,. _ u ____ u _____ { 1 ~ s t i t u t l t " J n 8 I H t r 8 h s f ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' ; ~ ; ; k i ~ ~ u _______ - - u 1 
: ",. : 
I 
I 
I L ___ _ 
, 
~ ~
- ~ ~
~ ~
<: 
"0-
8 
-.:; 
Cl 
E 
-.:; 
-e;, 
'" ..... 
Institutions ~ r r Organisations l 
I " ' ~ ! : I I " " ,",VJ 'OlII"J\,U JI \,lI n , .. t;\oI.IL 
~ ~
'" 
organisational sensemaking I ::> Q) ~ ~ ... ';:' 
... 
~ ~ Cl 
'" 
a 
<: ~ ~ f 15ensegiving "0-
'" Institutional agents 1 Stakeholders 1 <: E 1>-~ ~ E 
'" Sensemaldng '5 
'" E 0 feedback '" ~ ~ '5 ~ ~ 1 -.:; '" s 
i i 
Internal influences External influences 
power relationS, changes in SOCicI expectationS, 
leadership, c u l t u r r ~ ~ political, l e g g ~ ~
commlJllicatiOfl, etc. economic environment 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~
harder for resistance forces to overcome the deinstitutionalisation tendency. From 
here, two possible scenarios arise. Either this is the end of the entire process, in 
which case deinstitutionalisation initiatives fail and appropriate changes are made to 
amend problems, otherwise the deinstitutionalisation incentive persists (due to 
continued tensions) and push for another round of challenges. This is when the 
process enters Phase 2, which lasts until new institutions are formed. Hence, by 
taking into account relative strengths of institutional resistance (and indirectly 
sensemaking), the new model is able to explain why some deinstitutionalisation 
succeeds while others fail even when changes are desperately needed. 
One final implication derived from the findings was the possibility of multiple paces 
and outcomes within a single deinstitutionalisation process. If the previous model 
was only concerned with learning how certain organisational sensemaking led to one 
combination of outcome and pace of deinstitutionalisation, the findings suggested 
that it was possible to envision the deinstitutionalisation process as a collection of 
episodes, each characterised by individual outcomes and paces before the final 
outcome is reached. Here, the deinstitutionalisation process is believed to possibly 
experience more than one scenario of organisational response and move with 
different speeds over time, depending on sensemaking at different points in time. 
Moreover, the findings revealed that the final outcome was the product of the 
interplay between institutions and sensemaking throughout the whole process, not 
just in the final episode. This point could be understood by considering the sequential 
nature of these episodes and by examining cause - consequence linkage therein. The 
entire series of events ensues as follows. Deinstitutionalisation started with 
institutional inconsistencies activating conscious sensemaking, which in tum 
determines features of institutional process in that particular episode. Given that 
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transformation is not yet complete, this unfinished state means that existing 
imperfections subsequently become antecedents of the next episode of makeover and 
trigger sensemaking once again. The process continues until new institutions settle 
and mature. Figure 9.2 below illustrates the proposition. 
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Episod€.A: Deinstitutionalisation initiated 
• Allteadmts: misallocation of resources 
• Swltdling evmts: severe resource shortage 
• ReadioD strategies: fence-breaking Episode B: Deinstitutionalisation continues 
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Figure 9.2: 
Sequence of deinstitutionalisation episodes 
• Switching events: growing economy 
demanded more changes 
• ReadieD strategies: further economic 
reform 
• CODseq1lalas: extensive organisational 
restructuring 
9.4 Managerial implications 
This study was carried out in an organisational context therefore naturally it had 
relevant managerial implications. Knowledge gathered here should offer useful 
insights for businesses, especially managers. This section focuses on how the views 
of institutions and management of changes are altered by the findings. 
This research was designed with the intention to give companies better understanding 
of the deinstitutionalisation phenomenon and its implications. The conceptualisation 
of deinstitutionalisation in this study indicates that deinstitutionalisation is likely to 
be lengthier in process, more complicated in nature and more life-changing in 
consequences compared to institutional changes since the source of the problems lie 
in the most treasured of organisational values. The uprooting of such well-embraced 
assumptions and deeply embedded behaviours is inclined to meet with forceful 
resistance or even hostile dispute, sometimes too strong for deinstitutionalisation to 
continue. Organisations which wish to successfully manoeuvre deinstitutionalisation 
need to appreciate the extent of this psychological shock and allow sufficient time for 
recovery. Initial resistance should be interpreted in a different light. Instead of a 
complete failure, a brief period of 'denial' setback should be viewed as a temporary 
status, an inevitable part of the whole deinstitutionalisation process, a mere obstacle 
to overcome in order to move forward. Managers will find that intensive, 
information-rich propaganda might not be the most effective strategy at this stage. 
Rather, a 'softer' approach would be more appropriate. This means aiding employees 
to accept reality or simply giving them time to take everything in. 
Moreover, the two models describe what to expect throughout the course of 
institutional transformation as they enlighten the nature of interactions between 
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institutions and organisations, between managers and stakeholders and moderating 
factors surrounding the whole environment. With the understanding of what 
constraints existing institutions have on sensemaking and how organisational 
relationships affect organisational sensemaking, managers who can capitalise on this 
knowledge should be able to anticipate stakeholders' responses hence be able to 
execute more suitable strategies. It can be as simple as knowing how to present 
changes in the most appealing way or more complex coping plans that make the most 
of alliance among members. The finding that emotional alliance makes people more 
susceptible to sensemaking of others is particularly helpful as managers can 
concentrate on persuading a small number of individuals within these groups, 
knowing that they are in fact targeting a wider audience. Communication is more 
effective and less time-consuming this way. 
Last but by no means least, as organisational sensemaking passes through various 
stages with various resistance factors, managers gain better control of the process by 
adapting their strategies to the most prominent resistance factors in each individual 
stage. For instance, while during the 'denial' episode the best option is to eradicate 
fear of instability by neutralising the distressing situations as much as possible, when 
it comes to social construction of meaning, attention should be paid to resolving 
potential hostility towards institutional agents and facilitating mutual communication 
simultaneously to attain consensus in sensemaking. In order to influence the final 
outcome, managers should tailor strategies to suit individual groups' needs as 
homogeneity of coping responses is prone to failure. In a nutshell, management of 
changes yields better results if managers are more attentive towards emotional and 
cultural aspects of organisations. In the context of deinstitutionalisation where a 
whole new world is established, it does not mean that managers should attempt to 
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change organisational culture completely. There might be a new way of thinking and 
doing things but individuals must be able to identify with them. It is difficult to 
imagine collective-oriented communities like the Vietnamese adopting the 
individualism-embraced traditions omnipresent in the West. It is nevertheless 
universally true that it is best to ally with organisational culture. After all, knowing 
yourself is half the battle. 
9.S Directions for further research 
Given several outstanding questions in this thesis and existing limitations of 
institutional work, the following are among a few directions that further research can 
undertake: 
• To improve on conceptualisation of institutions and strategy to encompass 
differences of various cultural, social, economic and political environments 
• To examine the interaction between and relative strengths of mechanisms, in 
various institutional settings 
• To improve on conceptualisation, framework and indicators (crisis-driven and 
other kinds) of deinstitutionalisation, in various institutional settings 
• To test the comparability between institutional and sensemaking processes in 
other deinstitutional phenomena as well as other institutional change 
dynamics 
• To test the connection between firm characteristics and the institutional 
change/deinstitutionalisation process to clarify various firm strategic 
responses in different contexts 
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• To test the interplay between institutions and sensemaking in terms of its 
effects on the pace of different episodes of deinstitutionalisation in different 
contexts 
For this particular case study ofEVN, there is also scope for further research. Having 
said that the model of institutional linkages discussed in chapter 5 is only primitive, it 
is well-understood that as long as the Vietnamese economy and society continue to 
develop, even after institutions are well-established and fairly stable, further 
modifications to the model are needed to encompass these transformations. In the 
long term, these distinctive Vietnamese management institutions might come to more 
closely resemble those of the West but given such strong cultural embeddedness and 
the determination of the Vietnamese government to preserve national identity, it is 
suspected that Vietnamese institutions will always be centred on people. This 
emphasis on social capital in many aspects (entrepreneurism, strategy, institutions, 
etc) and the interaction among economic, cultural, social and political forces might 
be the most striking features that set Vietnamese institutions apart from others. 
Vietnam is worthy of further attention in its own right. 
9.6 Contributions of thesis 
The main contributions of this research can be summarised in the following five 
points: 
1. The first and most important contribution of this study is the conceptual and 
theoretical framework of the deinstitutionalisation process. Not only has it 
addressed one of the most under-developed areas of institutional theory -
deinstitutionalisation. It does so by elaborating the entire discourse starting 
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from the moment mature, taken-for-granted old institutions begin to show 
signs of instability, which unfortunately are overlooked at organisations' 
perils, to the ground-breaking events that finally set all the wheels in motions, 
through all the emotional, political, cognitive and social processes of 
institutional transformation, right to the final destination - the maturation of 
alternative institutions. Concisely, the model reveals the fuzzy details in 
between, not just the two blocks at the beginning and end. Moreover, the 
conceptualisation of deinstitutionalisation presented here uncovers the 
difference between institutional change and deinstitutionalisation i.e. the 
missed opportunity to realise much-needed adjustments, which lays the 
foundation for the catastrophe-triggered aftermaths that supposedly shake 
organisations to their core. Indeed, it has been proved that 
deinstitutionalisation is more life-altering which requires more complicated 
sensemaking efforts and strategic responses. 
2. Theoretically, the thesis has made a significant step in conciliating 
perspectives of institutional theory and sensemaking in a single framework. 
In doing so, it capitalised on the strengths of both literatures. By using 
variation in organisational sensemaking to explain different outcomes of 
deinstitutionalisation, it has offered clarification of the role of sensemaking 
during institutional processes. Not only are they supposed to playa key role 
in shaping the features of new institutions, they are just as capable in 
influencing the speed of how things occur. The model has great explanatory 
and predictability power because until now, research has been unable to link 
organisational versatility to the outcomes of multifaceted 
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deinstitutionalisation. Evidently, the model acknowledges the possibility of 
failure if resistance is stronger than deinstitutionalisation initiatives, in 
contrast to general assumption that once it starts deinstitutionalisation will 
definitely reach its destination. Apparently, this is conditional hence not 
predestined. In using the sensemaking perspective to understand 
deinstitutionalisation, the thesis also implicitly provides an alternative way to 
look at the interplay between institutions and sensemaking, especially its 
consequences. With the 'temporal bracketing' approach which examines 
characteristics of this interaction in a sequence of episodes, it shows the 
nature of intrinsic heterogeneity of the deinstitutionalisation process. 
3. Empirically, the study has established its value as a test of institutional 
change effects and outcomes in an unconventional context - an emerging 
economy of Vietnam. The complicated nature of institutional links brings rich 
and fruitful knowledge of institutional effects. Unlike mature Western 
institutional settings which are the usual focus of mainstream research, this 
study investigates the significance of institutional impacts on organisations 
whilst institutions themselves are undergoing transformations. The 
investigated company is a large state-owned enterprise undergoing partial 
privatisation. Detailed analysis has been carried out on deeply embedded 
cultural and social environments of the firm in question. 
4. Consistently presented throughout the thesis is the acknowledgement paid to 
organisational characteristics emphasising the role of agency, emotional and 
power relations as well as social negotiation processes in shaping the new 
environment and change process. Attention is also drawn to managerial 
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characteristics such as leadership and communication style. By taking into 
consideration these idiosyncrasies, the study is able to theorise different 
organisational sensemaking hence explanations for different 
deinstitutionalisation outcomes. 
5. On more general grounds, this research provided an alternative way to look at 
group sensemaking in a relatively new setting - catastrophic but not life-
threatening (as opposed to more extreme crisis sensemaking of disasters such 
as fires). 
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9.7 Concluding remarks 
'Ruin is the road to transformation. ' - Elizabeth Gilbert 
In a world surrounded by rapidly changing environments and filled with crises and 
uncertainties, we must learn to deal with the unexpected, the chaotic, the ruins. And 
we must learn fast because events like the financial crisis, eurozone debt problems or 
the American downgraded credit rating are turning out to surprise us, no matter how 
unlikely and impossible they sounded in the past. The best defence against them is to 
develop an appreciation for their manifesting mechanisms, to expect the unexpected 
and to have crisis management programmes at the ready. New knowledge and 
insights of how numerous conditions interweave to create instabilities and of the 
price of underestimating these seemingly low risks by failing to place them in a 
broader context hence providing us with valuable lessons. The understanding of how 
members think, feel and communicate in the aftennath of events means more than 
ever to the survival of disaster-struck organisations, fields or international 
collaborations. If the models and findings in this thesis are viewed as they are 
intended, crises shall be seen in a different light i.e. not all gloomy and hopeless. Just 
like phoenixes reborn from the ashes, crises are part of the bigger picture and 
sometimes are necessary. Without ruins, new and better things cannot come along. 
Ruins should be seen as blessings in disguise for they grant us the opportunities to 
get rid of the broken parts, to get to the bottom of things, which no one had the 
incentive or the support to do so earlier. The pain of having the ideals, the values we 
held dear taken away from us is only temporary; how we deal with it afterwards is 
what changes our lives forever. It is all that matters. 
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APPENDIX A 
List of Participants 
Preliminary Investigation Phase (March, 2007) 
Category Position/Department Date of (formal) 
interview 
Managers Vice President of Business (Northern Region) March,2007 
HeadslDeputies International Cooperation Department March,2007 
HeadslDeputies Emulation and Propaganda Department March,2007 
Employees International Cooperation Department March,2007 
Employees International Cooperation Department March,2007 
Main Investigation Phase (March, 2009 - March, 2010) 
Category Position/Department Date of (formal) 
interview 
Managers Vice President of Business (Northern region) March,2009 
March,20l0 
Managers Director of National Load Dispatching Centre March,2009 
March,20l0 
Managers Chief Officer of Transmission Company (Northern March,20l0 
Region) 
HeadslDeputies International Cooperation Departments March,2009 
March,2010 
HeadslDeputies International Cooperation Department March,20l0 
HeadslDeputies International Cooperation Department March,2010 
HeadslDeputies Emulation and Propaganda Department March,20l0 
HeadslDeputies Emulation and Propaganda Department March,2010 
HeadslDeputies Corporate Planning Department March,2010 
HeadslDeputies Corporate Planning Department March,2010 
HeadslDeputies Finance and Accounting Department March,2010 
HeadslDeputies Finance and Accounting Department March,2010 
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HeadslDeputies Organisation Personnel and Training Department March,2010 
HeadslDeputies Technical Department March,2010 
HeadslDeputies Business Department March,2010 
HeadslDeputies Business Department March,2010 
HeadslDeputies Project Management Board March,2010 
HeadslDeputies Project Management Board March,2010 
Employees International Cooperation Department March,2009 
March,2010 
Employees International Cooperation Department March,2009 
March,2010 
Employees International Cooperation Department March,2009 
March,2010 
Employees International Cooperation Department March,2010 
Employees Material and Import-Export Department March,2010 
Employees Material and Import-Export Department March,2010 
Employees Material and Import-Export Department March,2010 
Employees Emulation and Propaganda Department March,2010 
Employees Emulation and Propaganda Department March,2010 
Employees Emulation and Propaganda Department March,2010 
Employees Emulation and Propaganda Department March,2010 
E m p J o ~ ~ Corporate Planning Department March,2010 
Employees Corporate Planning Department March,2010 
Employees Corporate Planning Department March,2010 
Employees Corporate Planning Department March,2010 
Employees Finance and Accounting Department March, 2010 
Employees Finance and Accounting Department March,2010 
Employees Business Department March,2010 
Employees Business Department March,2010 
Employees Business Department March,2010 
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APPENDIXB 
Interview Questions 
Part 1: Details of the participant 
Name: ............................................................................................... . 
Position: ........................................................................................... . 
Department: ..................................................................................... . 
Length of employment (months/years): .......................................... . 
Part 2: Before 1975 
1. What is your opinion of central planning system (right after the war)? 
.............................................................................................................................. 
2. What were the main features of your work at that time? 
.............................................................................................................................. 
3. How do you describe your work/work environment (e.g. ethics, productivity, 
satisfaction) back then? 
............................................................................................................................. 
4. How do you describe the relationship among workerslbetween workers and 
superiors? 
............................................................................................................................. 
5. How do you describe your style of working? Of your unit? 
............................................................................................................................. 
6. How did you feel about your work? 
............................................................................................................................. 
7. What was your work assessed? 
............................................................................................................................. 
Part 3: 1975 - 1985 
8. In terms of economic crisis in the late 1 970s and early 1980s, what do you 
think the reasons were? 
............................................................................................................................. 
9. How did it affect your unit/you work/your view of the authority? 
............................................................................................................................. 
10. How did you feel/react to this difficult time? 
............................................................................................................................. 
11. Did your colleagues/superiors feel/react the same way as you did? And how 
did it affect you? 
............................................................................................................................. 
12. What is your opinion of 251CP? 
............................................................................................................................. 
13. How did it affect you and your unit? 
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Part 4: 1986 - present 
14. What do you think and feel about economic refonn? 
............................................................................................................................. 
15. After the refonn, what changes occurred at the company/your area of work? 
16. How did it affect the company's objectives/orientation? 
............................................................................................................................ 
17. How did these changes affect: 
17 .1 Your dutieslemotions/ethicslsatisfaction? 
............................................................................................................. , ....... . 
17.2 Relationship among employees? 
...................................................................................................................... 
17.3 Relationship between managers and employees? 
...................................................................................................................... 
17.4 Overall productivity? 
...................................................................................................................... 
18. How do you compare leadership before and after reform? 
............................................................................................................................ 
19. What are the criteria for perfonnance appraisal? 
............................................................................................................................ 
20. Do these changes meet your expectation? 
20.1 If no, could you explain why? 
............................................................................................................................ 
21. What more do you think need to be done? 
............................................................................................................................ 
22. How do you describe current values/norms/practices? 
............................................................................................................................ 
23. What sources do you use to gather information about the company (e.g. 
colleagues, leaders, media and government websites)? 
............................................................................................................................ 
23.l Among those, which one(s) do you consider as the most credible? 
...................................................................................................................... 
24. How do your leaders disseminate information? 
............................................................................................................................ 
25. Do you (employees) get involved in decision making process? 
26. Do you receive guidance/support from managers/colleagues during change 
process? If yes, please specify methods used . 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1 ••••••••••••••••••• 
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APPENDIXC 
Structure of Power Sector l4 
I eo,remment J 
The Ministry of 
Industry 
Electricity Regulatory 
Authority 
r-----1-----,1. Contnct I EVN J 
• o. .. ner of capital and usets 
• Decides development master plans and 
retail prices of electricity 
• Issues policiu, decisions, resolution. 
• Manages and regulates electridt activit 
and utility 
• InstnJcts the implementation ofruolutions 
issued by the Government 
• Issues dedicated regulations and rules 
• Prepares and appraiJe power development 
masterplans 
• Grants electricity activity license 
• Assists the Minister of Indmtry to regu12t 
activities in the competitive pow r market 
• Advises the l\{"misler oflndustry on tariff 
framework for power genera lion, bulk power 
supply. and fees for transmission and 
distribution and surcha.rges for using 
ancillary servicu in the competitive power 
market 
1 
BOT, IPP, Jolnt-Slock involnd in 
electricity aenention and dlstribulion 
14 Note: Electricity utilities outside EVN including: 
1. BOT Electricity Generation Company, domestic and InternatlonallPP . 
2. Electricity Generation Joint-Stock Companies: I) Joint-Stock companl s fund d by t. I • 
owned enterprises; ii) Joint-Stock companies partly fund d by t t -own d rlt rprl 
Joint-Stock companies established through equltlsation of EVN' I ctrl cl ty pi nt , but VN' 
stock is less than 50 percent. 
3. Electricity Distribution Joint-Stock companies: I) Companies In which EVN ' to k I mor 
than SO percent; II) Companies In which EVN's stock Is less than SO p rc nt. 
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APPENDIXE 
Vietnam: A brief history 
The first large Vietnamese cultural community, called Dong Son, was fonned around 
the first half of the first millennium (Lich Su Viet Nam, 1971). Under the first and 
second Chinese domination (B.C. 110 - A.D. 220), urging for centralised 
administration and social order, Confucianism replaced Buddhism as the nation's 
spiritual and social psychology (Vuong and Tran, 2009). Under Le dynasty, 
Confucian influential teachings became well-embedded in Vietnamese politics and 
social life (Reading, 1990). As widespread as it was, Vietnamese version of 
Confucianism was selective and simplified compared to the original. It appears that 
Vietnamese Confucianism was most prominent in education system, political 
structure and morality rather than its entire system (McHale, 2004). 
The post-Chinese domination period (A.D. 938) was the second peak of the 
Vietnamese culture: the Dai Viet (Great Vietnam) period. This was the era of 
independent feudalism; Vietnamese traditions received extensive restoration, mostly 
under influence of the more dominant Buddhism and Taoism at that time, alongside 
the slowly-fading Confucianism (Slote and De Vos, 1998). At the beginning of 19th 
century, after the chaotic Le-Mac and Trinh-Nguyen period (Vuong and Tran, 2009), 
the Nguyen dynasty tried hard to restore Confucian status. The attempt, however, 
failed because by that time, the potential and strategic position of Indochina countries 
had attracted French interest. Viewing Vietnam as the perfect gateway to the region, 
French immediately began their conquest. After establishing its rule in 1880, French 
started exploiting the country's rich resources and quickly implemented various 
measures (civilising mission), hoping to eliminate local economy and culture. 
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Apparently, it was not only political leadership they wanted to replace but also 
Vietnamese literature, thought and culture (Anderson, 2002). As colonisation lasted, 
old Confucian social orders were badly undermined; resources were exploited to the 
extreme while people were oppressed like slaves. Eventually, the French imperialism 
usurped administration, political, economic systems as well as education. This was 
no doubt the time of Western domination but how far did the French come in wiping 
out Vietnamese traditions and identity? By the looks of it, French succeeded in 
turning the country into a part of its empire. But one thing French failed to foresee or 
underestimated at their peril, was the fact that repression and exploitation gave the 
exact opposite effect to its intent. Instead of crushing national identity and traditional 
values, they actually stirred up burning desire for a united nation and created a 
generation with revolutionary attitudes (Anderson, 2005). Indeed, periods under 
French colonisation (1860 - 1945) and then American invasion (1945-1975) were 
characterised as mixture of patriotic and colonialist cultures (Wiest, 2002), which 
had long been one of the most prominent features of Vietnamese history as the 
country continuously struggled against foreign invaders. Unfortunately, even though 
nationalism was nurtured which should be credited for ultimate victory, repeated 
wars dismantled social traditions and economic structures insofar that they could 
hardly reach their peak. After nearly a century of colonisation, Vietnam was left with 
nothing but a stagnant economy that could barely feed the nation (Melling and 
Roper, 1991). As communist and socialist principles were extended to economic 
matters, Vietnamese post-war economy, like other socialist states, was heavily 
burdened with severe misallocation of resources, neglect of worker motivation and 
biased development strategy driven by heavy industrial-orientation. The state and at 
its centre, the Vietnamese Communist Party, controlled all economic activities and 
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distributions of goods. State owned cooperatives accounted for 90% of national 
economy since private businesses were banned. Market mechanism existed only in 
household economy where small household products were allowed to be produced 
and sold. Foreign trades were seriously restricted and monopolised by state-owned 
businesses (Dodsworth, 1999; Griffin, 1998). 
By 1986, domestic situations were appalling with widespread shortage in almost 
everything. Vietnamese Communist Party and the state had no other choice but to 
admit socialist system, despite its success during wars, could no longer hold up the 
economy. Egalitarianism, the main principle of production and distribution systems 
could not guarantee even minimum level of goods for existence. Desperately fighting 
for survival but reluctant to let go of socialism completely, the state ran out of 
options and finally decided to abandon central planning and set economic 
reconstruction in motion. Key policy elements of the new concept "socialist market" 
consisted of decentralisation of state economic management and decision making; 
replacement of socialist administrative measures and controls by market alternatives; 
adoption of open trade and external relations; acceptance of private sector and state 
sector reform (Litvack and Rondinelli (1999); Kerkvliet et al (2003). 
At present, Vietnam has changed into a socialist market economy although public 
sector hold on to the dominant role. Freedom to do business encouraged 
entrepreneurship, an illegal and boycotted concept under socialist regime. Over the 
years, market supporting institutions have been created and enhanced including the 
development of legal framework, the establishment of stock market, property rights, 
customer rights, public sector law, enterprise law and investment law permitting 
foreign companies to enter joint ventures (McCargo 2004; Tran-Nam and Pham 
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2003; Alpert 2005). Positive results came in quickly as underutilised resources and 
misallocated labour took to industrialisation and commercialisation with amazing 
pace and aptitude. In a few short years, Doi Moi (economic reconstruction) achieved 
remarkable results: annual growths have been maintained at approximately 10% ever 
since, akin to those of Asian tigers; standard of living has been improved and 
thousands of jobs created (IMF Country Report and World Bank Report, 2009). 
Vietnam honoured further its commitment to a "market economy with socialist twist" 
by joining global economic institutions such as ASEAN and WTO in 1995 and 2006. 
After more than two decades, 1986 reform has without a doubt transformed the 
country, evidenced in micro institutions like ways of thinking as well as 
macroeconomic structure. Institutional logics of this new era began to merge with 
elements of old socialism to fashion new national ideology (Murray, 1997). Despite 
their intrinsic differences, capitalist values such as individualism and task orientation 
might be more flexible than previously thought and might be able to coexist 
alongside traditional Vietnamese values like collective orientation, respect of 
hierarchy and relationship embeddedness. 
In spite of successes compared to experiences of Eastern European countries so far, 
there remain complicated issues and difficulties if sustainable growths are to be 
maintained. First of all, although Vietnam has made good progress with market and 
capitalism, as the economy develops, commitment to "socialist market" will raise 
more questions than answers. For key industries like electricity, the government 
might find it increasingly hard to attain the right balance between how far they 
willingly free the market and how much control over state owned enterprises they 
ably let go. As long as state owned enterprises remain the leading role and the 
government stays reluctant to abolish the old system in one swift move, this matter is 
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not easily resolved. Besides, there are uncertainty regarding where this "socialist 
market" is heading in the long tenn and ambiguity caused by government's favour of 
"trial and error" method to minimise aftershock impacts. Restructuring measures 
have been implemented step-by-step allowing time for necessary adjustments. This 
approach, however, might create anxiety and inconsistency that hinder future 
innovation. In referring to economic transition, underdeveloped market institutions 
and incomplete legal frameworks have been held responsible for misinterpretation 
and gaps in implementation process as well as prolonging development of 
competitive markets. This is expected to be a problem for both foreign and domestic 
enterprises yet state owned enterprises might find it easier to handle given 
government preferential treatments they receive. All things considered, unless 
government is willing to take a more proactive approach to institutional 
strengthening by making capitals more accessible to private businesses and pushing 
harder for healthy competition, long tenn economic development might suffer. 
Unfortunately, there is also the challenging issue of inertias embedded in planned 
economy such as bureaucratic management, red-tape, corruption and lack of 
systematic organisational practices. Sluggish state owned enterprise reform and 
complicated, time-consuming administrative controls only turns investment away 
from where it matters the most as foreign companies struggle to gain license or 
negotiate deals while state owned businesses take advantage of their role and 
connections (Ng et ai, 1996). Crucially, transforming key state firms into competitive 
corporations according to international standard plays pivotal role in reform yet the 
government shows no sign of willing to let private sector take the lead anytime soon. 
The government might encourage private participants but state enterprises have 
always been their priority. These confusing issues of how state owned enterprises fit 
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into market economy and how restructuring should be done are among the most 
debated matters, but at the moment no satisfying answers have been given yet. It 
seems that uncertainty regarding this matter will remain in the picture for some time. 
In sum, Vietnamese economic and social transformations seem to be well on its way. 
After various wars and cultural infiltration, Vietnamese traditions have taken a new 
identity, one that is resilient enough to retain their most intrinsic values while 
selectively adapt new ideas. Family is still the nuclear of society just like team-
working as the central value in organisations. Vietnamese families, which contain 
more than one generation under one roof, is common; paternalism, respect of social 
order and relationship based working style remain the most important traditional 
traits in Vietnamese organisations. Indeed, traditions are not lost but improved; 
Vietnamese values and beliefs get "mixed not assimilated". It is this ability to restore 
national ideology and preserve traditions while being flexible is what makes Vietnam 
an interesting case. 
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